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In psychology, invoking “strategies” to explain funny data is the last refuge of the clueless.
Steven Pinker
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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the strategies consumers use when making purchase decisions. It is
organized in two main parts, one centering on descriptive and the other on applied decision making
research.
In the first part, a new process tracing tool called InterActive Process Tracing (IAPT) is pre-
sented, which I developed to investigate the nature of consumers’ decision strategies. This tool is
a combination of several process tracing techniques, namely Active Information Search, Mouselab,
and retrospective verbal protocol. To validate IAPT, two experiments on mobile phone purchase de-
cisions were conducted where participants first repeatedly chose a mobile phone and then were asked
to formalize their decision strategy so that it could be used to make choices for them. The choices
made by the identified strategies correctly predicted the observed choices in 73% (Experiment 1)
and 67% (Experiment 2) of the cases. Moreover, in Experiment 2, Mouselab and eye tracking were
directly compared with respect to their impact on information search and strategy description. Only
minor differences were found between these two methods. I conclude that IAPT is a useful research
tool to identify choice strategies, and that using eye tracking technology did not increase its validity
beyond that gained with Mouselab.
In the second part, a prototype of a decision aid is introduced that was developed building in
particular on the knowledge about consumers’ decision strategies gained in Part I. This decision aid,
which is called the InterActive Choice Aid (IACA), systematically assists consumers in their purchase
decisions. To evaluate the prototype regarding its perceived utility, an experiment was conducted
where IACA was compared to two other prototypes that were based on real-world consumer decision
aids. All three prototypes differed in the number and type of tools they provided to facilitate the
process of choosing, ranging from low (Amazon) to medium (Sunrise/dpreview) to high functionality
(IACA). Overall, participants slightly preferred the prototype of medium functionality and this
prototype was also rated best on the dimensions of understandability and ease of use. IACA was
rated best regarding the two dimensions of ease of elimination and ease of comparison of alternatives.
Moreover, participants choices were more in line with the normatively oriented weighted additive
strategy when they used IACA than when they used the medium functionality prototype. The low
functionality prototype was the least preferred overall. It is concluded that consumers can and will
benefit from highly functional decision aids like IACA, but only when these systems are easy to
understand and to use.
Keywords: Decision strategies, process tracing, Mouselab, eye tracking, preferential choice, con-
sumer decision making, decision aids, online marketing
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Chapter 1
General introduction
Decisions are made throughout our entire lives and in virtually every moment. The most
frequent among them are partly or entirely automated and do not involve much cognitive
effort, for example when changing gears while driving a car or whether or not to carry an
umbrella when leaving the house. More complex are decisions where the consequences affect
the future of a single person or a group of persons in a more serious way (e.g., career decisions,
managerial decisions). These decisions often involve some time and effort to be solved and
can result in great personal or monetary costs if they do not lead to the desired outcome. In
the present dissertation, I study consumer purchase decisions, which fall somewhere between
these two extremes. In most cases, they are the result of conscious deliberation, and bad
decisions can entail negative—albeit not dramatic—consequences. In this first chapter, I give
a brief introduction into the field of decision making to provide the theoretical basis for the
research presented here, followed by an overview of my work and the contributions made to
the literature on decision making.
A decision is a means of realizing a goal, which can often be achieved in several ways.
For instance, a person with the goal of communicating on the road may face the decision of
buying either a basic mobile phone or a smart phone that also allows for sending e-mails.
Independent of the goal, the decision maker has to choose between at least two alternatives.
In the simplest form, the decision is between doing something or doing nothing. The non-
action is usually referred to as remaining at the status quo or deferring choice (e.g., Iyengar
& Lepper, 2000; White & Hoffrage, 2009; White, Reisen, & Hoffrage, 2009). Alternatives
must be mutually exclusive and can be objects like different restaurant for dinner, actions like
reading or going to the cinema, or long-term strategies like dieting or saving money.
The different characteristics that describe an alternative are called attributes. For instance,
if one makes a choice between two different mobile phones, a basic phone and a smart phone,
the attributes are the features of each of the phones. Whereas the basic phone is cheap, small
and well suited for basic communication (i.e., calling and text messaging), the smart phone
offers many additional functions such as mobile internet and e-mail. Which of the attributes
1
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is of greater importance to the decision maker depends on his or her subjective preferences.
Consequently, different people may make different decisions when faced with the same choice.
Decisions can be made by an individual or by a group of persons and are either single
decisions or scenarios. In a single decision, the decision maker has to decide only once. This
can be a student’s decision whether or not to enroll in a certain class. A scenario, in contrast,
is a series of decisions in which the outcome of a first decision affects further decisions. These
can be decisions of an emergency physician who has to decide whether to operate immediately
or to make some laboratory tests beforehand. If she decides to make the tests, the obtained
results will act as a new basis for the second decision and so on. A similar distinction exists
between whether a decision is made only once or repeatedly. The decision of whether to
become a physician is usually taken only once in a life-time. In contrast, the choice of a
mobile phone is made several times during one’s life, at least for many people.
When the person who makes the decision knows all the possible alternatives right from
the beginning, we speak of a given set of alternatives or options. In the case of an open set of
options, on the other hand, the decision maker first has to find out what the alternatives are.
For instance, if you do not want to spend your evening at home, you will have to make up
your mind what your options for that night are. Experiments in decision making have been
concerned primarily with single decisions with a given set of options (e.g., gambles).
Moreover, decisions are characterized by the number of attributes the alternatives have.
Onedimensional decisions are decisions in situations where each alternative has only one
attribute. Multidimensional or multiattribute decisions, in contrast, involve alternatives that
are described on two or more attributes. Typical for the latter is a conflict that arises when
one alternative is better on attribute A and the other is better on attribute B. This requires
making tradeoffs between the attributes, which is cognitively more demanding and often
experienced as painful (e.g., Weber, Baron, & Loomes, 2001).
As mentioned above, decisions can differ considerably with regard to the cognitive costs.
Routine decisions have the lowest cognitive costs, which are decisions where the decision maker
simply matches the current decision onto decisions made in the past and, if a similar decision
is found, chooses as before. Reflected decisions, in contrast, involve high cognitive costs. Here,
the decision maker first has to identify possible alternatives, search for information on these
alternatives and then integrate this information to finally make a decision. It is this latter
type of decision that is of special interest for the field of decision making in general and for
the present work in particular.
A final but important aspect is the distinction between judgement and choice. A choice
is a selection of an alternative out of a set of two or more alternatives, whereas a judgement
demands an allocation of values to each alternative, for example on a point scale or by
assigning a price one would be willing to pay (Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 1998; Huber,
1982). In this dissertation, the focus is on decisions as choices. I therefore now describe some
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theories of choice.
1.1 Theories of choice
The study of people’s decision behavior can be divided into three broad lines of theories,
normative, descriptive and prescriptive, which are usually summed up under the term Be-
havioral Decision Theory (BDT). The normative theory of decision making is “the theory of
how we should choose among possible actions under ideal conditions” (Baron, 2000, p. 223).
It is based on the assumption that the decision maker is rational and follows the principle
of maximization (i.e., achieving the best possible outcome). However, people often do not
act in the way prescribed by normative theory. In fact, in many cases only partly ratio-
nal reasoning is observed. This is due to the fact that the cognitive capacity of the decision
maker is not sufficient for the complex calculations required by normative theory, or—in some
situations—it is simply not used (Jungermann et al., 1998). The first author who took this
fact into consideration was Herbert Simon (1955; 1956) with his concept of bounded ratio-
nality. He argues that models of human judgment and decision making should be built on
what we actually know about the mind’s capacities rather than on fictitious competencies
(Simon, 1987). Specifically, “[b]ecause of limits on their computing speeds and power, in-
telligent systems [human beings, computers] must use approximate methods to handle most
tasks. Their rationality is bounded.” (Simon, 1990, p. 6). Moreover, the optimal strategy
is often unknown or unknowable and therefore the normative model fails in such real-world
situations. He introduced the concept of bounded rationality and proposed to replace maxi-
mizing (i.e., choosing the option with the highest utility) with satisficing (i.e., choosing the
first option that is good enough). Originating from this major objection, modern decision
theory turned away from the normative model toward a more realistic description of human
decision behavior. This line of research, descriptive decision theory, is the study of how people
who are not trained in normative theory make decisions in real-life situations, thereby taking
into account the natural limitations of the human mind. In particular, the work of the two
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky documented people’s violation of the rules
of normative theory. They showed that people often rely on simple heuristics rather than on
complex calculations when making decisions (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). Many authors contributed to this line of research, which conceptualizes
the human being as an information processing system that has to cope with many different
environments (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Hogarth & Karelaia,
2007; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Both the normative and the descriptive theory are
of importance for each other. On the one hand, normative research provides theories and
models of optimal decision behavior that can be used for the development of decision aids.
Observing people’s actual decision behavior, on the other hand, gives insights about people’s
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deviations from normative theory and can ultimately help to fit the decision aids to the needs
and habits of the decision makers.
The third class of decision theories, prescriptive decision theory or decision analysis, orig-
inated from normative and descriptive theory and provides guidelines for how a real person
should act (Ku¨hberger, 1994). Decision analysis provides techniques for structuring the deci-
sion problem to achieve the best possible outcome and is meant to help people who are faced
with difficult decisions like managers and physicians (for a detailed overview see Eisenfu¨hr
& Weber, 1994). To illustrate, have a look at a famous example: Charles Darwin facing the
question of whether or not to marry (Darwin, 1958). To structure the problem, he identified
the pros and cons for each of the two alternatives and wrote them on a piece of paper with
the heading “This is the Question:”
MARRY Not MARRY
Children – (if it please God) – constant
companion, (friend in old age) who will
feel interested in one, object to be beloved
and played with – better than a dog any-
how – Home, and someone to take care
of house – Charms of music and female
chitchat. These things good for one’s
health. Forced to visit and receive rela-
tions but terrible loss of time. My God, it
is intolerable to think of spending one’s
whole life, like a neuter bee, working,
working and nothing after all. – No, no
won’t do. – Imagine living all one’s day
solitarily in smoky dirty London House. –
Only picture to yourself a nice soft wife
on a sofa with good fire, and books and
music perhaps – compare this vision with
the dingy reality of Grt Marlboro’ St.
No children, (no second life) no one to
care for one in old age — What is the use
of working without sympathy from near
and dear friends — who are near and dear
friends to the old except relatives. Free-
dom to go where one liked – Choice of So-
ciety and little of it. Conversation of clever
men at clubs. – Not forced to visit rela-
tives, and to bend in every trifle – to have
the expense and anxiety of children – per-
haps quarrelling. Loss of time – cannot
read in the evenings – fatness and idleness
– anxiety and responsibility – less money
for books etc. – if many children forced
to gain one’s bread. – (But then it is very
bad for one’s health to work too much)
Perhaps my wife won’t like London; then
the sentence is banishment and degrada-
tion with indolent idle fool –
From this, Darwin concluded that he should marry. Many years later, this method of
writing down the pros and cons of the alternatives in separate columns was adopted by Janis
and Mann (1977) who developed a decision aid called balance sheet.
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1.1.1 The normative theory of choice
The main assumption of normative models is the homo economicus. He is characterized by
three issues: (i) he is disposed of the complete information about all alternatives, (ii) he
is unboundedly sensible regarding the differences between the alternatives, and (iii) he is
rational, that is, he is able to order his preferences and actions and his choice follows the
principle of maximization. Given the above premises he maximizes in any form his personal
utility (Ku¨hberger, 1994). The most famous example of such a theory is Subjectively Expected
Utility theory (SEU) by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1947), which is described
in the following.
Subjectively expected utility theory
Most of the research in BDT is done using gambles. In such a decision the determining
variables are (i) the utilities of the consequences and (ii) the probabilities of obtaining these
consequences (Huber & Huber, 2003). Depending on whether probabilities and consequences
are objective or subjective, four types of theories can be distinguished, which are shown in
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Utility theories
Values of the Consequences
objective subjective
Probabilities objective expected value expected utility
subjective subj. expected value subj. expected utility
(adapted from Jungermann et al., 1998, p. 199)
SEU theory is fundamental for BDT.1 Here, the decision maker tries to maximize the
value for him- or herself, hence his or her subjective utility. The (subjectively) expected value
can be computed mathematically by multiplying the probability of winning by the monetary
value of payoff. Imagine an unbiased coin tossed only once. When it lands on tails, the player
is paid $2, otherwise the player gets nothing. The probability of winning is exactly .5, so the
expected value of this gamble is .5*$2 or $1. If the game were played several times, the player
would, on average, win $1 per play. The formula for calculating the expected outcome is as
1Originally from normative theory, SEU theory was also regarded as the descriptive theory of human
decision behavior. Because of its foundation in normative theory, SEU theory is described in this chapter.
Further descriptive theories are presented in Section 1.1.2 (p. 6).
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follows:
(S)EV =
∑
i
pi ∗ vi (1.1)
where EV is the expected value, i are all the different outcomes, pi is the probability of the
ith outcome and vi is the value of the ith outcome. Hence, pi ∗ vi is the expected outcome of
one trial and EV =
∑
i pi ∗ vi is the expected outcome over all trials (Baron, 2000).
Analogously, the (subjectively) expected utility is obtained by replacing values (vi) with
utilities (ui):
(S)EU =
∑
i
pi ∗ ui (1.2)
To be able to compare the mathematical predictions of expected utility theory with the
behavior of real decision makers, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) specified a set of
axioms that underlie rational decision making. The following four axioms are central:
Comparability/Weak ordering. A decision maker can compare the alternatives and
prefers either option X to option Y, or option Y to option X, or is indifferent (X ∼ Y ).
Transitivity. A rational decision maker preferring option X to option Y and option Y to
option Z should also prefer option X to option Z.
Cancellation. A choice between two alternatives should be based only on those outcomes
that differ, not on outcomes that are the same for both alternatives.
Continuity. When a decision maker prefers option X to Y and Y to Z, then there is always
a probability p such that Y ∼ [X, p;Z, 1− p].
When at least one of these principles is violated, expected utility is not necessarily maxi-
mized. Famous violations are the Allais Paradox (Allais, 1953), Ellsberg’s Paradox (Ellsberg,
1961), and reversals of preference due to changes in the method of preference elicitation (see
Seidl, 2002, for an overview). These violations show that in many situations expected utility
theory does not adequately describe how people make decisions. Thus, it seems that both
paradigm (i.e., the gamble) and subject (i.e., homo economicus) are too narrow and that the
EU model can describe human behavior only in exceptional cases (Ku¨hberger, 1994).
1.1.2 Descriptive theories of choice
SEU theory is not only a normative theory, it was also the first descriptive theory of deci-
sion making. However, with a steadily growing number of findings that clearly demonstrated
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people’s deviations from SEU principles the research focus shifted toward new theories that
could explain and predict these contradictory findings. Here, two general types of models
are used. Isomorphic models aim to describe process, input, and outcome of cognitive infor-
mation processing, whereas paramorphic models try to relate input (i.e., information about
the decision alternatives) to output (i.e., the final decision), without claiming to provide a
valid representation of the underlying process (Ramaprasad, 1987). In this dissertation, the
focus is on isomorphic models, that is, the goal is to obtain valid and accurate descriptions
of human decision strategies. Several techniques exist that allow for the construction of such
process models. These techniques, called process tracing techniques, are designed to uncover
the cognitive processes that are involved in decision making, such as the acquisition and the
integration of information about the choice alternatives. In this context, cognitive processes
are understood as the decision maker’s processing of the information upon which the decision
is based. In other words:
Cognitive process research focuses on specific influences on a person’s cognitive
information processing. Its focus is micro, on the elements of a person’s cogni-
tive information processing. These are, for example: perceiving and recognizing
stimuli, remembering and searching for information, inducing rules, recognizing
patterns, formulating concepts, and applying all of these in sensing, formulating,
and solving problems (Ramaprasad, 1987, p. 140).
Paramorphic models, in contrast, can be obtained with structural modeling techniques.
They are not of direct importance for the present dissertation and are therefore only briefly
mentioned in Chapter 2 (p 15). I now describe some descriptive approaches.
Prospect theory
The most important revision of SEU is prospect theory or its newer form cumulative prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). It accounts for almost
all of the available data concerning decisions under risk and has inspired many other similar
attempts. Prospect theory is descriptive in that it explains how and why our choices deviate
from the normative model of SEU theory. It has two main parts, one concerning probabil-
ity and the other utility. In the first phase called editing, the decision maker encodes and
transforms the given problem and creates a mental representation according to certain rules.
Then, in the evaluation phase, a subjective value is assigned to each of the edited options and
finally one of the options is selected. The basic assumption remains that choices are made
by multiplying a subjective probability by a utility. What is new here is that humans distort
probabilities and think about utilities as changes from a reference point, which is usually
the individual’s status quo. This reference point can easily be affected by other factors, such
as how a problem is presented. A famous effect that depends on the presentation of the
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problem and that can be explained by PT is the so called framing effect, which refers to the
phenomenon that already slight differences in the way the problem is described can lead to
contrary choice (e.g., Asian disease, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Prospect theory is the most widely accepted alternative to SEU theory. It provides a more
accurate description of how people actually make decisions and can also be applied rather
easily to a range of common situations. Furthermore, it is capable of explicitly predicting
many violations of SEU theory (cf. Plous, 1993). Compared to SEU, prospect theory is
better in lotteries with extreme probabilities, that is, probabilities that are close to 0 or 1,
and is suitable especially when one is interested in a good trade-off between frugality and
explanative power. However, being an “as-if” model, prospect theory remains silent about
the processes underlying decision making and still falls short in explaining some empirical
findings (e.g., intransitivities, cf. Jungermann et al., 1998). A more detailed description of
PT would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. For an overview, see Baron (2000) or
Jungermann et al. (1998).
Heuristics and other decision strategies
SEU and prospect theory represent the human mind as a machine computing probabilities
and utilities. The problem with this assumption is that the more complex a decision gets, the
less likely it is that a human decision maker is able or willing to calculate the expected values
for all possible alternatives. A new line of descriptive theory that takes the limitations of the
human mind explicitly into account is the approach of decision heuristics.
Heuristics are decision strategies that are very simple to execute and that often use only a
fraction of the available information, but which—in spite of their simplicity—often yield very
close approximations to the “optimal” answers suggested by normative theories (Gigerenzer et
al., 1999; Payne et al., 1993). However, these “rules of thumb” or “shortcuts” can also result
in systematic biases and inconsistencies (i.e., deviations from normative theory; Kahneman
et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Whereas research in the tradition of Kahneman
and Tversky focuses more on the biases that result from the use of heuristics, the research by
Gerd Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group demonstrates that heuristics can lead to very
good decisions, even when only a fraction of the available information is used (Gigerenzer et
al., 1999; Gigerenzer, 2007, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008).
A famous example for the latter approach is the take-the-best heuristic proposed by
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999). This heuristic first looks up the values on the most valid
cue, where cue validity is defined as the relative proportion of correct inferences among all
inferences in which this cue discriminated between the alternatives. If the two alternatives
differ on this cue the information search is stopped and the alternative with the higher cue
value is selected. If they do not differ, take-the-best proceeds with the second most valid cue,
and so on. Take-the-best is a lexicographic heuristic: it orders the cues or attributes according
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to their validity or importance (similar to the ordering of words in a dictionary). Originally
formulated for inferential choices (e.g., which of two cities has more inhabitants), take-the-
best has also been generalized to preferential tasks (e.g., which company to buy stocks from;
see Section 3.1.1 on page 34 for details). A heuristic for preferential choices that follows a
similar logic is the eliminations-by-aspects heuristic (Tversky, 1972). It first determines the
most important attribute and then compares the values of all alternatives on this attribute to
a cutoff value (e.g., maximum acceptable price). All alternatives that fail to reach the cutoff
on this attribute are eliminated. This is continued with the second most important attribute
and so on until only one alternative remains.
The weighted additive strategy, in contrast, is a decision strategy that demands substantial
computational processing of the information. In contrast to a heuristic, it considers the values
of each alternative on all the relevant attributes and all the relative importances or weights of
the attributes to the decision maker. The alternative with the highest overall value is chosen.
This decision strategy is also known as the Multi-Attribute-Utility Theory (MAUT; Keeney &
Raiffa, 1976), which is one of the best-known decision models in the literature (see Section 5
on page 67 for more details).
Many more heuristics and decision strategies are described in the literature, which vary
in the extent to which they make tradeoffs among attributes. A strategy is compensatory
when good values on one attribute can offset bad values on another. If no such compensation
is possible then the strategy is noncompensatory. The weighted additive strategy is com-
pensatory and take-the-best and eliminations-by-aspects are noncompensatory. Furthermore,
take-the-best and elimination-by-aspects are examples for one-reason decision making. That
is, in some cases the decision is based solely on one reason or cue. The meta-decision of which
decision strategy to use depends on the problem characteristics such as the importance of the
decision and the number of alternatives and attributes. The more important the problem,
the more likely it is that the decision maker uses a compensatory rule. Noncompensatory
strategies, in contrast, are especially used in decisions with many alternatives and attributes,
in situations with time pressure, or when the decision maker simply does not want to devote
a lot of work into the decision (Jungermann et al., 1998). Research suggests that, especially
in more complex decision situations, decision makers use not only one but several different
heuristics or strategies in the course of the choice process. For instance, a person facing
a decision with a hundred possible alternatives will first want to reduce the set of options
to a manageable amount. This can be done easily with a noncompensatory heuristic, such
as elimination-by-aspects. When only three or four alternatives remain, she may want to
proceed in a more exhaustive manner and chooses in a second step the compensatory and
more effortful weighted additive strategy. This particular combination of decision strategies
has been observed frequently (Ball, 1997; Bettman, 1979; Billings & Marcus, 1983; Ford,
Schmitt, Schlechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Gensch, 1987; Olshavsky, 1979; Payne, 1976;
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Westenberg & Koele, 1994; Wright & Barbour, 1977; see, however, Glo¨ckner & Betsch, 2008).
Further combinations of different rules have been proposed by H. Montgomery and Svenson
(1976), Svenson (1979) and Payne et al. (1993).
1.2 Overview and contributions of the dissertation
Decision strategies, or, in other words, the cognitive processes that are at work when humans
make decisions are the main topic of the present dissertation. Specifically, I focus on two
major questions. The first is of a purely descriptive nature: How can the decision strategies
people use when making preferential choices be investigated and described? The second, in
turn, has an applied character: How can our knowledge about these decision strategies be
used to support human decision making? The research described here is thus organized into
two main parts, one devoted to each of these two questions.
In the first part, I introduce a new process tracing tool called InterActive Process Tracing
(IAPT), which I developed together with my co-workers at the University of Lausanne. This
tool is the result of a combination of several process tracing techniques that have been widely
used for the descriptive study of decision making, namely, Active Information Search, Mouse-
lab, and retrospective verbal protocol. In Chapter 2, I give a general introduction into process
tracing techniques followed by the description of the new method. To evaluate IAPT, two
experiments were conducted, which are described in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Because
IAPT was complemented with a further process tracing technique (namely, eye tracking) in
Experiment 2, a brief introduction into the topic of the recording of eye movements is given at
the beginning of Chapter 4. Note that a reduced version of Part I is published in the Journal
of Judgment and Decision Making (Reisen, Hoffrage, & Mast, 2008).
Part II is concerned with the question of how the insights from past research in general
and my own in particular can be used to develop a decision aid, which systematically assists
consumers in their purchase decisions. In Chapter 5, I give an overview of current (online)
decision aids, followed by the description of the prototype of a decision aid called InterActive
Choice Aid (IACA). The intention behind developing the IACA was to create a decision aid
that assists the natural process of human decision making by providing tools that facilitate
the execution of resource intensive tasks. To evaluate this prototype regarding its perceived
utility and general acceptance, an experiment was conducted where IACA was compared to
two other prototypes of real-world consumer decision aids. This third experiment is described
in Chapter 6. In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn about the general insights of the
presented research as well as its contributions to the literature.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions to the literature:
• A new methodology for the descriptive research of cognitive decision strategies is devel-
oped, extended, and evaluated (i.e., InterActive Process Tracing).
• Retrospective verbal protocols are validated as a measure of cognitive processes: deci-
sions predicted on the bases of these verbal protocols are compared to observed choices.
• The validity of information search measures for the detection of cognitive processes is
investigated by contrasting information search data and verbal protocol data.
• Two widely used process tracing techniques (i.e., Mouselab and eye tracking) are directly
compared in terms of their convergent validity.
• A new tool for aiding consumer decisions is developed and evaluated, which is directly
based on insights gained from the descriptive study of decision making (i.e., InterActive
Choice Aid).
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Part I
Identifying Decision Strategies
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Part I
Identifying the processes that underlie judgment and decision making has been of great interest
to researchers for several decades already. In this context, two major paradigms have been
used: structural modeling and process tracing (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Billings & Marcus, 1983;
Dawes, 1979; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Ford et al., 1989; Harte & Koele,
1995; Payne, 1976; Riedl, Brandsta¨tter, & Roithmayr, 2008; Svenson, 1979; Westenberg &
Koele, 1994). Structural modeling aims to uncover psychological processes by relating the
provided information to the decisions or judgments, typically via multiple linear regression
analysis. Inferences are drawn from the resulting model about the participants’ decision
strategy. Despite its popularity, this approach has been criticized for ignoring the predecisional
phase, that is, the processes that take place between stimulus presentation and final decision.
For example, Svenson (1979) came to the conclusion that it is “gradually becoming clear that
human decision making cannot be understood simply by studying final decisions” (p. 86) and,
similarly, Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll (1978) argued that the “input-output analyses that
have been used in most decision research are not fully adequate to develop and test process
models of decision behavior” (p. 19). As a response to these and other objections against
structural modeling (for an overview, see Bro¨der, 2000), Payne (1976) and others developed
the process tracing approach by adapting methods from research on human problem solving
(Newell & Simon, 1972). As opposed to structural modeling, the aim of process tracing is
to directly describe the processes taking place during the predecisional phase. To achieve
this, the participants’ information search and integration is closely observed while they work
on the decision task. Frequently used methods within this paradigm are information boards
(e.g., Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1993), verbal protocols (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984), the
recording of eye movements (e.g., Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Russo & Leclerc, 1994; Russo &
Rosen, 1975), and the method of Active Information Search (AIS; Huber, Wider, & Huber,
1997; Williamson, Ranyard, & Cuthbert, 2000).1
1For the sake of completeness, further process tracing techniques are the Information Search Laboratory
(ISLab) by Cook and Swain (1993) and Search Monitor by Brucks (1988).
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In the following, I briefly describe these process tracing methodologies and discuss their
strengths and weaknesses. I then present a new tool called InterActive Process Tracing
(IAPT), which was developed to identify the decision processes underlying preferential choice.
IAPT uses various elements of the process tracing measures cited above to combine their
strengths and simultaneously overcome some of their weaknesses. I subsequently describe
two experiments in which IAPT was successfully applied to identify participants’ decision
strategies. Finally, Part I concludes with a discussion of the findings and an outline of av-
enues for future research.
2.1 Process tracing techniques
2.1.1 Information search: Mouselab, eye tracking, and the method
of Active Information Search
A range of techniques have been developed within the process tracing paradigm, each of them
having both strengths and weaknesses (see Table 2.1). A popular method is Mouselab (Payne
et al., 1993), the computerized version of the information board (Payne, 1976). In a typical
Mouselab-based study, participants have the opportunity to acquire information about the
choice alternatives by using the computer mouse to click on or move a pointer over the cells
of an attributes-by-alternatives matrix. Mouselab provides data concerning the information
acquisition phase, such as which cells are looked up, in which order, and how much time
was spent looking at each cell. Besides being relatively easy to use for experimenters, this
method is also quite convenient for participants because they are confronted with a relatively
well-structured decision situation in which all the available information is clearly arranged.
Another, and in this context very similar, way to trace the participants’ information search
is to record their eye movements. Instead of using a computer mouse to obtain information,
here participants simply have to look at a screen where the information is displayed. The eye
tracking equipment records which information is fixated and so produces data that are similar
to Mouselab’s. However, for eye tracking, the process of information acquisition resembles
more a natural situation (simple reading) as compared to Mouselab (opening cells).
In the real world, however, decision problems very rarely come as pre-structured as in
the typical information-board experiments. Outside the laboratory, people not only have to
construct their choice strategy on-line, but they also have to structure the problem on-line
(Lopes, 1990). Furthermore, a pre-structured arrangement may bias participants’ information
processing because they are told indirectly what information is considered important for the
task (Brucks, 1988; Huber et al., 1997). To overcome this disadvantage, AIS is a promising
next step in the development of process tracing techniques. Similar to Mouselab and eye
tracking, this method is aimed at discovering the information that is actually requested by the
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decision maker. In contrast to studies using Mouselab, however, the decision task in a typical
AIS study is presented with as little structure as possible. In this manner, participants can
build up a cognitive representation of the task that is virtually unaffected by the experimental
setup (Brucks, 1988; Huber et al., 1997). Specifically, the participants receive a minimal
description of the decision situation and have to query the experimenter for any further
information.
Table 2.1: Strengths and weaknesses of four process tracing techniques
Strenghts Weaknesses
Mouselab
+ Convenient to use.
+ A large amount of data: which and how much
information is retrieved and the sequence of the
information acquisition.
– Overly structured: participant may be influ-
enced as to what information to use or to consider
important.
– Only data concerning the search for informa-
tion, but no data concerning information integra-
tion.
Eye Tracking
+ A large amount of data: which and how much
information is retrieved and the sequence of the
information acquisition.
+ Very fast and effortless information acquisi-
tion.
+ Mostly nonreactive: behavior cannot easily be
censored by the participants.
+ Better suited than Mouselab to problems with
more complex information displays.
– Expensive equipment.
– A reliable calibration cannot be achieved for all
participants.
– Overly structured: participant may be influ-
enced as to what information to use or to consider
important.
– Only data concerning the search for informa-
tion, but no data concerning information integra-
tion.
Active Information Search (AIS)
+ Enhanced realism: participants are less af-
fected by the experimental setup.
– Less exact monitoring of the information acqui-
sition process than with Mouselab.
– Only data concerning the search for informa-
tion, but no data concerning information integra-
tion.
Retrospective Verbal Protocol
+ Rich and detailed information: information
search and integration.
+ No interference with on-line decision making.
– Doubts that people can introspectively access
their cognitive processes.
– Reactivity: forgetting and fabrication.
– Very time-consuming analysis.
The most robust finding of the studies within the information search paradigm is that there
is a general tendency to use noncompensatory strategies in judgment and choice. This is the
case when the task is getting more complex (i.e., an increase in the amount of information to
process) or when time pressure is induced. In particular, the depth of search is reduced and the
search becomes more variable when the information load increases. Moreover, participants
tend to use strategies that consist of two steps. First, they quickly eliminate unattractive
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alternatives with a noncompensatory algorithm, where unfavorable values on some attributes
cannot be compensated for by favorable values on other attributes. In a second step, the
remaining options are compared in detail with the help of a compensatory algorithm (Ball,
1997; Bettman, 1979; Billings & Marcus, 1983; Ford et al., 1989; Gensch, 1987; Olshavsky,
1979; Payne, 1976); Westenberg & Koele, 1994; Wright & Barbour, 1977; see, however,
Glo¨ckner & Betsch, 2008).
A major weakness of the information search techniques is, however, that they provide
no direct data about how participants integrate the obtained information (for other reactive
effects of information boards, see Arch, Bettman, & Pakkar, 1978). Although it is commonly
assumed that characteristics of the evaluation process can be deduced from the way in which
participants search for information (e.g., Harte & Koele, 2001), it is not entirely clear exactly
how information search and information integration are related to each other (for a critical
position, see Bro¨der, 2000; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008).
2.1.2 Information integration: Retrospective verbal protocol
One way to gain more explicit insight into the processing of the obtained information is to
collect verbal protocols, which can be done in two different ways. Concurrent verbal protocols
are collected while the participant works on the task, whereas retrospective verbal protocols
are collected only after task completion. In both variants, the participants are asked to “think
aloud,” that is, to tell the experimenter everything that comes or came to their minds when
working on the task. Typically, these verbalizations are recorded and subsequently coded by
the experimenter.
Although intuitively appealing, serious concerns have been raised regarding the use of
verbal protocols in general and retrospective protocols in particular. Given that the partic-
ularities of the design of IAPT excluded the use of concurrent protocols, in the following I
focus mainly on retrospective protocols. In a classic paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) ques-
tioned the assumption that people have introspective access to their cognitive processes. They
concluded that people’s ability to observe and report upon higher order mental operations is
often small or even not existent:
“People often cannot report accurately on the effects of particular stimuli on higher
order, inference-based responses. Indeed, sometimes they cannot report on the
existence of critical stimuli, sometimes cannot report on the existence of their
responses, and sometimes cannot even report that an inferential process of any
kind has occurred (p. 233).”
Ericsson and Simon (1984) challenged this conclusion and claimed that “better methods
for probing for that awareness (concurrent or immediate retrospective reports) would yield
considerable insight into the cognitive processes occurring in most of the studies discussed by
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Nisbett and Wilson” (p. 29, italics in the original). However, they point out that retrospective
verbal protocols should be collected immediately after task completion and that the general
instruction should be “to report everything you can remember about your thoughts during
the last problem” (p. 19). When these conditions are met then retrospective verbal reports
can be powerful means for studying cognitive processes. In contrast, Russo, Johnson, and
Stephens (1989) have a more negative view on verbal protocols. They argue that in concurrent
protocols the instruction to think aloud may interfere with the task the participant is working
on (e.g., due to an increased load on working memory), which can alter the accuracy of
the response. Even worse, these authors found significant reactivity when collecting verbal
protocols retrospectively. This reactivity was manifested in errors of omission (forgetting),
that is, the participants could not recall the processes they used, and errors of commission
(fabrication), that is, they reported processes that did not actually happen. Russo et al.
(1989) conclude that retrospective protocols should be dismissed as nonveridical.
In my view, the position taken by Russo et al. (1989) is overly pessimistic, especially given
that the problems associated with retrospective protocols are not without remedies. First,
the problem of forgetting can be effectively diminished when cues are provided that facilitate
the participants’ recall during the collection of the retrospective protocol. This procedure
has been shown to increase the completeness of the verbal protocol (see van Gog, Paas, van
Merrie¨nboer, & Witte, 2005, for an overview).2 Second, to verify whether fabrication really
occurred and whether the verbal protocols do or do not accurately describe participants’
decision processes, one can compare the protocols to some behavioral data. If, for example,
the protocol data are used to formulate an algorithm that can replicate the decisions made by
the participants, then this provides considerable evidence for the validity of such protocols.
2.2 The method of InterActive Process Tracing (IAPT)
Given that each of the four process tracing techniques described above has weaknesses and
limitations, my co-workers and I developed a new method that uses and combines features
of these methods, thereby overcoming some of their downsides. As pointed out by various
authors, multimethod approaches are a particularly useful way to trace decision behavior
(e.g., Einhorn et al., 1979; Harte & Koele, 2001; Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1978; Riedl et
al., 2008; Russo, 1978). In particular the fact that it is difficult to detect different decision
strategies within one choice process with process or outcome measures alone calls for the use
of a complimentary method, such as verbal protocols (Riedl et al., 2008). For instance, Payne
(1976) used a combination of an information board and a concurrent verbal protocol in an
apartment choice task. He found that the more complex the task became, the more partici-
2Interestingly, Russo et al. (1989) were one of the first to use this method but without the positive effects
found in other studies.
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pants shifted from compensatory to noncompensatory processing and eliminated alternatives
early in the process to winnow down the number of options. Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, and
Linsmeier (1985) used a similar design for studying decision behavior of bank loan officers
(i.e., experts). Here, too, increased task size led to more noncompensatory strategies, whereas
increased similarity of alternatives led to more compensatory strategies. Participants in both
studies demonstrated adaptive behavior that is contingent on the characteristics of the task
(cf. Payne et al., 1993).
A major feature of the new method described here is that an attempt is made to detect
the cognitive processes interactively with the participant, which is why it is called InterActive
Process Tracing. In the experiments, participants first selected the attributes they considered
important (AIS) and then they made a series of choices (Mouselab in Experiments 1 and 2,
eye tracking in Experiment 2), which was followed by a retrospective protocol. Here, the
participants were asked to give a detailed description of how they made the decision. Note,
however, that the last phase of IAPT deviates from the conditions specified by Ericsson and
Simon (1984) in that participants were not asked to report a stream of thought but rather to
construct, in retrospect, a precise process model that resembles their own decision strategy as
closely as possible.3 I am aware that these changes in the procedure might reduce the validity
of the verbal protocols. However, the described strategies can be used to retrospectively
predict4 the choices actually made by the participants. The degree of correspondence between
the actual choices and the predictions of the described strategies can then be used as a measure
of the validity of the described strategies.
2.2.1 Approaches similar to IAPT
Similar procedures have been used by other authors in various contexts (e.g., Bettman, 1970;
Einhorn et al., 1979; Larcker & Lessig, 1983; Li, Shue, & Shiue, 2000). Bettman (1970), for
example, obtained concurrent verbal protocols from five housewives who were encouraged to
think aloud while shopping. Based on these protocols, he then developed a computational
model and subsequently tested whether this model could replicate the decisions made by
the participants reasonably well. He found that the predictions were highly accurate. In
another study, Larcker and Lessig (1983) asked participants to evaluate the stocks of 50 actual
companies with respect to possible purchase. Immediately after the evaluation, participants
provided a verbal report of their procedure and developed diagrammatic representations of
the manner in which they made their judgment (with the assistance of the researcher). In
3Consequently, no tape-recording during the collection of the verbal protocol and no subsequent coding
was necessary because participants provided a “ready to use” process model that could be used directly to
retrospectively predict their choices.
4Note that because the strategies were calculated only after the participants’ choices, the correct term in
this context would be postdiction rather than prediction. However, given that prediction is the more standard
terminology it will be used throughout this dissertation.
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addition, a linear model was estimated. The retrospective process tracing models predicted the
participants’ actual choices correctly in 84.4% of the cases (chance was 50%), which was even
higher than the percentage of correct predictions made by the linear model (73%). Finally,
Einhorn et al. (1979) and Li et al. (2000) used concurrent verbal protocols to construct a
model that was subsequently validated by comparing its predictions to the decisions made by
the participants. Again, the models predicted the decisions quite well.
In the experiments described in the following two chapters, IAPT was used to address
the question of whether people are indeed able to gain introspective access to their cognitive
processes, and ultimately, to what extent those verbal protocol data are instrumental in
constructing process models that can accurately predict the observed choices. Moreover,
in Experiment 2, IAPT was developed further by integrating yet another process tracing
measure, namely eye tracking, and some attention was devoted to the phenomenon of choice
deferral.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1: Validation of the
method of InterActive Process Tracing
In Experiment 1, IAPT was put to a first test. The central question was whether people are
able to accurately describe their cognitive processes, and whether IAPT is a good method for
identifying these processes. The hypotheses are as follows.
3.1 Hypotheses
3.1.1 Prediction accuracy
Building on the findings by Bettman (1970), Einhorn et al. (1979), Larcker and Lessig (1983),
and Li et al. (2000), it is reasonable to assume that people have a fairly good idea of (and
are able to verbalize) the decision strategy they use to select a product. If asked to provide
an executable decision strategy, they should thus be able to come up with an algorithm that
is able to retrospectively predict their own choices in a large number of the cases.
Hypothesis 1: The strategies described by the participants will predict their own choices
better than a random strategy (i.e., chance).
Chance, however, may not be a good standard of comparison, because for a certain number
of trials some mobile phones may be favored over others independently of the strategy used,
especially when one phone dominated the others on a given trial. Thus, a high number
of correct predictions does not necessarily imply that participants were able to accurately
describe their strategies. Therefore, another benchmark against which the number of correct
predictions could be compared is the percentage of correct predictions that results from using
a certain participant’s strategy to predict the choices of all other participants. Assuming that
each participant’s strategy is unique, it is expected that a particular participants’ strategy
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does not predict other participants’ choices well.
Hypothesis 2: A particular participants’ strategy will predict his or her own choices much
better than the choices made by other participants.
As a third benchmark, besides chance and cross-participants comparisons, is the fit ob-
tained when modeling the observed choices with several variants of two established strategies
from the literature. These strategies have been shown to lead to good fits (Dawes, 1979;
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). However, given the uniqueness of the strategies described by
the participants, it is expected that these still have a higher predictive accuracy than the
different versions of WADD and TTB.
Hypothesis 3: The described strategies will predict the observed choices better than the
different variants of the Weighted ADDitive strategy and the take-the-best heuristic.
3.1.2 Information search
Process tracing studies are based on the assumption that the information search data reflects
how the information about the decision alternatives is processed and used to form an evalu-
ation. From these data, insight into various particularities of the evaluation process can be
gained, because different decision strategies often require different types of information and
acquire them in a different order. Of special interest here is whether the strategy is com-
pensatory or noncompensatory and which information is used or not used (Harte & Koele,
2001). However, a concern with this type of data is that, strictly speaking, it only tells us
something about the information search, and hence the conclusions about the underlying cog-
nitive processes are more or less speculative. Given that two different procedures are used
(i.e., Mouselab and retrospective verbal protocol) to identify these processes, it is possible
to verify whether the way in which participants search for information is in agreement with
the strategies they describe. Here, I focus on three main questions. First, are the described
strategies reflected in the direction of the participants’ search for information? Second, do
participants stop acquiring further information for a specific alternative once this alternative
should be eliminated according to their described strategies? And third, does the frequency
with which participants access information on the selected attributes reflect the attributes’
ranking that they established in the first phase of the experiment?
To examine the direction of the participants’ information search, three measures are com-
monly used: the pattern of information acquisition expressed by the Payne Index (PI, Payne,
1976), the variability, and the depth of the information search (see, e.g., Ford et al., 1989;
Harte & Koele, 2001; Payne, 1976). The PI indicates whether the information search tends
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to proceed within or across attributes (alternative-wise vs. attribute-wise). An alternative-
wise search pattern is associated with compensatory strategies whereas an attribute-wise
search is indicative of noncompensatory strategies. Formally, it compares the total number
of within-alternative transitions to the number of within-attribute transitions (neglecting di-
agonal transitions, i.e., transitions from one alternative to another one and, simultaneously,
from one attribute to another):
PI =
Nalternative −Nattribute
Nalternative +Nattribute
(3.1)
where Nalternative is the number of within-alternative transition and Nattribute is the number of
within-attribute transitions. A score of 1.0 represents a fully alternative-based search whereas
a score of –1.0 represents a fully attribute-based search.
The variability of search indicates the degree of selectiveness of the participant’s search
by focusing on the amount of information examined per alternative. It is measured by the
standard deviation of the proportion of cells accessed. A variability of search of zero means
that the participant searched for the same amount of information on all alternatives, which
is typical for compensatory decision making. The more the standard deviation departs from
zero, the more selective is the search. This, in turn, points to a more noncompensatory
strategy. In addition, the depth of search is the percentage of the total information actually
inspected by the participant. Compensatory strategies such as the weighted additive strategy
need all the available information for execution whereas noncompensatory strategies in many
cases make a decision based on only a fraction of the information.
Therefore, it is expected that the strategies used by the participants are reflected in the
direction of their information search as measured by the Payne Index, the depth of search
and the variability of search. Specifically:
Hypothesis 4: Elimination strategies will lead to an attribute-wise search and additive
strategies will lead to an alternative-wise search (as indicated by the Payne Index).
Hypothesis 5: Elimination strategies will lead to a higher variability of search than
additive strategies.
Hypothesis 6: Elimination strategies will lead to a lower depth of search than additive
strategies.
Moreover, it is possible to test whether the elimination of alternatives as described by
the participants’ strategies is reflected in their information search. Specifically, it is assumed
that as soon as an alternative is eliminated because its value on one of the attributes fails
to reach the threshold, the participant should not acquire any more information about that
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alternative.
Hypothesis 7: Participants will stop searching for information on an alternative as soon
as their strategy prescribes its elimination.
Finally, it can be tested whether there is a relation between an attribute’s rank and the
frequency with which information about this attribute is accessed. This can be done by
assessing whether information about attributes that are reported to be more important is
acquired more frequently than information about less important attributes.
Hypothesis 8: Participants will access more information on higher-ranked attributes than
on lower-ranked attributes.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
Participants were 37 students (8 female and 29 male) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Tech-
nology of Lausanne (EPFL) with a mean age of 23.8 years (SD = 2.6 years).
3.2.2 Task and stimuli
In each of 30 choice trials, participants had to select one of four mobile phones for hypothetical
purchase. The stimuli were mobile phones because university students generally have both
interest in and some knowledge about this product category. The phones were real phones
sold in the USA in January 2006 and were drawn randomly from a pool of 50 in each trial,
with the only restriction being that no phone appeared twice in the same trial. Each partic-
ipant received exactly the same set of stimuli. To avoid biases due to previously established
preferences and to force participants to collect relevant information from the information
board rather than from their own memory, phone brand and model name were not displayed.
In this way, it was ensured that participants based their decisions on the informations they
sought rather than on inferences they made about the products based on previous experiences
with a certain brand or model. The attributes that were used in this and also the following
experiment were technical characteristics of mobile phones that could typically be found on
shopping websites (see Tables 3.1 and 4.1).
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3.2.3 Design
Participants were each randomly assigned to one of two groups. In the without-list condition,
participants were asked to select the attributes on which they wanted information, without
any further help from the experimenter. The rationale for this was to leave it entirely up
to the participants which information they wanted to consider. This was meant to enhance
the realism of the decision situation. In the with-list condition, participants also first freely
selected attributes but were then presented with a list containing all of the 33 available
attributes. From this list they could choose any number of further attributes that had not
occurred to them spontaneously.
3.2.4 Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases: an attribute selection phase, an information acquisi-
tion and choice phase, and finally, a strategy identification phase. The participants completed
the first two phases in a total of approximately 30 minutes and the last in approximately 25
minutes.
Phase 1: Selection of attributes
Attribute selection and ordering (a feature from AIS) as well as the 30 choice trials of Phase
2 were performed using a computer-based process tracing measure that combines central
elements of AIS and Mouselab. Phase 1 was the first interactive part of IAPT.
Participants were asked to select the attributes they were interested in and the experi-
menter entered them into the computer program. If participants had a clear idea of what
they wanted but did not know the exact name of the attribute then the experimenter pro-
vided some assistance while trying not to influence the participant in any way regarding the
selection of attributes. Whenever an attribute did not exist as specified by the participants
(e.g., the attribute “usability,” which was not in the set of available attributes due to its high
degree of subjectivity), they were informed that this information was not available.1
After the participants in both conditions had completed the selection of the attributes—
their final set of attributes is henceforth referred to as the selected attributes—they ranked
these attributes with respect to their importance. They were informed that in the next phase,
the attribute they considered most important would appear on the top and the one they
considered least important on the bottom of the information board. Moreover, participants
in both conditions were informed that once this ranking was complete, they could not access
any information other than that concerning the selected attributes.
1This did not happen very often. Participants were informed that only technical (i.e., objective) attributes
were available and some pre-testing was done to ensure the completeness of the list.
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Phase 2: Information acquisition and choices
In this phase, the information on the selected attributes was presented in an attributes-by-
alternatives matrix (see Figure 3.1), similar to the display used in the Mouselab procedure.
The information could be obtained by using the computer mouse to click in the appropriate
cells. Once a cell had been clicked on, the information contained within it remained visible
throughout the remainder of the trial.2 There were no constraints regarding the amount of
or the order in which the information was considered. A choice could be made at any time
during a given trial and participants could proceed to the next trial only after having selected
one of the options. It was not possible to go back to earlier trials.
Figure 3.1: Screen-shot of the computer-based process-tracing measure used in Experiment 1
Phase 3: Strategy identification
In Phase 3, the participant and the experimenter interacted closely to gain an exact de-
scription of the participant’s strategy. Specifically, the participants were asked to explain
and formalize their strategy in an exact enough manner so that it was possible to create
an algorithm which could stand in for the decision maker in future choice situations. That
is, participants described their decision strategies in terms of a step-by-step list, similar to a
computer program. When an element of their strategy was too imprecise, that is, when a step
could not be executed by a computer, they were asked to be more specific. For instance, when
2Note that this is different from the standard form of Mouselab, where the cells close as soon as the mouse
is moved away. I think that this form is easier to use for participants and, for the current purpose, I found
no reason to stick to the standard procedure.
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participants wanted to eliminate “too expensive” alternatives the experimenter asked them
to define precise cut-offs. Similarly, when the strategy required decisions based on subjective
attributes such as design, the participants were asked to assign values to the alternatives for
these attributes. Finally, when the strategy demanded the calculation of ratios or overall
values participants were asked to assign weights to the attributes. To reduce biases due to
forgetting, screen-shots of the information board of five of the trials were presented. These
screen-shots were taken when the participants had made a choice (a procedure known as cued
retrospective reporting; van Gog et al., 2005). These cuing trials that were different for each
participant were selected by first dividing the 30 trials into five equal segments and then
randomly selecting one trial in each segment, excluding the very first trial. While proceeding
through these cuing trials, the participants had to specify for some attributes how the values
of the alternatives map onto specific values that could be used more easily within their strat-
egy. To give an example, for the color attribute, the value “blue” might be assigned a value
of 10, the value “black” a value of 5 and so on, depending on the participant’s preferences.
The experimenter was careful not to influence the participant in any way when assisting with
the formulation of the strategy. This phase was completed once a strategy had been (a)
described by the participant, (b) formalized and written down by the experimenter, and (c)
verified by the participant. The outcome of this procedure will henceforth be referred to as a
participant’s described strategy.
3.2.5 Payment
To enhance participants’ motivation to carefully describe and formalize the strategies they
used (cf. Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), they were informed that their remuneration depended on
the number of times their strategies correctly predicted their choices. They received 1 Swiss
Franc (1 SFR = approximately 0.78 USD at the time the study was conducted) for each
correct prediction, with a minimum guaranteed amount of 10 SFR. This procedure resulted
in an average payment of 22 SFR (SD = 4). Note that while working on Phases 1 and 2,
participants were not aware that they would be asked to formalize their strategy in Phase 3,
or how their payment would be determined.
3.3 Results
Due to incomplete or faulty transcription of their strategies, six participants were excluded
from the analyses, leaving 16 participants in the without-list condition and 15 in the with-list
condition. Conditions did not differ significantly with respect to the number of attributes
participants decided to include in the information board (5.13 and 6.33 of 33, respectively;
30 CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1: VALIDATION OF IAPT
t(19) = 1.49, p = .15).3 Overall, they included 5.7 (17%) of the 33 available attributes in the
information board. The attributes that were selected most often were price (68%), digital
camera (55%), size (52%), and mp3 player (39%). Twenty-four attributes were requested
by between 29% and 3% of the participants and four attributes were never used (i.e., voice
command, Office, WAP, and external display). The frequency with which each attribute was
chosen is listed in Table 3.1.
3Because Levene’s test for the equality of variances proved significant, the degrees of freedom were adjusted
accordingly.
Table 3.1: Number of participants who chose each attribute
Choice frequency
Attribute Without list With list Total Total %
Price 9 12 21 68
Integrated digital camera 11 6 17 55
Size 9 7 16 52
MP3 Player 9 3 12 39
Bluetooth 3 6 9 29
Stand by 4 5 9 29
Internal display 5 4 9 29
Image 6 3 9 29
Talk time 2 5 7 23
Weight 4 3 7 23
VibraCall alert 0 6 6 19
SMS 1 5 6 19
GPRS 3 3 6 19
Stereo FM 0 5 5 16
MMS 2 2 4 13
Band support 1 3 4 13
Internal memory 2 2 4 13
Java games 2 1 3 10
Windows Mobile 2 1 3 10
External flash memory 2 1 3 10
Color 2 1 3 10
Integrated speakerphone 1 1 2 6
Email support 0 2 2 6
Infrared 0 2 2 6
UMTS (3G) compatibility 1 1 2 6
Connectivity (USB) 1 1 2 6
Video streaming 0 2 2 6
Video clip playback with sound 0 1 1 3
Speech recording 0 1 1 3
Voice command 0 0 0 0
Office 0 0 0 0
WAP 0 0 0 0
External display 0 0 0 0
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3.3.1 Described strategies
The strategies were classified according to several dimensions. Specifically, for each strat-
egy it was determined whether a certain element was present or not. The elements were:
elimination of alternatives, adding up attribute values, assigning weights to attributes, and
Just-Noticeable-Differences (see below). In general, two types of strategies could be iden-
tified: elimination strategies and additive strategies. Strategies of the first type eliminate
alternatives from the consideration set based on attribute values, that is, when a particular
attribute value does not reach the acceptance threshold specified by the participant (for an
example, see Table 3.2, participant 37). These strategies follow a similar logic as do lex-
icographic strategies like the take-the-best heuristic (TTB, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996;
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbo¨lting, 1991) or the Elimination-By-Aspects strategy (EBA,
Tversky, 1972). The number of attributes that were used for elimination varied between one
and nine (M = 3.03,Mdn = 3). About a third of the participants (10 of 31) used Just-
Noticeable-Differences when eliminating alternatives (see the Prediction accuracy section for
further details). Strategies of the second type add the values (either weighted or not) of all
or some attributes for each alternative to determine an overall score for the alternatives (e.g.,
Table 3.2, participant 5).
Table 3.2: Three examples of participants’ strategies. Participant 5 used a purely additive
strategy, the strategy of participant 37 was exclusively based on elimination, and participant
32 combined the two features.
Participant 5: 1) Look at the following attributes: Video clip playback with sound, Stereo FM,
Speech recording, Integrated speakerphone, VibraCall, Voice command, MMS,
SMS, and Email support. Take the phone that possesses the greatest number
of these attributes.
2) If there is a tie, choose one of the tied phones at random.
Participant 32: 1) Eliminate all phones that do not have SMS and whose standby time is less than
300 hours. If one phone remains then choose it.
2) If the standby time of all phones is less than 300, choose the phone with the
highest standby time.
3) Otherwise, assign the following attribute weights: VibraCall = 3, GPRS = 2,
and Bluetooth = 1. For each attribute that the phone possesses, assign a value
of 4. Multiply attribute value with attribute weight and choose the phone that
has the highest score.
4) If there is a tie, choose the phone with the highest standby time.
Participant 37: 1) Eliminate all phones that do not have SMS and VibraCall. If one phone remains
then choose it.
2) If more than one phone remains, select the cheapest phone.
3) If two or more products are equal in price, choose the smallest phone.
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Of the 31 participants, almost all (30) used elimination and 23 (74%) added up attribute
values in a linear fashion. Of those 23 participants, 17 (74%) assigned weights to the at-
tributes according to their subjective importance (e.g., participant 32). Finally, 22 of all 31
participants (71%) combined the two types of strategy (e.g., participant 32).
3.3.2 Prediction accuracy
The degree to which the strategies described by the participants could predict their own
choices was calculated. The averaged percentage of correct predictions across all 30 trials
was 73% (Figure 3.2, second bar). Within the subset of the five cuing trials, the averaged
prediction accuracy was virtually the same (75%, first bar). Note that these percentages are
far greater than the 25% that would be obtained when choosing randomly. This indicates that
the described strategies had reasonable predictive power and Hypothesis 1 is thus supported.
The percentage of correct predictions that resulted from using a certain participant’s strategy
to predict the choices of all other participants was 34% across all participants (Figure 3.2,
third bar)—much closer to chance level than to the percentage of correct predictions that
resulted when using the participants’ own strategies to predict their choices. This result is
in line with Hypothesis 2 and gives further evidence for the uniqueness of the participants’
strategies and indicates that they cannot be replaced easily by each other.
Figure 3.2: Percentage of choices correctly predicted by various decision strategies
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors; EQW = EQual Weighting, WADD = Weighted
ADDitive, TTB = Take-The-Best, JND = Just Noticeable Difference.
Given that the sample consisted of more male (29) than female (8) participants, it would
be interesting to test whether there are any gender differences with respect to the prediction
accuracy of the described strategy. Unfortunately, after the exclusion of the six participants
only four (13%) of the remaining 31 participants were female, a number that is too low for
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obtaining meaningful results. When calculating the prediction accuracy separately for each
gender, the prediction accuracy was found to be slightly higher for male participants than
for female participants (74% vs. 69%, respectively). The main result, however, remains the
same.
Figure 3.3: The six variants of WADD
In this experiment, six different variants of the Weighted ADDitive (WADD) strategy were
used. This strategy is computationally demanding and is considered to be “the traditional
gold standard for rational preferences” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999, p. 26; see also Keeney
& Raiffa, 1976; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Moreover, five variants of the take-the-best
(TTB) heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) were used (with different Just-Noticeable-
Differences), a lexicographic strategy that applies one-reason decision making and thus its
execution requires much less processing (although they each require a similar level of pre-
processing to determine the weights or the cue order). Each of the six variants of WADD
calculated a score for each alternative by adding up the weighted values of each attribute
and then choosing the alternative with the highest overall score.4 The variants differed with
respect to the skewness of these weights. At one extreme, EQual Weights was used. At
the other extreme, a set of noncompensatory weights was used, that is, the weight of the
attribute that was ranked highest by a participant was bigger than the sum of the weights
of all the lower-ranked attributes, the weight of the attribute that was ranked second highest
was bigger than the sum of all following weights, and so on (WADD0). Specifically, for this
noncompensatory variant, the weight of a given attribute was 1/2(r−1), where r is the rank of
the selected attribute in the attribute hierarchy established by the participant. The other four
4To be able to sum up the values across the different attributes, they were first normalized by performing
z -transformations. In addition, the attributes weight, dimensions, and price were multiplied by -1, because
lower values on these attributes are generally perceived as being better.
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variants (WADD4, WADD2, WADD1, and WADD0.5) were obtained by adding a constant (4,
2, 1, or 0.5, respectively) to each attribute weight in the noncompensatory set of weights5
(see Figure 3.3).
Take-the-best was originally formulated for tasks in which two objects had to be compared
to each other on a given criterion, as for example “Which nation obtained more gold medals
in the last Summer Olympics, Germany or France?” This heuristic first looks up the values
on the most valid cue, where cue validity is defined as the relative proportion of correct
inferences among all inferences in which this cue discriminated between the alternatives (e.g.,
the population of each country). If the two alternatives differ on this cue the information
search is stopped and the alternative with the higher cue value is selected. If they do not
differ, TTB proceeds with the second most valid cue, and so on. Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999;
2008) generalized TTB from inferential tasks to preferential tasks, and from two-alternative
to multi-alternative choice tasks. If two or more alternatives are tied, that is, if they have the
same value on the attribute of the highest importance, and no other alternative has an even
higher one, then take-the-best eliminates all other alternatives from further consideration and
compares the remaining alternatives on the second most important attribute, and so on (for
another way of generalizing TTB, see Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). Because of its highly
selective and attribute-wise information search, TTB can be considered very simple to use
once the cue-ordering has been determined.
However, it does not seem psychologically plausible to assume that information search is
stopped in each and every case in which alternatives differ on the most important attribute.
Consider, for instance, someone who cares most about price. After finding out that Phones
A, B, C, and D cost 158, 159, 299, and 339 SFR, it is not plausible to assume that he or
she will choose Phone A simply because a price of 158 SFR is more attractive than a price
of 159 SFR. To capture an insight from early research on psychophysics, versions of TTB
were created that operated with various Just-Noticeable-Differences (JND). A JND is the
difference between the attribute values on two alternatives that is sufficiently small to treat
the values as psychologically equal. Five levels of JNDs were used that were applied to all
selected attributes, namely 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%. The five corresponding strategies
are referred to as TTB0, TTB5, TTB10, TTB20 and TTB40, respectively. For calculating these
JNDs, the standard of reference was the alternative with the most attractive attribute value
(in the respective trial). For some attributes, this was the alternative with the highest value
(e.g., battery life), for others it was the one with the lowest value (e.g., price). For instance, if
the most important attribute of a particular participant was price, and the cheapest phone in
a given trial cost 100 SFR, TTB20 would have eliminated all phones that were more expensive
5It is obvious that adding nothing to the attribute weights in the noncompensatory set of weights will
maintain the noncompensatory structure, whereas adding a constant will minimize the relative differences
between the attribute weights. As the constant approaches infinity, the relative differences approach zero,
thereby ultimately turning the set of noncompensatory weights into a set of equal weights.
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than 120 SFR.
The 30 choices of each participant were predicted separately using each of the variants of
WADD and TTB. The only difference in each strategy between participants was the ranking
of the selected attributes, which was determined by the participants’ responses in Phase 1.
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the fit of the variants of WADD ranged between 55% and
57% correct predictions, suggesting that (consistent with Dawes, 1979) different weighting
schemes did not make a big difference (F (1, 44) = .367, p = .87).6 The fit of the variants
of TTB (averaged across all participants) ranged between 47% and 51%. Overall, the factor
JND turned out to be significant (F (2, 55) = 3.27, p = .049,MSe = 6.309).
The most important result, however, is that for each of these established strategies the fit is
much lower than for the described strategies (all t(30)’s > 5.7, all ps < .001), which is in favor
of Hypothesis 3. Even when the best fitting linear model and the best fitting lexicographic
model for each participant were selected, the fit of the reported strategy was better (tied)
for 20 (6) of the 31 participants when compared to their best fitting linear strategy, and
it was better (tied) for 26 (1) when compared to their best fitting lexicographic strategy.
When selecting the particular strategy that predicted each participant’s choices best, be it
the described strategy, a variant of WADD or a variant of TTB, and calculating the overall
fit, the fit was 74% and hence only slightly but significantly higher than the fit achieved with
the described strategies alone (t(30) = −2.193, p = .04). As a last step, exactly the same
analysis was performed again, but this time excluding the described strategies. Now the fit
was 66% and hence higher than the overall fit of any of the variants of WADD and TTB,
but at the same time lower than the fit achieved when applying IAPT. This difference was
significant (t(30) = 2.850, p = .007).
3.3.3 Information search
Direction of information search
A problem with the PI is that for asymmetrical matrices (i.e., when the number of attributes
is not equal to the number of alternatives), the expected PI score for a random informa-
tion search is not 0. Therefore, instead of taking zero as the reference point to distinguish
alternative-wise from attribute-wise search, the expected value of a random search in a par-
ticular matrix was used. To obtain these chance PIs, 10,000 random sequences of information
search for each participant and each trial were simulated, with the number of boxes opened by
the simulation being equal to the number of boxes opened by the participant in the respective
trial. For each sequence, the PI was calculated and the mean of these PIs then served as the
values for the chance PIs. It turned out that participants’ chance PIs ranged between -0.03
6The assumption of sphericity was violated so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in this analysis
and the following analysis concerning TTB.
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and 0.62. Twenty-two (71%) participants had an observed PI that differed significantly from
their chance PI, which indicated an attribute-wise search, and 5 (16%) of the participants had
an observed PI that indicated an alternative-wise search (the remaining 4 [13%] participants
could not be classified). This finding is in line with other process tracing studies where it has
been found that attribute-wise search patterns prevail (Ford et al., 1989).
Across all trials, the variability of search ranged between 0.02 and 3.49 with an overall mean
of 1.11. This indicates that participants tended to inspect an uneven amount of information
on each alternative. Across all participants, in 35% of the trials the proportion of cells accessed
was equal on each alternative (i.e., a standard deviation of zero).7
On average, each participant accessed 76% of the information (i.e., depth of search),
ranging between 47% and 100% (SD = 17%). Similarly to the variability of search, this
points to the use of more noncompensatory decision strategies (Ford et al., 1989).
As a next step, the pattern (i.e., the PI), the variability and the depth of the participants’
search for information were compared to that predicted by the described strategies. Regarding
the PI, the participants were expected to favor attribute-wise search when their strategy
was based on elimination whereas they should search more in an alternative-wise fashion
when using an additive strategy. And, indeed, for the eight participants who used strategies
based on elimination alone, seven had a significant PI score that indicated attribute-wise
search. However, the one and only participant who used a purely additive strategy also
had a score that indicated attribute-wise search. For the remaining 18 participants with
significant PI scores no claims can be made because these participants used mixed strategies
(i.e., elimination and additive). When looking at the variability of search, very similar scores
were found for all participants regardless of their described strategy. Even worse, the only
participant who described an exclusively additive strategy had only two trials with a complete
search and hence far less than many other participants who described elimination or mixed
strategies. Finally, looking at the depth of search, no significant differences could be found
between the participants using elimination-based strategies and all other participants (t(18) =
1.04, n.s.), and, curiously, the one participant using an exclusively additive strategy had a
depth of search that was lower than most of those found for the participants with elimination
strategies. Therefore, these data provide some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4 but fail to
support Hypotheses 5 and 6.
7A general problem with this measure is, however, that the standard deviations are greater when one or
more alternatives are eliminated early in the process and the subsequent information search concentrates only
on the remaining alternatives (i.e., when the strategy has two phases, of which one is more noncompensatory
and one is more compensatory). On one hand, this is a characteristic of noncompensatory decision making
and hence this fact correctly reflects the processes of the first phase of the decision strategy. On the other
hand, however, this measure fails to reflect a possible compensatoriness of the strategy in the second phase.
Thus, it should be interpreted carefully because it fails to distinguish between different phases of the decision
making process.
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Figure 3.4: Mean proportion of accesses per attribute rank
Note—The numbers in brackets below an attribute rank indicate how many participants used the corre-
sponding number of attributes or more.
Eliminations and information search
Participants stopped search on a particular alternative after its elimination in one third (33%)
of the trials. However, in the remaining two thirds (67%) at least one piece of information
was acquired on an alternative even though it was already doomed to elimination. Hence,
Hypothesis 7 is not fully supported.
Frequency of access
Generally, the more important an attribute was rated on average, the more often it was
accessed by the participants (see Figure 3.4). To determine whether the number of accesses
per rank was significantly different from each other, a within-participant one-way ANOVA was
conducted with attribute rank as independent variable. Only the first four ranks were used
for the analysis because this was the minimum number of attributes selected by individual
participants. The linear trend was highly significant (F (1, 30) = 18.9, p < .001). Then,
the correlation between attribute rank and frequency of access was calculated separately for
each participant, which was subsequently standardized by means of a Fisher transformation
and, finally, the mean over all participants was calculated. This standardized mean was re-
transformed and resulted in a correlation of -0.83.8 This result thus supports Hypothesis 8.
8Moreover, the correlation between (1) each participant’s correlation between attribute rank and frequency
of access and (2) the number of attributes this participant accessed was calculated. This correlation was .025,
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It should be noted, however, that attribute importance was confounded with the vertical
position on the screen, which may have artificially enhanced this effect.
As a final step, it was verified for how many participants the frequency of accesses decreased
monotonously from the highest ranked attribute to the lowest. For 8 (26%) participants the
trend was strictly monotonous (i.e., each higher ranked attribute was accessed more frequently
than any of the lower ranked ones), for 12 (39%) it was monotonous (i.e., each higher ranked
attribute was accessed more frequently than or as frequently as any of the lower ranked ones,
and for the remaining 11 (35%) it was not monotonous, though, as Figure 3.4 indicates, most
of the violations of the monotonous decrease occurred relatively low in the attribute hierarchy.
3.4 Discussion
The main finding is that people facing a consumer choice situation are indeed able to ver-
bally formalize the strategy they used to make their decisions. The strategies identified with
IAPT correctly predicted the observed choices in 73% of the cases, which is far greater than
chance. Male participants appeared to be slightly better at describing their strategies than
were female participants (i.e., 74% vs. 69%, respectively), but given the very small number of
female participants these numbers are not very meaningful. Moreover, the identified strate-
gies were able to predict the actual choices much better than several variants of linear and
lexicographic strategies. Thus, these findings do not lend support to Nisbett and Wilson’s
(1977) claim that people’s ability to observe and report upon higher order mental operations
is underdeveloped—if existent at all. On the other hand, in 27% of the cases the decisions
made by the described strategies did not correspond to the actual choices.
One simple reason for these prediction errors could be that at least some participants
changed their strategy (including parameters of their strategy such as elimination thresholds)
while proceeding through the choice phase. Such changes over time could not be considered
in the analysis because in Phase 3 the participants were asked to formalize only one strategy.
Although this explanation might potentially account for some misclassifications, the interviews
did not provide much evidence for such changes over time. Moreover, there was virtually no
difference in the prediction accuracy between the first and the second half of the trials (72.5%
and 73.6%, respectively; t(30) = −0.43, p = .67), which does not support the hypothesis that
their strategies differed over time.
Another reason for the wrong predictions could be execution errors and unreliable choices
on the part of the participants. From the literature on bootstrapping, for instance, it is well
known that laypeople and experts are often unable to execute a strategy reliably and without
errors. This is also the major explanation why in almost all studies on this issue it was
indicating that participants who used only a small number of attributes did not spuriously inflate the first
correlation.
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found that linear models outperformed the people on whom these models were based (for a
review, see Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Moreover, in the second experiment described in
Chapter 4, participants repeated half of the trials but made identical choices in both trials in
only 73% of the cases. Future research could both check for participants’ re-test reliability
(see Experiment 2) and also confront them with those cases in which the strategy they had
formulated in Phase 3 deviated from their own previous choices. It would be interesting to
know whether they would change the formulation of the strategy or whether they would prefer
to choose differently.
Still another reason for the mismatch between described strategy and observed process
could be that the participant’s description of his or her strategy—including the criteria for
elimination—resulted from an inductive inference, that is, from an attempt to characterize
the conditions under which a specific alternative is eliminated. This description should not be
confused with the strategy the participant used when performing the choices—maybe such a
strategy did not even exist in the first place and the description has just been constructed post-
hoc, after the experimenter requested to do so. In fact, things may even be more complicated
in that participants’ memories of thoughts during information acquisition will most likely have
mixed with their post-hoc attempt to identify patterns and statistical regularities in the set of
choices they made. Likewise, it cannot be excluded that participants used configural strategies
(Garcia-Retamero, Hoffrage, & Dieckmann, 2007) in Phase 2 but did not bother to report
this in Phase 3 as such strategies are complex and thus hard to describe. In other words, the
idea that IAPT merely leads to a post-hoc description of the participants’ behavior in the
preceding choice task instead of truly revealing the underlying strategies cannot be excluded.
A possible remedy for this problem is to let participants rank the alternatives in terms of
their desirability as opposed to asking them to simply choose one (cf. Riedl et al., 2008).
This improvement should be considered in further studies.9
3.4.1 Information search vs. described strategies
Many of the described strategies are in line with previous research stating that people often
start with a noncompensatory strategy to reduce the number of alternatives in the choice set,
and then switch to a compensatory strategy to make a decision between the remaining options
(e.g., Bettman, 1979; Billings & Marcus, 1983; Ford et al., 1989; Gensch, 1987; Olshavsky,
1979; Payne, 1976; Wright & Barbour, 1977, see, however, Glo¨ckner & Betsch, 2008). Such a
two-step strategy poses a challenge for any attempt to contrast the strategies and the choices
they predict with the information acquisition data. And in fact, the correspondence between
described strategies and measures reflecting the information search revealed mixed findings.
First, the three measures examining the direction of the information search all indicate that
9Unfortunately, this point was raised only after both experiments had been conducted and therefore it is
not considered in the following experiment.
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participants engaged in noncompensatory processing (at least to a certain extent), which
is consistent with previous research (Ford et al., 1989). In particular, for participants who
used purely elimination-based strategies, the Payne Index points in the predicted direction of
attribute-wise search, but this was not the case for the one participant who reported to have
used purely additive strategies: his search was also more attribute-wise than alternative-wise
(but note that only very few participants used pure elimination or additive strategies and that
this analysis is thus based on a very small sample). The two measures variability and depth
of search did not provide any meaningful data when compared to the described strategies.
Second, in two-thirds of the trials, participants looked up information for alternatives that they
should have already eliminated according to the strategy they described. Third and finally,
participants’ search for information reflects, by and large, their ranking of the attributes
according to their importance.
On the one hand, it seems that the participants have a clear idea of the importance of
the attributes they selected and their search processes reflect the ranking they made at the
beginning of the experiment. Moreover, the information search measures generally showed
more noncompensatory search, which is in line with the participants’ strategies because most
of these contained elements that suggest noncompensatory processing. In particular, almost
all of the participants who used elimination-based strategies searched in an attribute-wise
fashion, a search pattern that is to be expected with this type of decision strategy. On
the other hand, beyond the general tendency for noncompensatory search, no correspondence
could be found between the described strategies and the two measures of variability and depth
of search. Also, the information search frequently deviated from the expected pattern given
the strategies described by the participants. For instance, participants did not consistently
stop information search on an alternative after their strategy prescribed its elimination (only
in 33% of the trials). Given that the protocol and information search data converge only to
a certain degree, the question arises as to what extent a given strategy actually directs the
search for information, and, ultimately, how valid and specific the conclusions are that can
be drawn from information search data (for a critique on information search techniques see
Bro¨der, 2000).
A possible explanation for the discrepancy between people’s actual search behavior and the
search behavior that is expected given their strategies is that the acquisition of information
serves the purpose of giving a general overview of the choice options rather than providing
only the information that is needed for the execution of a decision strategy. It may be that
the particular strategy is generated and executed only after having obtained a certain amount
of information. Considering the fact that strategy choice is often adaptive (cf. Payne et al.,
1993), it is reasonable to assume that the decision maker first acquires a certain amount
of information and then decides on the strategy (or just certain parameters of it such as
thresholds) he or she is going to use.
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Overall, the first test of IAPT yielded satisfactory results. In Experiment 2, I sought to
further develop and eventually improve this new process tracing method by integrating eye
tracking technology. This experiment is presented next, after a brief introduction into the
recording of eye movements.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 2: InterActive Process
Tracing and eye tracking
One of the fastest and most natural ways for humans and many other species to acquire
information about something is to simply look at it. Eye movements are very fast and
accurate and need almost no conscious control. Hence, the possibility to track a person’s
eye movements is expected to yield very reliable and complete information about his or her
information search. When an object is examined, the eye fixates an area for about 100–300
ms and then moves on to the next area. The very rapid movements between the fixations are
called saccades and last for about 30–120 ms (Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Rayner, 1998). The
sequence of fixations and saccades across a stimulus is often referred to as the scanpath.
Most eye tracking systems work in the following way. A camera points to one or both
eyes and constantly sends an infrared light that is reflected on the pupil. The eye tracking
software detects the center of the pupil (on the basis of the contrast between pupil and iris)
as well as the reflection of the infrared light. The orientation of the eye is calculated based on
the relative position of these two points, a procedure which is often referred to as the pupil
and corneal reflection method. For the system to work, a calibration is necessary for each
participant, which usually takes a few minutes. For the analysis, fixations (i.e., position and
duration, among others), saccades, and blinks are detected and can be displayed as raw data
as well as visual outputs (e.g., a film of the scanpath).
Whereas with older systems it was often necessary to use bite bars to ensure that the
participants do not move their heads during the experiment, modern eye trackers can do
without this rather unpleasant measure to make accurate recordings of eye movements. Some
high speed eye trackers (operating at a sampling rate of 1250 Hz or even 2000 Hz with a
gaze position accuracy of 0.25°–0.5°) use a chin rest for stabilizing, but there are also (slower)
systems on the market where the participants can sit freely in front of the experimental screen.
These systems can compensate for minor head movements and still have an acceptable speed
(typically between 50 and 120 Hz) and accuracy (< 0.5°). They are completely unobtrusive
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because the eye tracking device is often integrated in the screen used for stimulus presentation
and hence almost invisible. Therefore, the participants can work on the task as if they were
working on a normal computer. Still another type of eye trackers are head-mounted devices,
which work at various speeds (50 Hz–500 Hz) and with a gaze position accuracy of around
0.5°. Here, the camera is attached to the head of the participant and the recording is done
with a tablet PC, which can be carried in a backpack. These systems are useful for studies
in the field (e.g., a marketing study in a supermarket).
Researchers’ optimism regarding the recording of eye movements is manifested in a large
body of studies which have been conducted in a great variety of disciplines. Among others,
eye tracking is used in neuroscience (e.g., attention), psychology (e.g., reading, scene and face
perception, visual search, and problem solving), industrial engineering and human factors
(e.g., aviation, driving, visual inspection), marketing/advertising (e.g., copy testing, print
advertising), and computer science (e.g., gaze as a pointing modality) (for excellent reviews,
see Duchowski, 2002, Rayner, 1998, and Wedel & Pieters, 2007). The first eye tracking
study to be published was conducted as early as in 1924 by Nixon, who hid in a box behind
a curtain to observe eye movements of consumers studying print ads. For the research on
cognitive decision strategies, in particular Edward Russo and co-workers made use of this
technology. In one paper, Russo and Rosen (1975) used eye tracking to examine cognitive
strategies in multialternative choice. Their participants had to choose from sets of 6 used cars.
The fixation sequences suggested that participants engaged in many pairwise-comparisons,
which was confirmed by verbal protocols. Similarly, Russo and Dosher (1983) presented
their participants with simple binary choice problems (e.g., granting a scholarship to one of
two applicants) and recorded their eye movements. Again, the interpretations of the eye
fixation data were validated with cued retrospective verbal protocols. The authors found that
participants processed the available information predominantly in an attribute-wise manner.
Even for simple gambles, where computations within alternatives were required, participants
searched at least as often attribute-wise as alternative-wise. In addition, participants used
procedures to simplify the calculations and to reduce cognitive effort, which, however, led
to a (relatively small) increase in errors. In a study on consumer decision making, Russo
and Leclerc (1994) recorded the eye fixations of typical shoppers in a simulated supermarket
environment. The participants were videotaped through a one-way mirror and were hence
not aware that their eye fixations were being recorded. The authors found evidence for three
stages in which the process of decision making could be divided. The stages were interpreted
as (1) orientation, (2) evaluation, and (3) verification. Finally, in another study where eye
movements were observed through a one-way mirror, van Raaij (1977) found that consumers
engage in many comparisons between pairs of alternatives.
Based on the assumption that simply looking at product information presented in a matrix
(i.e., eye tracking) is more realistic and less under conscious control than using a computer
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mouse for uncovering cells (i.e., Mouselab), it is reasonable to assume that there will be less
reactivity to the experimental method with eye tracking than with Mouselab. However, and
despite the popularity of eye tracking technology, very few studies directly compared different
information search techniques, with two important exceptions.
In van Raaij’s (1977) study, 20 housewives chose among thirteen alternative brands of
coffee, each described on four attributes. In a first session, they examined actual product
packages and their eye movements were recorded. Four months later, the same participants
now made their choices using an information board. Although choices were faster with eye
tracking, participants acquired more information in this condition (more than half of the avail-
able information) than in the information board condition (about one third of the available
information). More than half of the searched information was accessed twice or more with
eye tracking, but no reacquisitions were observed in the information board condition.
Lohse and Johnson (1996) compared Mouselab with eye tracking using apartment selec-
tion tasks and gambles. They found meaningful differences between the two methods. With
eye tracking, participants were faster, had more fixations, and more reacquisitions but ex-
amined a smaller percentage of the total information and their information search showed a
more variable pattern. Moreover, participants tended to search more attribute-wise with eye
tracking than with Mouselab. Generally, the differences between the two methods increased
with task size and the participants were more accurate in the gambles task when eye track-
ing was used. The authors came to the conclusion that the recording of eye movements has
several advantages: it elicits faster reaction times, hence it appears that it is less demanding
for the participants; it leads to more accurate task performance in choices between gambles,
and this was particularly true when processing demands increased; and is better suited for
larger problems (i.e., more alternatives and/or attributes). Similarly, in his comparison of
several process tracing methods Russo (1978) also came to the conclusion that eye tracking
offers advantages not offered by other methods. Moreover, he argued for a simultaneous use
of eye tracking and verbal protocols.
Having the results of van Raaij (1977) and of Lohse and Johnson (1996) in mind, a second
experiment was conducted where eye tracking was integrated into IAPT to test for possible
influences of the research method on the participants’ cognitive processes and behavior, and,
ultimately, whether this new method could still be improved by the use of eye tracking in
addition to or instead of Mouselab. A higher percentage of correct predictions and a higher
convergence between the described strategies and the information search data would be in-
dicative of such an improvement. A further, minor point of interest in Experiment 2 was
the phenomenon of choice deferral, or, in other words, the decision not to select any of the
presented options. As opposed to the forced choice paradigm used in most of the studies
on preferential choice (and also in the first experiment), I explicitly wanted to give the par-
ticipants the possibility to defer choice in any given set. I think that this is essential for
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the type of choice situation examined in the present experiments because in real life people
frequently (e.g., more than 95% of the time, Sismeiro & Bucklin, 2004) people decide not
to buy any of the options available in a certain (online) store. As a theoretical framework
the Two-Stage, Two-Threshold (2S2T) framework of choice deferral by White and Hoffrage
(2009) was used, which can account for all documented choice deferral phenomena, including
the counter-intuitive finding that people defer choice more often when faced with a larger
choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). It assumes two possible reasons or stages for choice de-
ferral. Either none of the presented options is judged as being sufficiently attractive (Stage 1;
absolute threshold), or the decision maker is not certain which of the options is best (Stage 2;
relative threshold). Note that in this experiment the possibility to defer choice was introduced
primarily to increase the reality of the purchase situation and not to study the phenomenon
of choice deferral in depth. Therefore, the investigation of choice and deferral behavior is
only of explorative character and no hypotheses are formulated regarding this topic. For a
specification of the framework and related experiments, see White and Hoffrage (2009) and
White et al. (2009).
4.1 Hypotheses
4.1.1 Prediction accuracy
Identical to Experiment 1, it is expected that participants can provide an accurate description
of their choice strategies. Based on the assumption that eye tracking allows for a less obtrusive
and hence more natural information search than does Mouselab, it is reasonable to hypothesize
that there will be less reactivity to the experimental method when this technology is used.
Albeit this is a rather speculative assumption, this decrease in reactivity could be manifested
in a higher prediction accuracy of the described strategies when eye tracking is used rather
than when Mouselab is used.
Hypothesis 9: The strategies described by the participants will predict their own choices
better than a random strategy.
Hypothesis 10: The prediction accuracy will be higher in trials where eye tracking is
used than in trials where Mouselab is used.
Given that in the first experiment the described strategies made incorrect predictions in
about a quarter of the cases, the question arose of how these prediction errors came about (see
the Discussion of Experiment 1 on p. 38). One possible explanation was that people are not
always consistent when faced with the same choice twice. Thus, rather than a lack of validity
of the achieved descriptions, inconsistencies in the participants’ strategy use could be the
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reason for the observed incorrect predictions. In other words, participants made errors during
the execution of their strategies. To test whether participants are consistent, in Experiment 2
some of the trials are presented twice and whether participants make identical choices in both
instances is observed. If it is assumed that the execution errors observed in Experiment 1
were due to inconsistencies on the side of the participants rather than due to invalid strategy
descriptions, then the prediction accuracy should be higher in the consistent trials than in
the totality of the trials.
Hypothesis 11: The prediction accuracy will be higher in the consistent trials than in
the totality of the trials.
4.1.2 Information search
The acquisition of information needs far less effort with eye tracking than with Mouselab,
which leads to two expectations. First, participants are expected to need less time to complete
a trial when using eye tracking than when using Mouslab, and, second, they should access
more information in the former condition than in the latter.
Hypothesis 12: The time to complete a trial will be shorter in the eye tracking condition
than in the Mouselab condition.
Hypothesis 13: The number of accesses will be higher with eye tracking than with Mouse-
lab.
Similarly, expectations concerning not only the total amount but also the number of reac-
quisitions of previously accessed information can be formulated. Due to the more effortful
information acquisition with Mouselab, participants are likely to memorize the acquired in-
formation better with this method than with eye tracking, which in turn reduces the need
for reacquisitions (cf. Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Russo, 1978; van Raaij, 1977). Hence, the
reacquisition rate is expected to be higher in the eye tracking condition than in the Mouselab
condition.
Hypothesis 14: The reacquisition rate will be higher with eye tracking than with Mouselab.
In the first experiment, participants stopped search on alternatives that they should have
eliminated according to the strategy they described in only a minority of the cases. In other
words, very often they acquired more information than their strategy needed for execution.
This is in line with Karelaia (2006) who found that people have the tendency to look for
confirming information before choosing. Following from this, it is expected that participants
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will search for more information than their strategy needs for execution.
Hypothesis 15: Participants will access more information than the strategy they describe
needs for execution.
Finally, the hypotheses regarding the direction of the information search and the rela-
tion between attribute rank and frequency of access are identical to the ones formulated in
Experiment 1.
Hypothesis 16: Elimination strategies will lead to an attribute-wise search and additive
strategies will lead to an alternative-wise search (as indicated by the Payne Index).
Hypothesis 17: Elimination strategies will lead to a higher variability of search than
additive strategies.
Hypothesis 18: Elimination strategies will lead to a lower depth of search than additive
strategies.
Hypothesis 19: Participants will access more information on higher ranked attributes
than on lower ranked attributes.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
Participants were 27 students (5 female and 22 male) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Tech-
nology of Lausanne (EPFL) and the University of Lausanne with a mean age of 24.6 years
(SD = 3).
4.2.2 Task and stimuli
As in Experiment 1, the task was to select a mobile phone for purchase out of a set of four.
The four phones presented in each trial were drawn randomly1 from the pool of phones used
in the first experiment (except for one which disappeared from the market in the meantime).
1 This random process had the following constraints: (a) Any set of four phones consisted of four distinct
phones, that is, no phone appeared more than once in a given set. (b) Half of the trials (randomly determined)
used the same phones in both conditions, but in a different, random order. Here, two orders were excluded:
(1) the order that was the exact reverse of the original order and (2) all the orders where two phones were
next two each other in the same order as in the first condition. In addition, the first trial of the first condition
was never repeated at all and the last trial of the first condition was never repeated as the first trial in the
second condition.
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4.2.3 Apparatus
For Phases 1 and 2 of IAPT a computer-based process tracing measure was used, which was
very similar to the one in Experiment 1. It was synchronized with the eye tracker so that
stimuli presentation in both conditions could be done with the same program (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Screen-shot of the computer-based process-tracing measure used in Experiment 2
The iView X™Hi-Speed eye tracker was used, manufactured by SensoMotoric Instruments
(SMI; Teltow, Germany), which works at a sampling rate of 1250 Hz, a spatial resolution of
0.01°and a gaze position accuracy of 0.25°. Only one eye was recorded and the gaze position
was determined using the pupil and corneal reflection method. The system has a chin rest to
avoid head movements. For stimulus presentation, a 17-inch screen was used and the distance
between the participants’ eyes and the screen was about 50 cm. The illumination of the screen
was kept constant and room lighting did not interfere with the recording capabilities of the
eye tracker.
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4.2.4 Design and procedure
Each participant experienced both of the two conditions, Mouselab (ML) and eye tracking
(ET) (in Phase 2 of IAPT), with the order counterbalanced (13 participants began with ML
and 14 with ET). Each condition consisted of 12 trials. Thirteen of 27 participants started
with ML and the remaining 14 with ET. Half of the trials of the first condition were repeated in
the second condition, but with a different, random ordering of the alternatives (see Footnote 1
for details). Participants completed the first two phases in approximately 30 minutes and the
last one in approximately 25 minutes. In addition, between five and ten minutes were needed
for the calibration of the eye tracker. The total duration of the experiment was thus about
an hour.
Except for the changes related to the new research questions and some minor modifications,
the general procedure was identical to the one of the first experiment. The changes were
as follows. First, because there were no differences between the with-list condition and the
without-list condition in Experiment 1, the list of attributes was now shown to all participants.
Second, given that many participants in Experiment 1 requested information about phone
brand and name now the image of the phone was replaced with this information. Third, to
open a cell it was sufficient to move the mouse over it (instead of clicking as in Experiment 1).
The cell closed again when the mouse was moved away. This modification was necessary to
be able to compare the data from Mouselab and eye tracking. Fourth, the size of the cells was
increased so that in Phase 2 participants could not read the information contained in the cells
neighboring the fixated cell. Due to size limitations of the screen, the maximum number of
attributes that could be selected was ten. The cell size was kept constant irrespective of the
number of selected attributes, with each cell being 60 mm wide and 33 mm high (visual angles
of 6.8 °and 3.8 °, respectively). Because the aim was to keep the situation as natural and
realistic as possible, the participants were informed about this limit only when the number
of attributes they selected exceeded this number. Apart from the fact that the cells were
initially masked in the Mouselab condition, the interface was completely identical in both
conditions. Fifth, in Phase 2 participants were now given the possibility to choose none of the
four alternatives. To defer choice, participants had to click a button labeled “Choose none
of these.” After that, they had to indicate why they deferred by selecting one of two reasons:
“Because none of them is good enough” or “Because I am not sure which is the best.” There
was no cost to deferring choice, and participants could do so as often as they wished. Sixth
and finally, instead of presenting screen-shots of the information board (i.e., cuing trials), in
Phase 3 it was tried to enhance recall by letting the participants repeat one of the trials of
the first condition of Phase 2. This repeated trial was randomly selected from the set of 12
(with the exception of the first trial). After that, participants were presented with an empty
matrix so that the values shown in the repeated trial did not influence the participant when
describing his or her strategy.
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4.2.5 Payment
In the introduction to Phase 3, participants were informed that they will receive 1.50 Swiss
Francs (1 SFR = approximately 0.82 USD at the time the study was conducted) for each
correct prediction of their described strategy, with a minimum guaranteed payment of 10 SFR.
The average payment was 25 SFR (SD = 6).
4.3 Results
On average, participants selected 7.15 (22%) of the 33 available attributes. The attributes that
were selected most often were price (96%), size (85%), stand-by time (59%), and digital camera
(56%). Twenty-three attributes were requested by between 52% and 4% of the participants
and six attributes were never used (external display, Java games, Office, video playback, video
streaming, and voice command). Table 4.1 lists the attributes and the frequency with which
they were chosen.
All analyses regarding differences between the conditions were done using a mixed design
ANOVA including the within-participants variable of condition and the between-participants
variable of order.
4.3.1 Deferrals
In 31% of the trials of the ML condition and in 30% of the trials of the ET condition partic-
ipants did not choose any of the phones presented in the respective set. This is in line with
most of the literature on choice deferral (e.g., Dhar, 1997; White & Hoffrage, 2009). The
difference between the conditions is not significant (F (1, 25) = .201, p = .66,MSe = 99.01),
but the order had a significant effect on the frequency with which participants deferred choice
(F (1, 25) = 6.49, p = .02,MSe = 880.6). When ET was used first participants deferred sig-
nificantly more often (41%) than when Mouselab was used first (20%). The deferral option
was used by all but two participants (93%). In most of the deferrals (86%, across conditions)
participants indicated that none of the available options was good enough, which corresponds
to a Stage 1 deferral in the 2S2T framework.
4.3.2 Described strategies
Again, two general types were found: elimination strategies and additive strategies. Of the 27
participants, almost all (26 of 27; 96%) eliminated alternatives during their decision making
process, based on between one and nine (M = 4.77,Mdn = 5) attributes. Eight participants
(30%) introduced JNDs. Adding up attribute values in a linear fashion was used by 18 of
27 (67%) participants. Of those 18 participants who used an additive strategy, 10 (63%)
assigned weights to the attributes according to their subjective importance. Finally, 17 of
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Table 4.1: Number of participants who chose each attribute
Chosen by
Attribute % of Participants Mean Rank
Price 96 2.19
Size 85 3.13
Stand-by Time 59 3.75
Integrated Digital Camera 56 5.53
Internal Display 52 5.36
Weight 52 4.14
Color 48 6
Bluetooth 41 5.18
MP3 player 41 5.27
Connectivity (USB) 33 3.22
Phone Name 33 5.56
Internal Memory 26 5.57
Stereo FM 11 4
Talk Time 11 6.67
UMTS(3G) Compatibility 7 2.5
Band Support 7 4.5
Email Support (POP3+IMAP4) 7 8
Infrared 7 3.5
SMS 7 5
VibraCall Alert 7 4
External Memory 4 10
GPRS 4 6
Integrated Speakerphone 4 3
MMS (Photos+Text+Sound) 4 7
Speech Recording 4 5
WAP 4 9
Windows© Mobile 4 10
External LCD Display 0 –
Java Games 0 –
Office© 0 –
Video Playback with Sound 0 –
Video Streaming 0 –
Voice Command 0 –
the 27 participants (63%) combined elimination with an additive strategy. Table 4.2 displays
three exemplary strategies.
4.3.3 Prediction accuracy
The degree to which the strategies described by the participants could predict their own
choices (66%) was slightly, but not significantly, higher (F (1, 25) = 3.96, p = .07,MSe =
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Table 4.2: Three examples of participants’ strategies
Participant 11: 1) Eliminate all phones that have a stand-by time of less than 250 hours and
that are more expensive than 200 euros. If no phone remains then defer choice
(because none of the phones is good enough). If one phone remains then choose
it.
2) If more than one phone remains, calculate a WADD model with all attributes
for the remaining phones (without the attribute size). Use the following
weights: price and stand-by: 4, mp3: 2, camera and USB: 1. Choose the
phone with the highest overall value.
3) If there is a tie, choose the cheapest phone if the difference in stand-by is less
than 20 hours. If this difference is greater than 20 hours then choose the phone
with the higher stand-by time.
Participant 12: 1) Eliminate all phones that are more expensive than 200 euros, that are not at
least tri-band phones, that do not have an integrated speakerphone and that
are heavier than 120 grams. If no phone remains then defer choice (because
none of the phones is good enough). If one phone remains then choose it.
2) If more than one phone remains then take the lightest phone.
3) If there is a tie then choose the phone with bluetooth.
4) If there is still a tie then choose the cheaper phone.
Participant 26: 1) Calculate the ratio price/talk time for all phones. Take the phone with the
best ratio if it has also the most or equal connectivity features (i.e., UMTS,
e-mail, USB, GPRS, Bluetooth).
2) If no phone can be chosen this way, take the phone with the most connectivity
features, if the ratio price/talk time is not the worst of the four.
3) If still no phone can be chosen, take the phone with the second most connec-
tivity features.
4) If there are more than one second best phones regarding connectivity then take
the phone with the best ratio price/talk time.
139.8) in the ML condition (69%) than in the ET condition (63%, average = 66%). In
the repeated trials, participants made the same decision in both instance in only 73% of
the cases. This supports Hypothesis 9 but not Hypothesis 10. The prediction accuracy
was considerably higher in the consistent trials (78%) than in the inconsistent trials (40%)
(F (1, 22) = 52.3, p < .001,MSe = 296.3), which is in line with Hypothesis 11.
Similar to what was found in the first experiment, the prediction accuracy was higher for
male than for female participants (68% vs. 59%, respectively). However, the number of female
participants was again very low (five out of 27), and therefore no meaningful conclusions can
be drawn from this data.
It was also verified whether the participants’ strategies were better at predicting choices,
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of choices correctly predicted by the participants’ decision strategies
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors.
choice deferrals, or whether there was no difference between these two decisions. The predic-
tion accuracy was significantly higher in the trials where the participants selected an option
(70%) then in the trials in which choice was deferred (53%, F (1, 18) = 4.81, p = .04,MSe =
812.7)2 (see Figure 4.2).
4.3.4 Information search
An in-depth analysis of the information search data was done to check for possible differ-
ences between Mouselab and ET. As in the first experiment, it was also verified whether the
described strategies were reflected in the information search data. In particular, I focused
on the following: (1) the time spent per trial, (2) the amount of information acquired, (3)
the information considered by the participants compared to the information needed by the
strategy they described, (4) the direction of the information search, and (5) the correlation
between percentage of accesses and attribute rank. The scanpaths depicted in Figure 4.4
exemplify some of the results described in the following.
Due to some calibration problems that were detected only when analyzing the ET data,
seven participants had to be excluded from all analyses involving information search data
except for time. Half of the remaining 20 participants started with Mouselab and the other
10 with ET. The ET data was analyzed using the software BeGaze (SMI). Fixation position,
duration, and sequence (i.e., scanpath) were analyzed. Fixations of less than 100 ms were
2For all analyses concerning choices and deferrals, the one participant who never chose and the six partic-
ipants who never deferred were excluded.
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excluded from the analysis.3
Time
In general and in line with Hypothesis 12, participants spent significantly more time per trial
in the Mouselab condition than in the ET condition (36.73 vs. 20.41 seconds, respectively,
F (1, 25) = 72.0, p < .001,MSe = 52.36). There was a significant interaction between condi-
tion and order (F (1, 25) = 30.5, p < .001,MSe = 52.36), but in both orderings the effect of
condition was significant and in the same direction.
The time in which a trial was completed did not depend on whether a phone was chosen or
choice was deferred (29.47 vs, 29.49 seconds, respectively; F (1, 22) = .005, p = .95). However,
participants needed significantly more time for Stage 2 deferrals than for Stage 1 deferrals
(39.82 vs. 26.54 seconds, respectively, F (1, 7) = 13.1, p = .009,MSe = 51.39).
4 This is in
line with the assumptions of the 2S2T framework, which predicts that Stage 2 processing
only occurs after Stage 1 processing and so Stage 2 deferrals should take longer than Stage 1
deferrals.
Amount of information
The next analysis concerns the amount of information the participants accessed. First, it was
distinguished between the total number of accesses or fixations (i.e., including reacquisitions
of the same information) and the number of different cells accessed. As predicted by Hypoth-
esis 13, participants had significantly more total accesses in the ET condition than in the ML
condition (41.83 vs. 22.35, respectively, F (1, 18) = 44.5, p < .001,MSe = 85.35). The effect
of condition interacted with the order (F (1, 18) = 14.7, p < .001); looking at the simple effects
of each order showed that this was the case for both orderings but the effect just failed to reach
significance when ML was the first condition (ML first: F (1, 18) = 4.00, p = .06; ET first:
F (1, 18) = 55.2, p < .001). However, the number of different cells accessed was very similar in
the two conditions. On average, participants accessed 15.45 (59%) cells in the ML condition
and 16.73 (63%) cells in the ET condition (F (1, 18) = 3.01, p = .10,MSe = 5.393). This cor-
responds to 59% (ML) and 63% (ET) of the total information that was available (i.e., depth
of search). Again, the effect of condition interacted with the order (F (1, 18) = 15.0, p < .001).
When ET was the first condition, participants searched for significantly more information in
the ET condition than in the ML condition (F (1, 18) = 15.7, p < .001). However, this was
reversed for the opposite ordering, but here the difference between the ML and ET condition
3BeGaze calculates fixations by subtracting saccades and eye blinks from the original gaze stream. For a
saccade to be detected three conditions had to be satisfied: (a) peak values of velocities in the gaze stream
were > 75°/s, (b) the single peak value of velocity lay in the middle 60% between start and end of the event
and (c) the duration of the event was > 1 ms. An eye blink was detected when the conditions for saccades
were satisfied and when the change in the pupil diameter exceeded an internally defined threshold.
4Only the 9 participants who made Stage 1 and Stage 2 deferrals were used for this analysis.
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was not significant (F (1, 18) = 2.28, p = .15).
Second, the reacquisition rate was assessed, which is the percentage of accesses that were
reaccesses of previously seen information (in the same trial). In line with Hypothesis 14, there
was a significant difference between the two conditions, with a reacquisition rate of 27% in the
Mouselab condition and 57% in the ET condition (F (1, 18) = 126, p < .001,MSe = 72.34).
Again, the effect of condition interacted with the order (F (1, 18) = 13.1, p = .002), but in
both orderings the effect was significant and in the same direction.
Information considered
The information accessed by the participants (IA) was compared with the information that
their described strategies needed for execution (SP). In particular, the number of times a
participant accessed a cell contrary to the prescription of his or her strategy (CA), and the
number of times a participant did not access a cell although his or her strategy prescribed
it (CNA). Generally, participants in both conditions accessed more information than their
strategy needed, which is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 15. In the Mouselab condition,
participants accessed an average of 15.45 cells although their strategies required only 10.63.
This difference is significant (F (1, 18) = 45.2, p < .001,MSe = 5.156). Moreover, there was
a significant interaction between condition and order (F (1, 18) = 4.93, p = .04), but the
effect was significant and in the same direction in both conditions. The average number
of cells accessed contrary to the requirement of the strategy (CA) was 5.80 as opposed to
only 0.98 cells that were not looked up although the described strategy required it (CNA)
(F (1, 18) = 35.5, p < .001,MSe = 6.570). The same holds true for the ET condition, where
participants accessed an average of 16.73 cells although their strategy required only 10.65
cells (F (1, 18) = 21.6, p < .001,MSe = 17.06). Analogous to the Mouselab condition, the
mean CA was 7.48 as opposed to a mean CNA of 1.40 (F (1, 18) = 30.6, p < .001,MSe =
12.06). Apart from CA (F (1, 18) = 7.24, p = .02,MSe = 3.858)
5, these measures did not
differ significantly between the two conditions (IA: F (1, 18) = 1.85, p = .19,MSe = 8.724;
SP : F (1, 18) = .03, p = .86; CNA: F (1, 18) = .971, p = .34).
Direction and variability of information search
As already briefly mentioned in the first experiment, the PI has been subject to some criticism
(Bo¨ckenholt & Hynan, 1994; Stokmans, 1992). For the cases where the number of attributes
is not equal to the number of alternatives the PI for a completely random search is unequal to
zero. In addition, the PI varies as a function of the number of transitions in a particular trial.
Therefore, the PI can lead to inaccurate conclusions and the values of the index observed under
5A significant interaction between order and condition was found (F (1, 18) = 14.8, p = .001). Only when
the participants started with ET the difference in CA was significantly higher in the ET condition than in
the Mouselab condition.
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different combinations of attributes and alternatives or even different numbers of transitions
are not directly comparable (Bo¨ckenholt & Hynan, 1994). Still another problem with the
PI is that extreme values have a higher probability of occurrence than intermediate values.
As a reaction, Bo¨ckenholt and Hynan (1994) developed a standardized version of the PI, the
SM index. This index is a function of the differences between the observed alternative-wise
and attribute-wise transitions. For any N, the mean is 0 and the variance is 1 when the
search pattern is random. For a large number of transitions, the SM approximates a standard
normal distribution. With this index, extreme values have a lower probability of occurrence
than intermediate values.6 Formally:
SM =
√
N((AD/N)(ra − rd)− (D − A)√
a2(D − 1) + (D2(A− 1)
(4.1)
where N is the total number of transitions, A is the number of alternatives, D is the number of
attributes, ra is the number of alternative-wise transitions and rd is the number of attribute-
wise transitions. The SM index was calculated for each participant and each condition,
resulting in the following. In the Mouselab condition, 17 of 20 (85%) participants had a SM
score that indicated attribute-wise search whereas only one participant had a SM score that
indicated alternative-wise search. Two participants had non-significant SM scores. In the
ET condition, 14 participants searched attribute-wise and again only one participant (not the
one of the ML condition) searched alternative-wise. In this condition, five participants had
non-significant SM scores. There was no significant difference in the SM scores between the
two conditions (F (1, 18) = .777, p = .39,MSe = 31.20).
The variability of search was calculated separately for each condition and the number of
trials in which the proportion of cells accessed was equal on each alternative (i.e., a standard
deviation of zero) was counted. This was found in only 14 (6%) of all trials of the ML condition
(across all participants) and in none of the trials of the ET condition. The mean standard
deviation across all trials and participants was 3.17 in the ML condition and 6.17 in the ET
condition. This difference is significant (F (1, 18) = 34.8, p < .001,MSe = 2.579), showing
that the search in the ET condition was much more selective than in the ML condition. The
variability of search was also generally higher here than in the first experiment.
The significant SM scores were also compared to the described strategies to check for the
degree of correspondence between the described strategies and information search. In the
ML condition, five of the six participants who used purely elimination-based strategies had a
significant SM score that indicated attribute-wise search. However, the only participant who
used a purely additive strategy also had a score that indicated attribute-wise search. The
6This index is not without criticism either (e.g., Ball, 1997; Harte & Koele, 2001), but I felt that it is
sufficiently informative for the present purposes. Note that it could not be used in Experiment 1 because it
is not applicable when the cells of the information board remain open once they have been clicked on.
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remaining 13 participants with significant SM scores used mixed strategies (i.e., elimination
and additive), and therefore their data cannot be interpreted in this context. In the ET
condition, virtually the same pattern emerged. Four of the six participants who used purely
elimination-based strategies had a significant SM score indicating attribute-wise search. But
again, attribute-wise search was also found for the participant with the purely additive strat-
egy. The remaining 11 participants with significant SM scores used mixed strategies. Thus,
although the search pattern and the strategy descriptions are in line for those participants
who used purely elimination-based strategies, this does not hold true for the participant who
used an additive strategy. However, it would be audacious to base a conclusion on only one
participant.
Moreover, the participants in the ML condition who used exclusively elimination-based
strategies tended to have a lower variability of search than the participants with the mixed
strategies. This is contrary to what would be expected. In the ET condition, the mean vari-
ability of search was almost identical. Curiously, the participant using the additive strategy
had a relatively low variability of search in the ML condition and a relatively high variability of
search in the ET condition. This might indicate a limited validity of this measure. In contrast,
and more promising, the depth of search was lower for participants with elimination-based
strategies (in both conditions) than for participants with mixed strategies. The participant
with the additive strategy again showed a strange behavior having one of the highest depths
of search overall in the ML condition and a lower depth of search than the participants
with mixed strategies in the ET condition. Altogether, Hypotheses 16 and 18 are somewhat
supported by the data but there is no evidence in favor of Hypothesis 17.
Further assumptions about the underlying decision strategies used by the participants
can be derived by looking at the two measures search pattern and variability of search in
combination. In the present case, every participant with significant SM score indicating
attribute-wise search had a variability of search greater than zero. This suggests that a
strategy similar to the elimination-by-aspects strategy (Tversky, 1972) was used. The one
participant who had a more alternative-wise search pattern also had a variability of search
larger than zero which points to the use of the conjunctive strategy (cf. Harte & Koele, 2001).
Frequency of access
In a last analysis, I wanted to know whether the frequency with which participants accessed
information on the selected attributes reflected the attributes’ rank ordering that they had
established in the first phase of the experiment. First, the mean frequency of accesses per
rank was calculated separately for both conditions. However, the correlations between ac-
cess rate and attribute rank (see below) were not significantly different in both conditions
(F (1, 19) = .139, p = .71). Hence, only the results averaged over both conditions are reported
here. Overall and in accordance with Hypothesis 19, it was found that the less important an
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Figure 4.3: Mean proportion of accesses and box opening/fixation times per attribute rank
Note—(1) Proportion of accesses refers to the frequency with which a particular attribute rank was
accessed. (2) Proportion of time refers to the total amount of time spent on a particular attribute
rank. (3) The numbers in brackets following an attribute rank indicate how many participants used the
corresponding number of attributes or more.
attribute was rated, the less frequently it was accessed by the participant (Figure 4.3). The
linear trend was highly significant (F (1, 30) = 45.4, p < .001). The standardized mean corre-
lation was -0.91 and hence very closely resembled that found in Experiment 1 (r=-0.83).7,8
As a final step, it was verified for how many participants the frequency of accesses decreased
monotonously from the highest ranked attribute to the lowest. Looking at each participant
separately, only 3 (10%) participants had a strictly monotonous trend (i.e., each higher ranked
attribute was accessed more frequently than any of the lower ranked ones), and one single
participant (3%) had a monotonous trend (i.e., each higher ranked attribute was accessed
more frequently than or as frequently as any of the lower ranked ones). For the majority
of participants (16 of 20, 52%) the trend was not monotonous, although the violations were
small in many cases and the general trend of decreasing frequency of accesses with decreasing
attribute importance could still be observed. Averaged across all participants the trend was
not monotonous either, though, as Figure 4.3 indicates, the only violation of the monotonous
7Moreover, the correlation between (1) each participant’s correlation between attribute rank and frequency
of access and (2) the number of attributes this participant accessed was calculated. This correlation was -.12,
indicating that participants who used only a small number of attributes did not spuriously inflate the first
correlation.
8But note that, as in Experiment 1, attribute importance was confounded with the vertical position on
the screen.
60 CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2: IAPT AND EYE TRACKING
decrease occurred relatively low in the attribute hierarchy. In this context, I also looked at
the latency of search (Ford et al., 1989; Harte & Koele, 2001), that is, the total time spent
on each attribute rank (averaged across all participants). Not surprisingly, exactly the same
pattern was found as with the access rates (see Figure 4.3). However, the time a box was
opened in the Mouselab condition and the fixation time in the ET condition did not differ
significantly between the attribute ranks (F (3, 54) < 1, p > .88 for both conditions).9 In other
words, the time participants spent on a particular piece of information did not depend on the
importance they assigned to the attribute containing this information.
Summary
The analysis of the process data yielded the following results. First, participants needed
significantly less time to complete a trial in the ET condition than in the ML condition. When
participants deferred choice, they spent more time on a trial when they reported deferring
because they were unsure which phone was best than when they reported that none of the
phones was good enough. Second, participants had a significantly higher number of accesses
(including reacquisitions) in the ET condition than in the ML condition. However, there was
no difference between the two conditions regarding the number of different cells accessed (i.e.,
depth of search). Consequentially, the reacquisition rate was far higher in the ET condition
than in the ML condition. Third, when comparing information search and the described
strategies it was found that participants accessed significantly more information than their
strategy required for execution, without any difference between the conditions. However,
they obtained almost all the necessary information for their strategy to work. Fourth, the
pattern of search also did not differ significantly between the two conditions. The search
was generally more attribute-wise and selective (i.e., indicating noncompensatory processing),
which was in line with the nature of the described strategies. However, the variability of search
was significantly higher in the ET condition than in the ML condition. Fifth and finally,
participants’ search for information reflected, by and large, their ranking of the attributes
according to their importance.
A look at the scanpath of Participant 7 in Figure 4.4 is a good example for some of the
results described above. What can be seen here is that this participant examined almost
exactly the same information (with a few exceptions) in both conditions. However, he had
many more fixations in the ET condition than in the Mouselab condition, of which most
were reacquisitions of already accessed cells. The times the boxes were open in the Mouselab
condition were clearly longer than the fixation times in the ET condition. The direction of
his information search was very similar in both conditions.
9This analysis was calculated based on only the first four ranks (thereby excluding one participant who
had less than four ranks).
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Figure 4.4: Scanpaths of one participant in the ML condition (a) and in the ET condition (b)
Note—The size of the circles correspond to the time a box remained open in the ML condition and the
fixation time in the ET condition. The trials were identical in both conditions with the exception that
the positions of Phones 1 and 4 were swapped. The participant completed the trials in 44 sec (ML) and
17 sec (ET).
4.4 Discussion
In Experiment 2, the finding that the strategies identified with IAPT have good predictive
power was successfully replicated. In 66% of the cases the described strategies correctly
predicted the participants’ choices, which is very similar to the 73% that were observed
in Experiment 1. Again male participants were better at describing their strategies than
were female participants (68% vs. 59%, respectively) but, as in Experiment 1, the number
of female participants was too low to obtain meaningful results. However, the question of
whether gender differences regarding the description of choice strategies exist is worthwhile
and should be addressed in further studies using more balanced samples.
Moreover, it appears that many of the incorrect predictions can be attributed to incon-
sistent choices rather than to unreliable strategy descriptions: participants made consistent
choices in only 73% of the trials and the prediction accuracy was considerably higher (i.e.,
78%) when only the consistent trials were taken into account. Thus, it appears that some
or even many of the incorrect predictions of the participants’ strategies can be explained by
inconsistent behavior during the choice phase.
Very similar to what was found in the first experiment, the described strategies were only
partly reflected in the information search data. The analysis of the pattern, variability and
depth of search measures did not lead to new insights, and, in an analysis slightly different
to the one performed in the first experiment, it was found that participants accessed a lot
of information that was not needed by the described strategy. However, they rarely failed
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to obtain information that was required by their strategy, which demonstrates at least some
convergence between the information search measures and the verbal protocol.
Regarding choice deferral there was some evidence for the 2S2T framework (White et
al., 2009), for instance, the fact that Stage 2 deferrals took significantly longer than Stage
1 deferrals. Interestingly, the participants’ strategies were far less successful at predicting a
choice deferral (i.e., 53%) than the choice of a concrete alternative (i.e., 70%). It seems that
participants were better at giving reasons for their choices than for their deferrals.
The comparison between the two information search techniques, Mouselab and eye track-
ing, yielded the following picture. Eye tracking was generally faster, that is, even though
participants had a higher number of accesses they needed less time to complete a trial. Fur-
thermore, the information search was more selective (i.e., there was a higher variability of
search) in the eye tracking condition. However, the difference in the number of accesses can
almost completely be attributed to the fact that participants simply reaccessed some cells
several times, because participants searched for virtually the same proportion of the total
information in both conditions. Many of these reaccesses might have served the purpose of
validating a tentative choice (which was often visible in the scanpath of the participants’
eye movements), which corresponds to the validation stage described by Russo and Leclerc
(1994). Moreover, no differences were found between the two information search measures
regarding the pattern of search and the relation of determined rank order and frequency of
access. These results are quite similar to the findings of van Raaij (1977) and Lohse and
Johnson (1996), except for the following: van Raaij’s participants acquired more different
items with eye tracking than with the information board, whereas my participants had a
very similar depth of search in both conditions. Lohse and Johnson found a slight difference
in search pattern (i.e., with more alternative-wise with eye tracking) and their participants
unexpectedly searched for less information with eye tracking. In contrast, I did not find any
differences on these variables.
What can now be concluded about the use of eye tracking with IAPT? Given that eye
movements are less under conscious control than the hand movements required by Mouselab,
it is reasonable to assume that eye tracking is less prone to reactivity than Mouselab. How-
ever, it appears that the former methodology improves neither the exactness of the description
of the cognitive processes nor the quality of the results concerning the information search. In
other words, eye tracking did not provide more informative data than did Mouselab. With
eye tracking, there is considerable noise in the information search data due to the fact that
sometimes it is impossible to separate voluntary information acquisitions from random fixa-
tions that occurred while the participant was thinking. In contrast, the process of information
acquisition with Mouselab seems to be more systematic, which could be a result of some reac-
tivity of the method on the one hand (see Glo¨ckner & Betsch, 2008), but which leads to data
that is easier to interpret on the other hand. Moreover, given that the results obtained with
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both methods were very similar is thus evidence in favor of the latter method. In other words,
Mouselab was validated with eye tracking. In sum, despite the technological innovations of
the eye tracking technology, Mouselab is still much easier to set up and to use. When using
Mouselab, no calibration is necessary and it works with virtually every participant whereas
when using eye tracking some of the participants have to be excluded because no reliable
calibration can be achieved (in my experiment, this was the case for seven of the 27 partic-
ipants; 26%). In addition, with Mouselab, many participants can be run at the same time
and even over the internet with a ready-to-use program called MouselabWEB (Willemsen &
Johnson, 2006). Given that the advantages of eye tracking were not very pronounced in my
experiment, I conclude that Mouselab is the more convenient and efficient method for this
kind of task. It should be noted, however, that there is another, very recent process tracing
technique called Flashlight (Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hutzler, 2008), which has the
potential to mimic laboratory based eye tracking research online. Here, the information on
the screen is blurred so that it cannot be read by the participant. However, a small area (i.e.,
a circle) around the mouse cursor is sharp, similar to a flashlight in the dark. To search for
information, participants just have to move the mouse over the areas of interest. Flashlight
seems to be a promising alternative here because it is as easy to set up and use as is Mouselab
but, similar to eye tracking, it comes closer to a natural information search by providing less
structure. Moreover, given that the information search is done with the mouse and not with
the eyes, Flashlight may even provide less noisy data than eye tracking because arbitrary
fixations that occur during “thinking breaks,” for example, are less likely to occur.
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that IAPT is a valid technique for the iden-
tification of consumers’ decision strategies. Moreover, the new process tracing technique is
not only useful for descriptive research in decision making, but as is shown in the following,
the obtained findings also prove beneficial for applied purposes such as the development of
decision aids. These systems systematically assist consumers in the execution of typical choice
strategies like the ones described above. I have developed such a decision aid, which is de-
scribed in the subsequent second part of the present dissertation. After an introduction into
the topic of decision support systems in general and web-based decision aids in particular, the
new choice aid is presented in detail and an experiment that was conducted for its evaluation
in terms of usability and general acceptance is described.
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Part II
Aiding Preferential Choices
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Chapter 5
Decision support systems and
web-based decision aids
Broadly speaking, a decision support system (DSS) is a “computer-based system that aids the
process of decision making” (Finlay, 1994, p. 29). Emerging from both information technology
and decision analysis, DSS aim to improve managerial decision making in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness. They are used by one or several decision makers and come into operation
in many different fields, such as management, medicine, government, or engineering.1
A typical application of DSSs is to assist multi-attribute decision making (MADM),2 that
is, decisions under certainty where the decision maker chooses among several alternatives,
which are described on a varying number of attributes. How many alternatives and attributes
are actually considered depends on the decision problem at hand, and, to some extent also on
the decision maker. For instance, for the choice of a new apartment, only a few alternatives
(< 10) may be considered, whereas a human resources specialist often has to choose among
hundreds of job applicants. To represent the (subjective) importance of an attribute relative
to the others, each of them receives a weight. These weights are either assigned by the decision
maker or elicited by special methods (e.g., ranking, ratio weighting, etc.). MADM problems
are usually represented in a matrix format, with the attributes in the rows and the alternatives
in the columns (or vice versa). This form of representation has the advantage that it facilitates
the detection of the conflict typically inherent in this type of decision problems. Given that
often one alternative is better than the other(s) on some attributes but worse on others, the
decision maker is forced to make trade-offs to resolve this conflict (Yoon & Hwang, 1995).
In contrast to descriptive models of decision making that aim at merely describing human
behavior without normative implications (see Part I), MADM models are prescriptive models
of decision making. The purpose of these models is to provide instruments for making rational
1The field of DSS is very broad and diverse, but a more detailed description would be beyond the scope of
this work. For good overviews see Finlay (1994) and Holsapple (2008).
2Variants of this term are: multiple attribute, multiple objective, multiobjective, multiple criteria or
multicriteria (D. L. Olson, 2008).
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decisions.
Decision aids are tools within a DSS where multi-attribute analysis is used to support
selection decisions (D. L. Olson, 2008). They are intended to help the decision makers to
make better decisions from a normative point of view. Typical multi attribute approaches
that have been integrated into decision support systems are multiattribute utility theory
(MAUT; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), TOPSIS (Hwang & Yoon, 1981), or the analytic hierarchy
process (AHP; Saaty, 1980).
One of the best known and most widely used methods of MADM is the Weighted ADDitive
method (WADD), also known as the Simple Additive Weighting method (SAW). This method,
which is based on MAUT, multiplies each attribute value with the corresponding weight and
then adds up these weighted values to obtain an overall score for each alternative (cf. Part I,
Chapter 3.3.2 on p. 32). The alternative with the highest overall score is chosen. To be able
to add up items with different measurement units (e.g., price vs. size), the attribute values
have to be normalized. This can be achieved by various methods (see, for example, Yoon &
Hwang, 1995). Formally:
Vi =
n∑
j=1
wj ∗ rij, i = 1, . . . ,m (5.1)
where wj are the attribute weights, rij the normalized attribute values, i the alternatives and
j the attributes. An example for a system that is based on MAUT is the software Logical
Decisions3 (for more examples, see D. L. Olson, 2008).
The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS, Hwang &
Yoon, 1981) follows a similar logic. This method first calculates normalized attribute values
and weights and then determines the euclidean distance of each alternative to the positive- and
negative-ideal solutions (i.e., a hypothetical alternative with the best/worst attribute ratings
attainable for the specific set of alternatives under consideration). TOPSIS then chooses the
alternative with the maximum similarity to the positive-ideal solution.
A different approach is the analytic hierarchy process by Thomas L. Saaty, which has
received much attention since its development in 1980. A complex problem is structured into
a hierarchy of attributes, with the overall goal at the top (e.g., buy a mobile phone that will
satisfy me), the attributes describing the alternatives in the middle (e.g., price, display size,
etc.), and the choice alternatives at the bottom. To determine the relative importance of
the attributes, the decision maker has to make pairwise comparisons of all attributes and all
alternatives on a nine-point scale. These ratings are then used to calculate each alternative’s
contribution to the overall goal. An additional feature of AHP is that after the pairwise
comparisons the decision maker can perform a sensitivity analysis (i.e., a “what if” analysis)
by changing attribute weights and observing how different weights affect the ranking of the
3www.logicaldecisions.com
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alternatives. Today, the AHP is used as a principal component in many (commercial) decision
support systems (e.g., Expert Choice,4 Decision Lens,5 and Decision Simplifier 6).
5.1 Decision aiding on the internet
The internet is a very well suited platform for decision aids due to three reasons. First, it
is easily accessible and being accessed by a tremendous amount of people. As of today, the
internet has almost 1.5 billion users worldwide7 and the number of purchases that are made
on the internet is constantly growing. According to Forrester research, European e-commerce
will reach €263 billion in 2011, which translates to an average spending increase per customer
from €1,000 in 2006 to €1,500 in 2011 (Favier & Bouquet, 2006). Second, it stores enormous
amounts of information, the basic ingredient for making decisions. Third, the possibilities
of today’s technology allow for technically advanced implementations of decision aids, which
are comparable to its oﬄine counterparts in speed and functionality. In fact, many of the
commercial decision support systems now have a web-based version.
These positive features are some of the reasons for the success of online shopping. As op-
posed to traditional brick-and-mortar stores, online retailers do not face physically imposed
limits regarding the number of alternatives per product category. This is certainly an ad-
vantage for both the retailer (i.e., competitive edge) and the consumer (i.e., a large choice
set), but it entails a problem that is very well known to everyone who has done information
search on the world wide web: information overload. For example, at the time of writing,
Amazon.com featured more than 2’300 products only in the category “point & shoot digital
cameras.” On the one hand, having a large choice set is good, because the probability of
finding a product that corresponds to one’s needs is higher. White and Hoffrage (2009) refer
to this positive effect as the “allure of more choice.” However, having many alternatives to
choose from can also be problematic. In a large choice set, there are often many very similar
alternatives, which makes it more difficult to decide which of the products is best. There is
hence a “tyranny of too much choice” (White & Hoffrage, 2009). Moreover, as apposed to a
traditional shop, an online retailer has no vendor who can assist the consumers to find their
way when confronted with a large number of products and product features.
The objective of online decision aids is to overcome the tyranny of too much choice and
even, at least to a certain extent, to replace the vendor. They present and structure the
available information according to the input provided by the users and can substantially
increase the fit between a particular person’s information needs and the available information
(Ariely, 2000). Given that preferences are often constructed on the spot and that the selection
4www.expertchoice.com
5www.decisionlens.com
6www.decisionduck.com
7www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm, accessed in 2009
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of decision strategies is contingent on the task at hand, these information needs tend to vary
not only between but also within consumers (over time).
Nowadays, several tools facilitating consumer decision making exist on the internet. Ha¨ubl
and Trifts (2000) call these tools interactive decision aids, where the term (machine) interac-
tivity refers to systems that have the following characteristics: “reciprocity in the exchange
of information, availability of information on demand, response contingency, customization of
content, and real-time feedback” (p. 5; see also Alba et al., 1997; Ariely, 2000; Zack, 1993).
The underlying idea of these tools is that “resource-intensive but standardizable, information
processing tasks are performed by a computer-based system, thus freeing up some of the
human decision maker’s processing capacity” (Ha¨ubl & Trifts, 2000, p. 6). These kinds of
decision aids are also referred to as recommendation agents, which can be defined as systems
that “elicit the interests of preferences of individual users for products, either explicitly or
implicitly, and make recommendations accordingly” (Xiao & Benbasat, 2007, pp. 138–139).
In their overview of interactive decision aids, Ha¨ubl and Trifts (2000) used a slightly different
categorization and identified two general types: recommendation agents and comparison ma-
trices. As can be seen in the description of the choice aid presented below, this distinction is
very well suitable for the present purpose and I will therefore use it in the remainder of this
dissertation.
Recommendation agents (also called recommender systems [Adomavicius & Tuzhilin, 2005]
or electronic sales assistants [Miles, Howes, & Davies, 2000]) help consumers to view products
they are very likely to be interested in. These can either be recommendations based on past
search behavior or recommendations based on preferences specified by the consumer in terms
of a pre-selection of products. For instance, the recommendation agent used in a study by
Ha¨ubl and Trifts (2000) generates a personalized list of products based on the consumers’
attribute importance weights. Using these weights, the agent applies the WADD rule to the
alternatives in the choice set and ranks them by overall value. In addition, the consumers
can specify acceptance thresholds for the attributes and also determine the desired maximum
size of the choice set.
In contrast, comparison matrices display the product information in an attributes-by-
alternatives matrix, which allows for a good side-by-side comparison of the products. Exam-
ples for comparison matrices can be found on the websites of shopping.com, dpreview, or O2
Germany. Although it is a promising development, simply displaying product information in a
matrix is neither directly aiding the consumers nor does it guarantee that the decision process
used is in line with rational standards and procedures. For instance, Fasolo and McClelland
(1999) found that although people often tend to look at much or even all of the available
information, they do not aggregate the information in a way that would be consistent with
a (weighted) additive rule (especially when the attributes were positively correlated). This
calls for a decision aid that directly supports the compensatory in-depth comparison of alter-
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natives. At the time being, however, there is no such system available for private consumers,
at least to my knowledge.
Decision aids belonging to the two types presented above can now be found on many if
not most consumer websites. Edwards and Fasolo (2001) discuss some further tools, which
incorporate various ideas and procedures of decision analysis. However, by the time the
present work was written, almost every site they present has disappeared. Moreover, some of
the (promising) features they mention are not contained in today’s web decision aids anymore
(e.g., assigning weights to attributes or specifying the preferred range of variation for each
attribute). I now first give an overview of decision aids implemented in today’s consumer
websites and then discuss some related literature.
5.1.1 Web-based decision aids: An overview
The most prominent decision aids that can be found currently are recommendation agents,
which can be divided into two types: collaborative filtering and content filtering agents. Rec-
ommendation agents of the first type are based on the users’ past browsing and buying
behavior and are useful especially for products that are rather difficult to describe on at-
tributes other than price, such as books and music. For instance, one of the major online
retailers, Amazon, features a recommendation page where consumers are provided with a
list of articles that might be of interest to them. This list is compiled with the help of rec-
ommendation algorithms, which elicit the users preference implicitly (e.g.,“people who also
bought”) or explicitly (via techniques such as question answering, rating options, critiquing,
or conversational interaction; Peintner, Viappiani, & Yorke-Smith, 2008) and make sugges-
tions accordingly. The resulting list of recommendations can often be sorted according to
certain criteria such as price or customer rating. There is a vast literature on this type of
recommendation agents, which use complex algorithms (e.g., collaborative filtering; Linden,
Smith, & York, 2003) to find the products that correspond best to the preferences of the users
(for a recent review, see Xiao & Benbasat, 2007). However, these recommendation agents are
only of minor interest for the present purpose and a discussion of this field would be beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
In contrast, content-filtering recommendation agents allow the consumers to view a list
with alternatives that correspond to certain criteria (via a pre-selection feature). These rec-
ommendation agents are typically used for technical products such as mobile phones or digital
cameras. For instance, Amazon provides the possibility to specify the set of displayed alter-
natives by indicating desired attribute values (e.g., digital cameras that have a resolution of
8 megapixels). This is not surprising, given that the number of products within one product
category can sometimes be quite large. Many of today’s online retailers (e.g., shopping.com,
bestbuy.com) have similar elimination or “winnowing-down” features. However, the attributes
that can be used for elimination vary widely from one site to the next and it is quite possible
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that a decision maker might get very different choice sets from one site to another (Martin &
Norton, 2008). In addition to this, many sites feature comparison matrices. Here, the users
can sometimes sort the alternatives by attribute values (e.g., price) and reduce the size of
the matrix by hiding attributes and/or alternatives. Apart from that, however, no further
manipulations such as changing the vertical position of the attributes are possible.
Figure 5.1: The main screen of the O2 Handyberater
A choice aid with a relatively advanced pre-selection tool is the so called “Handyberater”
(mobile phone advisor), which can be found on the websites of several german mobile phone
carriers (i.e., T-Mobile, E-Plus, and O2). In this tool (a java applet) the users define cut-
offs for continuous attributes such as price or weight by setting sliders to the maximum or
minimum acceptable attribute level. For discrete attributes (usually “yes” or “no”), the
desired presence of a feature is indicated by checking a box. After each user input, the
eliminated alternatives disappear from the screen (see Figure 5.1). This is an advantage as
compared to other sites, where the page has to be re-loaded each time a threshold is set or
changed. Along with this tool a comparison matrix is provided where a maximum of three
5.1. DECISION AIDING ON THE INTERNET 73
alternatives can be compared.
Figure 5.2: Several screens of GM’s Shopping Advisor
Even more advanced and fundamentally different in its use is General Motor’s Shopping
Advisor for choosing a car, where the users are walked through a step-by-step process with
three phases. In the first phase (Figure 5.2 a, b, c), the potential car buyers are asked to
indicate their preferences regarding several attributes (e.g., body style, passenger and cargo
capacity, and price) by assigning numbers between zero and ten to several discrete values of
the attribute (e.g., capacity for 2, 4, 6, 8, or > 8 passengers).8 Then, in the second phase,
8In most cases, the values have a preset of five and to be able to proceed the value of at least one alternative
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the users may specify importance weights for each attribute (between zero and hundred, with
the default being 50) (Figure 5.2 d). Finally, in the third phase, the users are asked to make
pairwise comparisons of sets of two attribute values (assuming everything else to be constant).
Specifically, they have to make active trade-offs between attributes that they have rated as
important (see Figure 5.2 e). Following that, the system displays the users’ attributes weights
and recommends three cars (Figure 5.2 f). Unfortunately, however, the users are not told to
what degree the three recommended alternatives match their preferences and there is no
possibility to make a sensitivity analysis in terms of changing the attribute weights calculated
by the system. From what one can tell by using the tool, the underlying mechanism of this
choice aid is probably an adaptive conjoint analysis (Johnson, 1985; 1991).
5.1.2 Related literature
Electronic product recommendations, even more than human recommendations, can have a
significant influence on the likelihood of purchasing a product. For instance, Senecal and
Nantel (2004) found that consumers using a recommendation agent bought recommended
products twice as often as consumers who did not receive any recommendations. But not
only whether or not but also which product is bought can be influenced by the use of a de-
cision aid. Ha¨ubl and Trifts (2000) conducted an experiment to investigate the impact of a
recommendation agent and a comparison matrix on consumer decision making. Generally,
both tools led to smaller but higher quality consideration sets. Moreover, 93% of the partici-
pants selected a nondominated alternative when using a recommendation agent as opposed to
only 65% without assistance. Aided participants also switched far less often (21%) to another
alternative after their purchase than unaided participants (60%). The authors concluded that
these two decision aids simultaneously increase decision quality and decrease effort.
In a study by Jedetski, Adelman, and Yeo (2002) participants were asked to choose several
products on two consumer shopping sites (varied between-participants). On one website
(Jango) the alternatives were presented in a simple list, whereas the other (CompareNet)9
provided tools to sort alternatives by specific criteria and to compare the products side by side.
Jedetski et al. (2002) found that participants used more compensatory decision strategies and
were more satisfied10 when using the CompareNet than when using Jango (as indicated by a
self-report). The number of alternatives also had an effect on the type of decision strategy
used: when the number of alternatives increased more participants used noncompensatory
strategies. However, this study has some flaws. The participants were presented with a
list containing six very different decision strategies (three of them compensatory and three
noncompensatory) before they made their choices and, after each choice, were asked to select
has to be changed.
9Both websites discussed in this paper do not exist anymore in the form described by the authors.
10This satisfaction was not affected by the decision strategy used.
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the strategy that best described their decision process. Hence, when making their choices,
participants could have simply followed one of the presented decision strategies motivated
by several reasons: to appear consistent, to please the experimenter, etc. In addition, one
probably important strategy for this kind of task was omitted, the elimination-by-aspects
strategy (Tversky, 1972).
Ariely (2000) conducted a series of experiments on the costs and benefits of control over
the information flow. He found that a high level of control over the displayed information
was beneficial in terms of a better matching of preferences, better memory and knowledge
about the examined domain, and a higher confidence in the judgment. People also liked the
interface more than a very simple one where no control over the information flow was given.
However, these benefits were not always present. Given that the use of a system with high
information control itself entails a higher demand on processing capacities due to its increased
complexity, some learning about how to use the system is necessary to be able to exploit its
advantages. Without this learning, the use of such a system can even lead to a decrease in
the ability to utilize the presented information. Another finding by Ariely (2000) was that
systems with high information control led to a better memory for the information and the
organization of the information in memory. Moreover, with these systems participants also
had a higher knowledge of the structure of the environment, that is, the relationship between
the values of the different attributes.
Finally, Is¸ıklar and Bu¨yu¨ko¨zkan (2007) propose a formal MADM approach for the selection
of mobile phones. First, in a questionnaire, the users rate a set of 16 attributes in terms of
their importance on a five-point scale. Then, AHP is used to determine the relative weights,
and, finally, a rank order of the alternatives is established with TOPSIS. However, although
it is an interesting approach, so far it has not been evaluated in terms of usability or user
acceptance.
5.1.3 Caveats of web decision aids: The trust issue
Decision aids like the ones described above can greatly facilitate a consumer’s way through
the data laden hyperspace. However, these increasingly complex and sophisticated systems
become less and less transparent. This reduced transparency may raise consumers’ suspicions
about the degree of altruism of these systems. As pointed out by Ha¨ubl and Murray (2006),
such choice aids may be designed not only to support consumers but also to serve the sellers
interests such as increasing sales, selling particular items and so on (see also Senecal & Nantel,
2004). Thus, consumers might transfer the image they have of real sales people to their
electronic counterparts. This is perhaps one of the reasons why recommendation agents still
are not as prevalent as they could, or perhaps should, be (according to A. L. Montgomery,
Hosanagar, Krishnan, & Clay, 2004, they are used by only 10% of online shoppers). Xiao
and Benbasat (2007) propose that the credibility of the provider or the decision aid (e.g.,
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Amazon) might influence the trust users have in the system. Consequently, the same decision
aid could be met with different degrees of trust, depending on the hosting website. However,
they were not able to find experimental data that supports this hypothesis.
5.2 The InterActive Choice Aid (IACA): A web-based
decision aid for online shopping
The rationale for the creation of a decision aid is to improve decision making, or, in other
words, to help the decision maker to achieve a good decision outcome, while keeping the effort
of the decision process low. That is, a decision aid tries to reduce the trade-off between effort
and accuracy implied by the notion of adaptive decision making (Payne et al., 1993; see above
on p. 19). However, there is evidence that people are primarily concerned with reducing
the effort while maintaining accuracy at an acceptable level. Therefore, to induce the use
of normatively oriented strategies such as WADD, the decision aid has to sufficiently reduce
the effort needed to execute such a strategy (Todd & Benbasat, 1991; 1992; 1994a; 1994b;
2000).11 When designing a decision aid, emphasis should thus be placed on the reduction
of effort needed to execute a normatively desirable strategy. In addition, the system should
help the users to cope with decisional conflict, that is, difficult trade-offs between attributes
(Kottemann & Davis, 1991).
As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Ha¨ubl and Trifts (2000) characterize
consumer decision making as a two-step process in which, first, the choice set is screened and
promising alternatives are retained, and, second, the retained alternatives are compared in
depth (for similar characterizations see Edwards & Fasolo, 2001; O’Keefe & McEachern, 1998).
This two-step process is virtually identical to what was found in the experiments described in
Part I of the present dissertation. Based on this knowledge about the way consumers make
decisions, I wanted to create a choice aid, which systematically helps consumers to make
purchase decisions. Rather than imposing a possibly objectively-ideal but unnatural decision
procedure on the users (e.g., AHP-based decision aids), the intent was to assist the natural
process of human decision making by providing explicit support for the execution of the users’
decision strategies (i.e., elimination strategies and additive strategies). The rationale for this
was to ensure that users accept and understand the system and, ultimately, can benefit from it.
A very recent study by Al-Natour, Benbasat, and Cenfetelli (2008) provides positive evidence
for this assumption. These authors found that decision aids were rated better in terms of
usefulness and trustworthiness when their process was perceived to be similar to the one of the
11However, Chu and Spires (2000) have investigated this claim and found that rather than focusing exclu-
sively on effort reduction, a decision maker trades off effort and quality to select the decision strategy. In
that sense, decision aids can also cause users to choose a higher effort strategy to increase the accuracy of the
decision.
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users (see, however, Aksoy & Bloom, 2001). By reducing the effort of the decision process, the
choice aid aims to promote more compensatory and hence more normative decision making.
The result of this endeavor, the InterActive Choice Aid (IACA), therefore has two phases:
a pre-selection phase, where undesirable alternatives can be quickly eliminated by setting
limits based on attribute values, and a comparison phase, where the users can perform side-
by-side comparisons of the alternatives. The system has several features to support decision
making in both stages and it is interactive in that its output depends on the user’s interaction
with the system. In contrast to many DSSs, IACA does not focus exclusively on the normative
side of decision making (i.e., assisting the users in making decisions that are in line with
rational standards and procedures), but it also explicitly takes into account our knowledge
about the decision process. In the following, I describe an existing prototype of IACA, which
was developed for the evaluation of the system. The screenshots presented below are all taken
from this prototype. Some additional specifications of the prototype that are of importance
for the evaluation experiment in particular but not for the choice aid in general are listed in
Section 6.2.1 (p. 87). The description of IACA is followed by a discussion of its strengths and
weaknesses. After that, an experiment is described that was conducted for its evaluation.
5.2.1 Phase 1: Pre-selection of alternatives
In Phase 1, the users can reduce the size of the choice set quickly and conveniently by indicat-
ing desirable ranges of values on some or all attributes. For example, many consumers have a
good idea of how much they are willing to pay for a product. The possibility to exclude too
expensive products from the list of shown alternatives would hence facilitate their information
search considerably. In IACA, there are two ways to set such exclusion criteria, depending on
the type of the attribute (i.e., continuous vs. discrete).
For continuous attributes such as price, size or stand-by time, IACA features sliders that
can be moved to the desired cut-off-level. For instance, if a customer’s maximum acceptable
price was 100 SFR, he or she would set the slider to this value. The endpoints of the sliders are
always the lowest and the highest attribute value, respectively, in the entire choice set. The
value corresponding to the actual position of the slider is displayed to its right. For discrete
attributes such as whether the phone features a music player or Bluetooth, the users define
the acceptance threshold by checking a box for the attributes of interest (i.e., present/absent).
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, the sliders and check boxes are on the left side of the screen
with the field containing the alternatives is to its right. Note, that the pre-selection phase of
IACA is very similar to the Handyberater described in Section 5.1.1 (p. 71).
At the outset, all sliders and check boxes are set so that all alternatives are included. For
each alternative, the name and a link to another website with further details is provided.
When the users move the mouse over the name of a particular product, a window containing
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Figure 5.3: The pre-selection phase of IACA at the outset
Figure 5.4: The pre-selection phase of IACA after some eliminations
the product picture pops up.12 When a slider is moved or a box is checked, all alternatives that
fail to meet the acceptance threshold on the respective attribute are eliminated. Eliminated
12I would have liked to display pictures of the products in addition to the product name and without any
action required from the users, but this was technically not feasible for the prototype used (see Chapter 6 on
p. 87).
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alternatives disappear from the screen (see Figure 5.4).13 In addition, on the top left of
the field containing the alternatives the number of phones that are currently in the choice
set is indicated. When the users feel that the choice set has a manageable size for making
more detailed comparisons, they can proceed to Phase 2 (i.e., comparison of alternatives) by
clicking a button labeled “Ready. Take Me to the Comparison Phase!”
5.2.2 Phase 2: Comparison of alternatives
The second phase of IACA, comparison of alternatives, can be considered a very simple
spreadsheet-based decision support system (Seref & Ahuja, 2008). As is shown in Figures 5.5
to 5.7, the screen is dominated by an attributes-by-alternatives matrix with the product
features in the rows and the products in the columns. Because the users can adapt this matrix
interactively to their personal needs and preferences, it is called the Interactive Comparison
Matrix (ICM). A list displayed to the left of the ICM contains all available attributes for the
particular product category currently in use.
At the top of each column (except for the very first column), product name and picture
are displayed along with a link to another webpage containing more details (the same as
in Phase 1). Below that, an overall value for each product is shown (see below for details
regarding the calculation of that value). The rank of a particular product, which depends on
this overall value is displayed above the picture of the phone. Moreover, the three phones
with the highest overall value are marked “Best Phone,” “Second Best Phone,” and “Third
Best Phone,” respectively. A phone can be selected for purchase by clicking on “Buy Phone”
on the bottom of the matrix.
When the users first get to this site, the system displays only the products that were
not eliminated in the pre-selection phase. However, at this moment the matrix does not
contain any attribute values. The rationale for this was to try to prevent the system from
influencing the users too much regarding which information should be considered important
(cf. the attribute selection phase of the experiments in Part I). To see information on one of
the attributes of the list, the users write the name of the attribute in the leftmost column
of the ICM.14 Upon that, this attribute’s values are shown for each product. Note that the
vertical position of the attribute plays an important role here. As indicated by a red bar
labeled “importance factor” to the left of the first column, more important attributes should
be placed higher up (i.e., “extremely important”) and less important attributes lower down
(i.e., “not so important”) the column. Moreover, this importance rating is not simply a rank
13Again, this is in part due to the limitations of the prototype. In the final application and for the cases
where the initial choice set is not very large (i.e., all alternatives fit conveniently on one page), the picture of
the eliminated alternatives would not disappear but just be reduced in contrast. However, when the choice
sets are so large that the alternatives are spread out over many pages, this is no longer feasible because one
goal of elimination, that is, reducing the information search, would not be achieved given that the amount of
pages to visit would remain the same as before the elimination.
14In the final application of IACA this will be a drag and drop function and no writing will be required.
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Figure 5.5: The comparison phase of IACA at the outset
ordering. Hence, bigger distances between two attributes mean bigger differences in subjective
importance. By making the decision of where to place the attributes, the users define their
subjective attribute weights. For each alternative, the weights of each attribute are multiplied
with the corresponding attribute values. The sum of these values is the overall value shown
for each product. The system hence executes a WADD strategy based on the user input. To
be able to calculate this overall value across different attributes with different measurement
units, the attribute values have to be normalized first. This normalization allows inter- and
intra-attribute comparisons. As in the experiments reported in Part I, the attribute values
were normalized by performing z -standardizations on them.15 The position of the attributes
can be changed throughout the entire decision process to see how different weights affect the
overall values of the alternatives.
The users could also specify for each attribute whether a high value is desirable (by writing
“yes” in the space to the right of the respective attribute) or undesirable (by leaving the space
blank). The default is chosen so that most of the consumers would agree (e.g., a lower weight
is more desirable than a higher weight but a higher stand-by time is more desirable than a
lower stand-by time). This option has the advantage that each user can adapt the system to
his or her particular needs (e.g., somebody who for a particular reason wants a very heavy
15See below for more ways of standardizing attribute values.
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Figure 5.6: The comparison phase of IACA with some attributes added
phone would change from the default). Another possibility the users have here is to change
between two different ways the information about the attributes is presented. In the standard
setting, absolute attribute values are displayed (e.g., 149 CHF for price, 95g for weight etc.;
see Figure 5.6). In the other setting, relative attribute values are displayed. These values are
percentages relative to all other products in the entire choice set. For instance, in the choice
set used in the experiment described below, a stand-by time of 250 hours corresponds to 52%
of the maximum available stand-by time (see Figure 5.7). The rationale for introducing this
representation was to facilitate alternative comparison in particular for users who are not
experts in the respective product domain. Particularly for attributes such as size or weight,
the users can quickly see whether the product is relatively big or small, light or heavy when
compared to the other phones they can choose from.
To speed up the attribute selection process, three buttons were introduced to the right of
the attribute list. The first, labeled “all,” allows the users to move all available attributes
at once into the matrix whereas the second, “clear,” removes all attributes from the matrix.
The button labeled “typical” moves a selection of attributes in the matrix, which is based
on the behavior of past consumers. This last button was meant to assist consumers who
have limited knowledge about the product category and who are therefore not sure which
attributes to consider. Finally, there are two more options. First, the users can eliminate a
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Figure 5.7: The comparison phase of IACA with relative values
particular product from the matrix by clicking on “Hide Phone” (at the top of each column).
Second, the phones that have been eliminated in the pre-selection phase can be included into
the matrix by clicking on “Show All Available Phones” (in the first column of the ICM).
With IACA, I have tried to create an environment that facilitates the search for and the
integration of product information, the two cardinal components of consumer choice. To what
degree this goal has been achieved and what the shortcomings are becomes apparent in the
following discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the new system.
5.2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the pre-selection phase
To avoid information overload, which is often inevitable given the very large choice sets that
are common today, IACA enables the users to quickly eliminate undesirable alternatives (e.g.,
too expensive) by defining what is an acceptable alternative (i.e., via the sliders and check
boxes). In contrast to other systems that have an elimination feature, in IACA the users
can base their exclusions on all available attributes (simultaneously) as opposed to only on a
few, which are determined by the system designers. This guarantees a high system adaptivity
across users. The reason why sliders and check boxes were used, which have a directly visible
effect on the size and the composition of the choice set, was to provide accurate and timely
feedback about the effects of the threshold setting. For instance, if most of the phones are
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below 200 CHF, not many eliminations would take place before the users reach this threshold
(when starting from the most expensive phone). Similarly, when almost no phone has an
infrared connection, checking this box has a big effect and vice versa. Many consumers are not
experts in the respective product domain and they therefore have little or no knowledge about
what can be considered favorable or unfavorable attribute values. For example, somebody
who has never bought a digital camera probably does not know how many megapixels the
camera should have, and what is common for cameras that are on the market today. The
direct feedback of IACA helps the users to get an idea of the composition of the choice set,
for example, that today most cameras have at least seven or eight megapixels. Moreover, the
sliders make this process more dynamic than just choosing a value from a drop-down menu
or something similar. As a slider is moved from one end to the other, the users can discover
the point at which products start to be eliminated and whether this happens slowly (i.e.,
one after the other) or suddenly (i.e., many at once). In the former case, this indicates that
many products have different values, in the latter this means that many products have the
same value on the respective attribute. Thus, the users easily and quickly get a feel for the
distribution of values for a given attribute.
A potential weakness of the sliders is, however, that only single point cut-offs and no
intervals can be determined. Moreover, the fact that all attributes can be used for eliminating
has the consequence that the screen is relatively “full,” which reduces the understandability
of the system.
A basic problem of elimination features in general is that sequential eliminations are a
hill climbing process that can lead to local optima, which may be significantly less desirable
than the global optimum. For example, if the price cut-off is set to 200 CHF, all subsequent
eliminations and comparisons happen in this reduced choice set. This prevents the user
from detecting a possible alternative that is only slightly worse on the respective elimination
criterion (e.g., 210 CHF) but more desirable overall. Edwards and Fasolo (2001) refer to this
as “winnowed-out winners.”
5.2.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the comparison phase
Strengths
The problem of information overload is biggest in the pre-selection phase. However, in the
comparison phase I also tried to achieve the best possible way of information presentation to
ensure that the users can focus exclusively on the information that really matters to them.
That is why the ICM is empty at the outset of Phase 2. As opposed to most matrices
that are nowadays available on the web, the ICM does not automatically display all available
information at once. This is because my past research has shown that consumers are interested
in only a small fraction of the available information (see Part I). With IACA, the users
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therefore have the ability to select the information they want to focus on and they can
even arrange it in terms of its subjective importance. The latter matters mainly for the
calculation of the overall value, but it also entails another advantage. Given the natural
direction of reading in most of the world (i.e., from left to right and from the top to the
bottom), it makes sense to display more important information towards the top and less
important information towards the bottom of the screen. The fact that attributes of similar
importance are closer together than attributes of varying importance further enhances this
visual advantage. Another advantage of IACA is the possibility to display relative instead of
absolute values. These different forms of information representation makes it easy to see how
well an alternative fares in comparison to the others on a particular attribute. This feature is
usually not present in a typical comparison matrix, but has been found in other contexts. For
example, on one site (www.tigerdirect.com16) the ranges of some attributes are presented as
lines (e.g, smallest to highest megapixels) and a cross on the line marks the relative position
of the product in question.
The second goal, namely, to facilitate information integration by providing assistance for
resource intensive calculations, is achieved with the introduction of the alternatives’ overall
value that is calculated by the system depending on the users’ input. This calculation fea-
ture aims to help the consumer to resolve difficult tradeoffs that are not easy to mentally
calculate. The interactivity of the system guarantees an overall value that is very specific
to the users’ preferences. A further advantage of the overall value is that it is immune to
selective perception. In other words, it “sees” what the users sometimes overlook, especially
if they want a particular alternative to come out first in the evaluation (for a reason that they
might not be aware of). In addition, the process of selecting and arranging attributes often
helps decision makers to get a better view of the decision problem and of what is actually
important to them. Things that seemed to be very important at the beginning are often
reevaluated when looking at the bigger picture. By re-setting the attribute weights, the users
can perform a sensitivity analysis to see how their changes affect the overall value. In sum,
this feature supports a more normatively oriented decision process by promoting the use of a
compensatory strategy (i.e., WADD). This, in turn, is likely to lead to more accurate choices,
or, in other words, to better decisions.
Weaknesses
One main problem with the present prototype of IACA concerns more the prototype itself
than the system as such. Due to the fact that it is not a a fully functional website, its usability
is clearly below what it could possibly be. However, this prototype was created for a first
test that was intended to evaluate IACA’s various features in terms of general acceptance
and perceived overall utility rather than to run a rigorous usability test of an almost finished
16The feature described here has disappeared in the meantime.
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application. Therefore, I will not go into more detail regarding usability issues. Further
weaknesses are the following.
First, IACA’s procedure for weight elicitation is very simple and attribute importance
could probably be assessed more accurately with more sophisticated techniques (e.g., ratio
method, swing weighting method, tradeoff method, or pricing out method), which have been
tested with regard to their validity and consistency (for a discussion of different weight elici-
tation techniques, see Borcherding, Eppel, & von Winterfeldt, 1991; Borcherding, Schmeer, &
Weber, 1995). Moreover, the AHP, which is widely used in organizational contexts, could be
a further valid technique for the kind of choices studied here (Is¸ıklar & Bu¨yu¨ko¨zkan, 2007).
However, I am skeptical that many consumers would be willing to engage in more complicated
weight elicitation processes or even numerous repeated pairwise comparisons as required by
the AHP, in particular when they do not really understand how the system works (see also
Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). I therefore think that in the present case the benefits of simplicity
outweigh the costs of a possibly reduced validity. With IACA, the users can see the whole
picture throughout the decision process and the effects of their actions are immediate. More-
over, the way weights are elicited with IACA entails a further advantage. By moving one
attribute at a time and holding all others constant, the users can make sensitivity analyses
similar to the one used in AHP-based applications. This is in line with Edwards and Fasolo
(2001) who suggested that a sensitivity analysis feature should be incorporated into decision
aids. Thus, although IACA’s method of weight elicitation might be less accurate than others,
I am confident that this approach has a clear advantage in terms of user acceptance as well
as ease of use.
Second, for the calculation of the overall value, the attribute values were normalized
relative to all 45 alternatives by using a z -transformation. However, during the experiment
reported below it became clear that this particular way of normalization was less than perfect,
in particular because in some rare cases the resulting overall values did not make much
sense. This problem disappears when the attribute values are normalized relative to only the
alternatives that are being compared in the ICM. For the future development of IACA, this
and other ways of normalization should therefore be considered.
Third and again related to the overall value, IACA uses values and not utilities. Given
that it is reasonable to assume that many users’ utility functions are not linear, this reduces
the validity of the overall value. Another, similar problem is that there might be a lack of
independence between the attributes. A high positive correlation between two attributes that
are both rated as being important leads to double-counting and distorts the overall value. A
decision maker might regard a certain combination of two attributes as being better or worse
than their weighted sum (Hill & King, 1989, Garcia-Retamero et al., 2007).
However, I again point out that when creating IACA one of the main goals was to have
a system that is very transparent and easy to understand. For a manager who makes risky
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decisions where mistakes are costly, a complex and highly accurate system may be desirable
and useful, but the average consumer who buys a comparatively cheap product is probably
not willing to invest the time that is needed for the execution of more sophisticated preference
elicitation techniques. Moreover, there is evidence that even for professionals training and
experience is necessary to provide complete and consistent answers (Tversky, 1974).17
In sum, IACA is a new decision aid, which incorporates ideas from various fields of research
as well as from similar systems that are on the market today. While some of its features (e.g.,
pre-selection) already exist in a similar form, others, albeit inspired by existing technologies,
are new, at least to my knowledge. As compared to other online decision aids, IACA has more
functions that assist the users in their choices. The price for this increase in functionality
is, however, a decrease in the ease of use of the system. Now, the question arises whether
people are ready to pay this price or whether they prefer easier systems. I tried to answer this
question empirically by conducting an experiment, which is described in the next chapter.
17For further ways of improving IACA, see the discussion of the experiment in Chapter 6 (p. 105).
Chapter 6
Experiment 3: Evaluating the
InterActive Choice Aid
When a new product is created, it usually goes through repeated cycles of testing and re-
finement, a process often referred to as iterative design (Rubin, 1994). To avoid significant
usability problems with the product that become apparent only after the product has been
completely designed, prototypes of varying degrees of fidelity have become an integral part of
the development process (Grady, 2000; Rudd, Stern, & Isensee, 1996).
Low fidelity prototypes are quickly constructed, very rough approximations of the product.
They are limited in functionality and user interaction, and are mainly used to evaluate general
concepts, design alternatives or screen layouts. These prototypes are hence used in particular
at the beginning of the development process. They can be simple, sometimes even hand
drawn paper representations of the product, whose use is mediated by a facilitator. For
instance, if the user “presses a button” in the prototype, the facilitator provides a new sheet of
paper representing the changed state of the system (i.e., after button press). The advantages
of low fidelity prototypes are that their creation is quick and cost effective, with little or
no programming skills being required. The cost of their simplicity is, however, that these
prototypes can provide little error checking and important design decisions may be overlooked.
A further problem is that during testing, they are demonstrated to the users rather than really
employed (Rudd et al., 1996).
Although it has been argued that the use of low fidelity prototypes can lead to a reduced
detection of usability problems (e.g., Nielsen, 1990), the current evidence suggests that they
are equally suited for usability testing than high fidelity prototypes (for an overview, see
Sauer & Sonderegger, in press). Another advantage of low fidelity prototypes is that because
of their quick and effortless creation, designers are less inclined to defend their design and are
therefore more receptive to user suggestions. Likewise, the users have the impression that the
prototype is only a rough model, which encourages them to make critical recommendations
(Grady, 2000).
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In contrast, high fidelity prototypes are valid representations of the product in develop-
ment. They are completely functional and interactive and can therefore be used and evaluated
as if they were the final product. Evaluations based on high fidelity prototypes can be more
thorough than those based on their low fidelity counterparts and they can be used to fine-tune
the prototype. Moreover, realistic comparisons with other products can be made. However,
these prototypes are much more costly in terms of time and money, and substantial program-
ming knowledge is required. This can be problematic because often there are no funds for the
development of such a prototype (Rudd et al., 1996).
The prototype of IACA that was created is strictly speaking not a high fidelity prototype,
in particular due to the fact that it is not a real website. However, in terms of feel and
functionality this prototype comes very close to high fidelity for most of the features. Yet,
some features are much more cumbersome than they will be in the final application (e.g., the
use of the ICM in Phase 2). Given the early stage of development and the cost that would be
incurred by the creation of a truly high fidelity prototype, I decided that the current version
would be the best solution. This prototype could be produced relatively quickly and without
external help. Moreover, already during its creation many things were noticed that had to
be different to how they were originally conceived, which could be implemented immediately.
By consequence, the prototype used in the experiment had already gone through some cycles
of development.
In the experiment described here, the prototype of IACA was evaluated in terms of per-
ceived utility and user satisfaction. To see how this new decision aid fares in comparison to
other applications, it was tested against two other (control) prototypes, which were adapta-
tions of decision aids implemented in real world consumer websites. The three prototypes
varied with respect to their functionality, that is, the number and type of tools they featured
to facilitate choosing, or, in other words, the degree to which users had influence on how the
information about the products was displayed. The tests were performed using two different
product categories, mobile phones and digital cameras.
6.1 Hypotheses
Processing a large amount of information takes time. Consequently, a choice aid that allows
for a substantial reduction of the information that has to be processed should equally have
an effect on the time that is needed to make the decision. Decision aids typically contain
several tools that allow for such a reduction of processing effort and time and positive effects
have been demonstrated by Hostler, Yoon, and Guimaraes (2005), Pedersen (2000), and
Vijayasarathy and Jones (2001). First, the number of alternatives that have to be inspected
can be reduced quickly and efficiently with tools for eliminating undesirable alternatives from
the consideration set. Second, tools for comparing several alternatives side-by-side make it
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unnecessary to switch between different websites containing detailed information about the
products in question and should thus reduce the decision time further. Third, a tool that
provides explicit assistance for resolving tradeoffs is also likely to speed up the process of
choosing because the decision maker is required to make fewer calculations.
The three prototypes that were compared in this experiment contain a different number of
such tools (see Section 6.2.1, p. 90). The first prototype features a tool for eliminations (low
degree of functionality, LowF ), the second tools for eliminations and side-by-side comparisons
(medium degree of functionality, MedF ), and the third tools for eliminations, side-by-side
comparisons and resolving tradeoffs (high degree of functionality, HighF ). Moreover, the high
functionality prototype further reduces the amount of processing by enabling the users to
limit the number of attributes that are displayed. Following from this, it is hypothesized that
the decision time will decrease from the first prototype to the third.
Hypothesis 20a: The decision time will be negatively correlated with the degree of pro-
totype functionality, that is, it will be longest for LowF, shorter for MedF and shortest
for HighF.
However, it is also possible that the decision aid will prompt users to make a more careful
and deliberate choice, which would be reflected in an increased decision time (E. L. Olson &
Widing, 2002). Therefore, Hypothesis 20b reads as follows.
Hypothesis 20b: The decision time will be positively correlated with the degree of proto-
type functionality, that is, it will be shortest for the LowF, longer for MedF and longest
for HighF.
These tools should not only have a positive influence on the time, but also on the effort of
executing certain decision strategies such as elimination and additive strategies. Given that
the three prototypes differ in regard to the number of alternatives the eliminations can be
based on, it is expected that the ease of elimination will be rated better when this number
is higher. Moreover, a side-by-side comparison tool should significantly increase the ease of
comparison of alternatives, in particular when assistance for resolving tradeoffs is provided.
Hypothesis 21: The ease of elimination of alternatives will be lowest for LowF, higher
for MedF, and highest for HighF.
Hypothesis 22: The ease of comparison of alternatives will be lowest for LowF, higher
for MedF, and highest for HighF.
Finally, based on the assumption that such tools allow for a more straightforward and
deliberate decision process, decision aids with a higher degree of functionality are thus likely
90 CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 3: EVALUATING IACA
to result in a higher confidence that a good choice was made than lower functionality decision
aids.
Hypothesis 23: Decision confidence will be lowest for LowF, higher for MedF, and highest
for HighF.
A negative aspect of highly functional decision aids is, however, that they are perceived
as more difficult to use and to understand, simply because the system gets more complex.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 24: The understandability of the choice aid will be highest for LowF, lower
for MedF, and lowest for HighF.
Hypothesis 25: The ease of use of the choice aid will be highest for LowF, lower for
MedF, and lowest for HighF.
A more difficult to use system could equally lead to worse usability ratings, which are
likely to be higher for more simple than for more complex systems. However, if the decision
aid greatly facilitates choice in spite of its complexity then its usability should be higher than
that for the more basic systems. Therefore, no clear predictions can be made in this case.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Material
Prototypes
The three prototypes were created with the spreadsheet application Microsoft Excel.1 They
were set up so that they very closely resembled real websites in terms of content, appearance
and functionality. Visual appearance and basic functionality were held constant across all
three prototypes. Each of them contained a “help function,” which was activated when the
participants moved the mouse over a field labeled “Help” in the right or left top corner of
the screen. Upon activation, a message appeared instructing the participants to refer to the
experimenter for any questions. The experimenter answered their questions orally, but tried
to mimic as closely as possible a real help function implemented on a web site.
The first prototype (LowF) had the least degree of functionality and was adapted from a
major shopping website offering many different products (www.amazon.de). Here, the users
could make a pre-selection of alternatives based on some attributes, either by choosing one
1Microsoft® Excel® 2004 for Mac, version 11.5.3
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Table 6.1: Attributes available in the three prototypes
Mobile Phones
LowF (Amazon) MedF (Sunrise) HighF (IACA) cont. cont.
Dual-band Brand Price Band support Infrared
Mp3 player Price Size SAR Bluetooth
Camera Weight Weight Brand USB
Tri-band Camera Stand-by Email UMTS
UMTS Bluetooth Talk time Active Sync GPRS
Quad-band LiveTV Camera Music Player EDGE
Price UMTS Internal memory LiveTV HSDPA
Display WLAN
Digital Cameras
LowF (Amazon) MedF (dpreview) cont. HighF (IACA) cont.
Resolution Format Storage types Price White balance override
Optical zoom Price Uncompressed format Resolution Image stabilization
Display size Resolution Optical viewfinder Optical Zoom Optical viewfinder
Image stabilization Optical zoom Display size Digital Zoom Manual exposure control
Optical viewfinder Zoom wide USB Zoom Wide Manual focus
Brand Digital zoom Firewire Min. Aperture Size Flip display
Price Image stabilization Battery Max. Aperture Size Self-timer
Manual focus Weight Min. Shutter Speed Continuous drive
White balance override Brand Max. Shutter Speed Built-in flash
Min. shutter speed Flash Distance External flash
Max. shutter speed Video Resolution USB
Built-in flash Min. ISO Rating Firewire
External flash Max. ISO Rating Orientation sensor
Manual exposure control Size Uncompressed format
Movie clips Weight Battery type
Orientation sensor Brand Storage types
of several ranges of attribute values (e.g., > 10 megapixels) or by indicating whether the
presence of a certain feature was desired (e.g., mp3 player; yes/no). For the price attribute,
the users could write their lower and upper limits in separate boxes. The attributes on which
this pre-selection could be based are shown in Table 6.1. For the settings to be effective, the
page had to be “refreshed,” just as in the original web version. This was realized in Excel
with a macro that was launched when a button labeled “Show Selection” was clicked. The
only other influence users had on the presentation of information was the possibility to sort
the products by price and customer rating. The field where the products were displayed,
which was almost identical in all three prototypes, showed the name of the product and a
link to another webpage containing more details. This webpage, which was visually identical
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Figure 6.1: The LowF prototype (mobile phone condition)
to the interface of the prototype, was opened in an internet browser (Safari).2 In contrast
to the other two prototypes, underneath each alternative, additional information on two or
three attributes was given. These attributes were camera and band support in the mobile
phone condition and resolution, optical zoom and image stabilization in the digital camera
condition. In addition, price and customer rating were shown (as on Amazon). Figure 6.1
contains a screenshot of the LowF prototype.
The second prototype (MedF), medium degree of functionality) was adapted from another
real-world website, which was specific to only one product (www.sunrise.ch for mobile phones
and www.dpreview.com for digital cameras). Again, the users could make a pre-selection
based on attribute values (see Table 6.1). As in the LowF prototype, the page had to be
“refreshed” to see the reduced choice set. To select a particular product for comparison, the
users had to check a box to the left of the product name. The comparison could be done using
a simple attribute-by-alternative matrix, which was displayed on another screen upon request.
This matrix contained all the information about the products but could not be manipulated
in any way. To make a decision, participants could either inform the experimenter about
their choice or click on “Buy Phone” (which was located underneath each alternative in the
comparison matrix) upon which a webpage opened on which it was written “Thank you for
your participation” (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
The third prototype (HighF) had the highest degree of functionality. Given that this
2In fact, participants often did not even notice that they changed the application, even though they were
made aware of this and instructed how to switch between applications before the experiment started.
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Figure 6.2: The MedF prototype: Pre-selection phase (mobile phone condition)
Figure 6.3: The MedF prototype: Comparison phase (mobile phone condition)
prototype is described in some detail in Section 5.2 (p. 76), here only some details that are
important for the present experiment are added. In Phase 1, when the button leading to the
second phase was clicked, the following message appeared right underneath it: “Please ask
the experimenter to guide you to the next step.” Upon that, a facilitator switched to the next
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screen and prepared the ICM by including the phones that remained after the first phase
and the experiment proceeded. In the comparison phase, when the participants clicked on
“Hide Phone” or “Show All Available Phones”, the facilitator executed the requested action
manually by deleting the respective phones from or including them in the matrix. When
a participant clicked the button labeled “typical” in the mobile phone condition, the six
attributes that were selected most often in Experiments 1 and 2 of Part I were included in the
matrix, equally distributed from the top to the bottom. These attributes were: price, size,
weight, stand-by time, talk time, camera, and music player. In the digital camera condition
no past data could be used. Therefore, attributes that were prominent on many shopping
websites were selected, namely, price, resolution, optical zoom, digital zoom, display size,
video resolution, and size. A decision could be made in the same way as in MedF.
Task and stimuli
Participants were asked to make three choices, one with each of the three prototypes. Each
choice was made out of a set of 30 products, which was drawn randomly from a larger set of
45 products and which was different for each participant and each prototype. Specifically, for
each participant, the entire set was randomly divided into three equal parts A, B, and C, of
which two were used for each prototype. That is, prototypes 1 to 3 received choice sets AB,
AC, and BC, respectively (in terms of the order in the experiment). Two sets of stimuli were
used, mobile phones and digital cameras (varied between-participants).
Questionnaires
Two questionnaires were used for the evaluation of the prototypes. To assess the usability
of the three prototypes, a usability questionnaire was administered once for each prototype.
This questionnaire was based on the Post-Study System Usability Questionnaire (PSSUQ)
by Lewis (1995), which is a 19-item instrument that measures the users’ satisfaction with
system usability. Some small changes were made to adapt the questionnaire to my task and
research questions. In particular, some minor changes were made to the wording, three items
were changed, four removed and two added. The final questionnaire contained 17 items.
Participants had to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each statement on a Likert
scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). The only exception was
Item 2, where the scale ranged from –3 (“too simple”) to +3 (“too complex”). There was
also a “not applicable” (N/A) point outside the scale. The questionnaire can be found in the
appendix (p. 127).
The second questionnaire directly compared the three prototypes. It was administered
after the participants had made a choice with each prototype and contained five dimensions:
understandability, ease of use, ease of elimination of alternatives, ease of comparison of alter-
natives, and choice confidence (see appendix, p. 129). To indicate how well the prototypes
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fared in comparison to each other on each of these dimensions, participants were asked to
locate the three prototypes on a line ranging from “low” (on the left) to “high” (on the right).
Semi-structured interview
In the semi-structured interview, I intended to give the participants room to express their
thoughts about my new decision aid. I sought feedback in particular regarding the general
acceptance and the perceived overall utility of the system. The interview also served as a
check to see whether participants fully understood the system and its functions. To add a
bit of structure to the interview, some questions were prepared, which served as a guideline.
However, the experimenter could freely choose the questions he asked (and in which order).
The questions can be seen in the appendix (p. 130).
6.2.2 Participants and payment
Participants were 24 students (10 female and 14 male) from different faculties of the University
of Lausanne and of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne (EPFL). The
mean age was 24.67 years (SD = 3.7 years). They were recruited personally by both the
present author and the experimenter, who had generally no prior knowledge regarding the
participants’ experience with online shopping websites and the internet in general. A flat fee
of 20 SFR was paid for participation.
6.2.3 Design
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the two conditions of the between-participants
variable product category (i.e., mobile phones or digital cameras). Each of them experienced all
three conditions of the within-participants variable degree of functionality (i.e., low, medium,
or high degree of influence). The order was counterbalanced, which resulted in six different
orderings.
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were informed that the goal of the present research was to create a website, which
actively aids the decision maker during the process of choosing. In addition, they were told
that three prototypes of such a website had been created for this study, which they were now
going to evaluate. Besides that, no further information regarding the prototypes and research
questions was given.
The experiment consisted of three steps: (1) choices and usability questionnaires, (2)
comparison questionnaire, and (3) semi-structured interview. In the first step, participants
chose a product with each of the three prototypes and filled out the usability questionnaire
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after each choice. They were informed that the prototypes were supposed to mimic real
webpages in terms of appearance and functionality and that they thus could be used almost
as if they were real. Particularities of the prototype that were due to technical constraints
(i.e., the hidden pictures of the products or the inclusion of attributes into the ICM) were
explained at the beginning of each of the two phases. In addition, given the many functions
of IACA two further explanations were introduced in the HighF prototype. First, at the
beginning of the pre-selection phase, a window with the following text appeared:
Welcome to Choice Advisor!
Choice Advisor helps you finding the phone that best corresponds to your prefer-
ences. It consists of two phases, a pre-selection and a comparison phase.
You are now in the pre-selection phase. Use the rulers and buttons on the left to
display only the phones that you would like to examine in further detail.
Once you are done, proceed to the comparison phase, where our side-by-side com-
parison system helps you evaluating and comparing the preselected phones.
The window was meant to resemble a pop-up window in an internet browser. The partic-
ipants were told that they could close the window whenever they liked and that this could be
done simply by moving the mouse. Second, at the beginning of the comparison phase another
pop-up window appeared, which contained a series of screenshots along with some explana-
tions of how to use this phase. Participants could move from one screenshot to another using
the arrow keys. Again, they were told that they could close this window whenever they liked.
When participants had made a decision, the experimenter noted down the chosen product
and proceeded with the experiment. The time participants needed to make a decision was
also recorded, thereby excluding the time needed to prepare the screen for the comparison
phase for the MedF and HighF Prototypes.
In the second step, participants compared the three prototypes to each other using the
comparison questionnaire. Finally, in the third step the semi-structured interview was con-
ducted. At the beginning of this interview, participants were debriefed about the motivation
for the study and the meaning of the two control prototypes.
The whole experimented lasted for about one hour. Note that the developer of the pro-
totypes (i.e., the present author) was present as a facilitator throughout the experiment. To
avoid desirability effects, the experiment was performed by an experimenter who was blind to
the research questions and the origin of the three prototypes. The semi-structured interview
was conducted by the developer alone.
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6.3 Results
On average, participants compared 4.22 alternatives with MedF (between 2 and 10, Mdn =
3.5) and 5.56 alternatives with HighF (between 2 and 27, Mdn = 4). This difference is not
significant (t(10) = −1.04, p = .32). The overall mean number of attributes participants
included in the ICM was 7.13 (between 4 and 13, Mdn = 7), with 6.7 (between 4 and 10,
Mdn = 7) in the mobile phone condition and 7.7 (between 5 and 13, Mdn = 7) in the digital
camera condition (t(14) = −.933, p = .37). The attributes that were included most often in
the mobile phone condition were price (by 89% of the participants), standby, talk time, USB
(67% each), and music player (56%). Eleven attributes were included by between 11% and
44% of the participants and six attributes were never used (i.e., active sync, live TV, infrared,
EDGE, HSDPA, SAR). In the digital camera condition, all participants included the attribute
price, followed by resolution (86%), optical zoom, and USB (57% each). Each of a further 19
attributes were included by between 14% and 43% and eight attributes were never used (min.
shutter, flip display, self-timer, continuous drive, built-in flash, firewire, orientation sensor,
and uncompressed format) (cf. Table 6.1).
To have an indication of whether IACA’s comparison features led to “better” choices
in terms of the overall value of the chosen alternative, the ranks of the alternatives chosen
with HighF were compared to the ranks that would have been obtained with MedF if this
system had the same comparison features. To obtain these ranks, the participants’ individual
comparison matrices of the MedF condition were reconstructed with IACA by using the
participants’ attributes and weights of the HighF condition. Indeed, the mean rank of the
chosen alternative was higher (i.e., lower overall value) with MedF (3.09) than with HighF
(2.19). However, this difference was only marginally significant (t(10) = −1.79, p = .10).3
In the following, I first briefly summarize the findings regarding the decision time and
then present the results of the two questionnaires and the semi-structured interview. If not
stated otherwise, all analyses regarding differences between the three prototypes were done
using a mixed design ANOVA including the within-participants variable of prototype and the
between-participants variables product category and order.
6.3.1 Decision time
The time needed to select an alternative differed significantly between the three prototypes
(F (2, 24) = 13.7, p < .001,MSe = 21920). Overall, decision times were longest for HighF
(480 sec.), and significantly shorter for MedF and LowF (314 and 268 sec., respectively). The
difference between MedF and HighF was significant (t(23) = 3.96, p < .001), but the difference
between LowF and MedF was not (t(23) = .882, p = .39). There was also a significant effect
3Only the 11 participants who used the comparison phase in both the MedF and the HighF prototype were
included in these analyses.
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Figure 6.4: Mean choice times for the three prototypes
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors.
of product category (F (1, 12) = 5.48, p = .04,MSe = 64819), but the interaction between
the conditions prototype and product category was not significant (F (2, 24) = 2.01, p = .16).
These results provide some evidence for Hypothesis 20b, and, consequently, do not support
Hypothesis 20a.
6.3.2 Usability questionnaire
For the following analyses, two items (7 and 8) were omitted because they contained many
missing values and participants were generally uncertain how to respond to them. In addition,
Item 2 was excluded from the overall ratings because the response scale was different for this
item (i.e., from –3 to +3), and the responses could hence not be combined with those of the
other items. The reliability calculation of this questionnaire resulted in Cronbach’s alphas of
.95 (LowF), .97 (MedF), and .95 (HighF).4 Gender did not have a significant effect on the
ratings on any of the items (all p’s> .129). This variable was therefore excluded from all
further analyses.
Overall, the three prototypes received mean usability ratings of 4.90 (LowF), 5.07 (MedF),
and 4.62 (HighF). These values were significantly different (F (2, 52) = 12.3, p < .001,MSe =
.119). When looking at the contrasts, it was found that the ratings differed significantly
between LowF and MedF (t(27) = 3.7, p = .001), but there was no difference between
4The inter-item correlations of items 12 and 13 were above .90 for LowF and MedF, which indicates that
these two items are redundant. Averaging their values and re-doing the reliability analysis resulted in very
similar Cronbach’s alphas, which is why the analyses were calculated with the original items.
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Figure 6.5: Mean overall usability ratings of the three prototypes (items 2, 7 and 8 were
excluded).
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors.
MedF and HighF (t(27) = −1.68, p = .11). Moreover, there was a significant interac-
tion between prototype and product category (F (2, 52) = 13.6, p < .001). The partici-
pants who chose mobile phones gave significantly different ratings to all three prototypes
(F (2, 52) = 25.6, p < .001, contrasts: LowF–MedF: t(13) = 10.0, p < .001; MedF–HighF:
t(13) = −3.18, p = .007). However, there was no difference in the ratings in the digital
camera condition. Not surprisingly, the product category also had a significant effect on the
usability ratings (F (1, 26) = .4.54, p = .002,MSe = .372), which were generally higher in the
mobile phone condition.5 The overall ratings are shown in Figure 6.5.
However, when looking at the items individually, the differences in the ratings assigned
to the three prototypes were generally quite small and significant only for Item 2 (F (2, 22) =
8.16, p = .002,MSe = .879).
6 Here, participants rated LowF and MedF as rather too simple
(-0.57 and -0.4, respectively, and HighF as rather too complex (0.54). The difference between
MedF and HighF was significant (t(23) = 3.32, p = .003), but the ratings of LowF and MedF
did not differ significantly (t(22) = .385, p = .70). However, in all three cases the mean ratings
were close to the neutral mid-point (i.e., 0).
5When using only the first condition of each participant to simulate a between-participants design, no
significant differences in the ratings of the three prototypes could be found neither overall nor for any of the
items (all ps > .05).
6Note, that the significance test of Item 14 resulted in a p-value of .04 (F (2, 24) = 3.58). However, to
maintain the familywise error rate over all items (except for items 7 and 8), the Bonferroni correction was
used. The resulting statistical significance level against which the obtained p-values were compared was
p = 115= .003.
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6.3.3 Comparison questionnaire
Given that I wanted the participants to use the prototypes as if they were in a real online
shopping situation, they were not pointed to any of the features of the three systems. As a
consequence, not every participant used the comparison phase in MedF and HighF.7 Specifi-
cally, 18 participants (75%) used the comparison phase in MedF and 16 (67%) in HighF, but
only 11 participants (46%) used it in both prototypes. The following analyses will be done
for all participants as well as for the subset of 11 participants who used the comparison phase
in the prototypes that featured one.
Figure 6.6: Mean participant ratings of the three prototypes on each of five dimensions (all
participants)
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors.
To obtain the values for the analyses, the positions of the three points on each line were
measured in mm, starting from the left end of the line (i.e., low). The values so obtained
ranged from 0 to 78.
The average overall rating (AR) was calculated for each prototype across all five dimen-
sions. Overall, participants preferred MedF (AR = 232) over HighF (AR = 220) and LowF
(AR = 197). When looking at the two product categories separately, the same picture was
found for the mobile phones (ARs = 267, 229, and 200, respectively), but a preference for
HighF (AR = 211) over MedF (AR = 198) and LowF (AR = 193) in the digital cameras
condition.
Gender of the participants did not have a significant effect on the ratings, neither overall
7When I asked the participants in the interview why they did not use the comparison phase, most of
them admitted that they simply had not seen the respective button or that they got so confused during the
pre-selection phase that they forgot about it. One participant thought the comparison phase of HighF would
be identical to the one of MedF, which he had seen before.
6.3. RESULTS 101
Figure 6.7: Mean participant ratings of the three prototypes on each of five dimensions
(participants who used the comparison feature in both prototypes)
Note—The vertical bars denote the standard errors.
Figure 6.8: Number of times each prototype received the highest rating (all participants)
nor on any of the five dimensions (all p’s > .14). This variable was therefore excluded from
all further analyses.
To test whether these differences between the three prototypes were significant a mixed
design MANOVA was run, which included the within-participants variable of degree of in-
fluence, the between-participants variables of product category and order, and the five de-
pendent variables understandability, ease of use, ease of elimination, ease of comparison, and
choice confidence. Overall, there were no significant differences between the three prototypes
(F (10, 3) = 3.682, p = .16). When including only LowF and HighF in the analysis, the overall
effect was significant (F (5, 8) = 8.68, p = .004). However, the difference was only significant
for one dimension, namely, ease of comparison (F (1, 12) = 11.3, p = .006,MSe = 872.5).
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A look at the contrasts revealed that the ratings did not differ significantly between MedF
and HighF (F (1, 12) = 1.33, p = .28,MSe = 692.6), but they did between LowF and MedF
(F (1, 12) = 16.1, p = .002,MSe = 298.4). Product category and order of the prototypes did
not have a significant effect on the ratings (see Figure 6.6). Including only the 11 participants
who used the comparison features in both MedF and HighF did not change the results. Here,
six participants (54%) gave the highest ratings to MedF and five participants (46%) to HighF.
In this subset, no participant rated LowF best (see Figure 6.7).
In a final analysis, the number of times each prototype received the highest rating was
counted (ignoring ties) to see which prototype fared best on each dimension. As can be seen
in Figure 6.8, most participants rated MedF to be the most understandable and the most
easy to use, but preferred HighF regarding the ease of elimination, the ease of comparison
and the confidence in their choice. However, these differences are only significant for ease
of comparison (χ2 = 18.1, p < .001). Overall, 11 of 24 participants (46%) gave the highest
ratings to MedF, 9 (37%) to HighF, and 4 (17%) to LowF. These differences are not significant
(χ2 = 3.25, p = .197), and even if MedF and HighF are combined, the difference is still not
significant (χ2 = 3, p = .08). Hence, there is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 22, and, albeit not
being significant, these results also provide some support for Hypotheses 21 and 23. However,
the data do not support Hypotheses 24 and 25. Not only are the results not significant, the
means are contrary to what was expected, too.
6.3.4 Semi-structured interview
In this section, I first briefly summarize the participants’ answers to the general Questions 1
to 9 and then describe the reported problems and possible improvements of IAPT (Questions
10 and 11). After that, a short summary of the answers to the specific questions is provided.
General questions
All but two participants (92%) indicated that they would use IACA (HighF) if it existed as
a real website and all but one (22 of 23, 96%)8 would use it at least once when searching
for information about a product they want to purchase. However, only 6 of 22 participants
(27%) would be willing to pay to use the system. The products participants could imagine
to choose with IACA were mostly from the category of consumer electronics (e.g., mobile
phones, digital cameras, computers, and mp3 players), but also other things like mobile phone
plans, insurances, cars, holidays (e.g., flights and hotels), apartments, sports equipment (e.g.,
bikes and sports clothing), furniture, vacuum cleaners and music instruments were mentioned.
About two thirds of the participants (15 of 23) would use the possibility of creating their own
attributes and 74% (17 of 23) would like to have an attribute representing the product rating
8The reason why the number of total participants differs from question to question is that these questions
were not always asked. See the Materials section (p. 95).
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by a known review site or journal. All participants (16) stated that the interface helped
them to select the way they like to choose and only one (of 15, 7%) participant thought
that he changed his habitual way of choosing due to the architecture of the system. When
asked whether they thought that they detected and explored all possibilities of the system or
whether they would benefit from the instruction of an expert, the participants gave a mean
rating of 4.7 (on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is a lot profit from the instruction and 7 is little
profit from the instruction). Overall, IACA was rated to be of medium complexity (3.8 on a
scale from 1 [not at all complex] to 7 [very complex]) and all participants would recommend
the system to others, mostly to friends and family. Lastly, all of them thought that most
people would learn to use the system very quickly.
Problems of IACA
Most usability problems were reported to be in the pre-selection phase. A frequent comment
was that there was too much information on the screen (mentioned by at least five partici-
pants). Some participants had problems with the sliders in the pre-selection phase because
it was not clear to them that they did not have to move all of them. When acting on this
assumption, the threshold setting usually was a very cumbersome process because the elimi-
nation criteria became quickly too severe and no alternatives remained in the choice set. To
go back, that is, to set the thresholds so that at least some products were in the choice set
was often even more difficult. For some participants, the sliders were too sensitive (i.e., very
small movements lead to many eliminations). In general, it seemed that the solution with
the sliders was not optimal and even some of the participants who perfectly understood how
to use them said that they would prefer other methods for setting thresholds (see below).
Regarding the available attributes and in line with what was said above, some participants
thought that there were too many unimportant attributes but that at the same time some
important attributes were missing. A criticism regarding the comparison phase was that two
attributes could not be given the same weight.9
Suggested improvements
The participants were asked to give us some ideas how a possible fourth prototype should
look like. This question was used to elicit suggestions for the improvement of the actual
prototype of IACA. Most recommendations concerned HighF, but this might be due to the
general setting of the interview. Many participants recommended a combination of MedF and
HighF, with the following improvements. To avoid information overload, some participants
proposed to hide most of the sliders and check boxes but to give the possibility to unhide
them when needed. As mentioned above, pull-down menus and intervals instead of single
9Note that this will be possible in the final application.
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points as thresholds were suggested by several participants. It was also regarded as a helpful
improvement to provide explanations of the attributes (and the sliders). Moreover, some
participants would add the possibility to sort the products by criteria such as price and
brand.
Some more fundamental changes to the structure of the system were also considered. One
participant had the idea to start directly with the comparison phase. In his prototype, users
would be asked to specify acceptance thresholds as soon as they move an attribute into the
matrix. Another participant suggested a sequential search where the users start with browsing
through very detailed descriptions of the products with one product per page. While browsing,
the users can retain some of them for later comparison. A third idea was to start the pre-
selection phase with some prototypical examples of products, such as different types of digital
cameras (i.e., point and shoot or single-lens reflex). Depending on the selected category, the
system interface should then be adapted to the complexity of the selected example (e.g., low
functionality for products that are described on few attributes and high functionality for more
complex products).
Specific questions
All but one participant (out of 24) understood the meaning of the sliders, check boxes, and
buttons, and all of them detected the pictures of the products and the links to the complete
descriptions. Each participant who used the comparison phase understood the meaning of the
importance factor and the overall values and ranks. Almost all (14, 93%) of the 15 participants
who were asked reported to have understood that they could inverse the polarization of the
attributes, for example, if a heavy phone was desired instead of a light one. Twelve of 15
participants (80%) would find it helpful to have relative attribute values, which indicate the
position of the respective product relative to the other products. This could be realized as
a bar underneath each value, which is similar to the battery symbol of a mobile device. For
instance, a bar that is filled to a quarter for the weight attribute means that the product’s
weight is 25% of the maximum weight in the choice set. No participant used this information
in the prototype but this was probably because they did not detect this feature. Almost all
participants (13 of 15, 87%) saw the three buttons labeled “all,” “clear,” and “typical”, but
only 2 of 16 (13%) used them. Some participants stated that they did not need them and
some others thought that the buttons would not work (although they have been informed
before the experiment that all buttons work). The options “Hide Phone” and “Show All
Available Phones” were never used.
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6.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to evaluate the prototype of the InterActive Decision Aid in terms
of perceived utility and user satisfaction. To see how well IAPT fared in comparison to
already existing decision aids, two more prototypes were created, which were based on real-
world consumer websites. The three prototypes differed in the number and type of tools
they featured to facilitate choosing, ranging from low (LowF) to medium (MedF) to high
functionality (HighF).
Unfortunately, the usability questionnaire did not yield very useful results. The ratings
were very similar on all three prototypes and the differences were significant on only one
item (i.e., Item 2, degree of complexity). In addition, the Cronbach’s alpha values were very
high, which suggests that people responded almost identically to all questions and might
have ignored the subtle differences between them. Likewise, only on one dimension of the
comparison questionnaire (i.e., ease of elimination) significant differences between the three
prototypes could be found. Nevertheless, some insights can be gained from the present data,
which are discussed now.
Overall, participants slightly preferred the prototype of medium functionality and this
prototype was also rated best on the dimensions of understandability and ease of use. HighF
(IACA) was rated best regarding the two dimensions of ease of elimination and ease of com-
parison of alternatives. The low functionality prototype was the least preferred overall. It
seems that for my participants, MedF offered the best trade-off between ease of use and
functionality.
However, there is evidence that many of the goals that I had in mind when I created IACA
were achieved. First, the tools provided for elimination and comparison served their ends,
that is, they facilitated these tasks. Although the differences in the ratings were generally
quite small and significant only for one dimension (i.e., comparison of alternatives), the means
pointed in the expected direction. Second, the alternatives chosen with HighF had a higher
overall value than those chosen with MedF. The use of IACA hence resulted in choices that
were more in line with the normatively oriented WADD strategy (i.e., the “gold standard,” see
p. 33). In other words and similar to what was found by Ha¨ubl and Trifts (2000), people made
better decisions with the new decision aid. Third, almost half of the participants indicated
their confidence to be higher when choosing with this prototype than with the other two. This
is an indicator that the choice aid increased the quality of the decision, at least subjectively
(cf. Ha¨ubl & Trifts, 2000; Xiao & Benbasat, 2007). Fourth, all participants stated that the
interface helped them to choose the way they like to choose and only one thought that the
system altered his habitual way of choosing. The objective to create a decision aid that aims
to assist people in their natural way of making a choice has thus been accomplished. Fifth,
the vast majority of the participants stated that they would find it helpful to have relative
values in addition to the absolute ones. This therefore seemed to be a desired feature and the
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fact that it was not used is very likely due to usability problems. Sixth, the mean number of
attributes that were used for the comparison of alternatives (i.e., 7) was very similar to what
was found in Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., 6 and 7, respectively). This is further evidence for
the assumption that people base their choice on only a subset of the available information
(cf. Jacoby, Szybillo, & Busato-Schach, 1977) and hence demonstrates that IACA’s feature
to give the users the ability to decide which attributes to include in the comparison matrix
is reasonable. This is also in line with Ariely (2000) who found that people preferred to have
a higher level of control over an information system. Moreover, a higher degree of control
has been found to increase trust, satisfaction, and the perception of usefulness of the system
(McNee, Lam, Konstan, & Riedl, 2003; Pereira, 2000; Wang, 2005). Seventh and finally,
during the interview, almost all participants stated that they would use the prototype with
the highest functionality if it was a real website. They felt that once they understood how
the system works, its features could be very helpful to facilitate the process of choosing. This
is particularly interesting given that the decision times were significantly longer with HighF
than with the other two prototypes.
On the negative side, however, the use of the HighF prototype was rather cumbersome not
only due to its suboptimal usability but also due to its high level of functionality, which might
have overshadowed the positive effects of the new tools (cf. Peintner et al., 2008). For instance,
the possibility to make a sensitivity analysis has been used by only one participant. Moreover,
it has to be acknowledged that the presence of the developer of IACA during the experiment
might have biased the results. Although it was attempted to minimize such effects by using a
double blind design, the possibility cannot be excluded that participants wanted to please the
developer and gave more favorable ratings than they would have without him being present.
Likewise, a Pygmalion effect (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1992) may have occurred, that is, the
developer unknowingly influenced the participants during their choices and evaluations in a
way that biased the results in the desired direction. However, the fact that three prototypes
were evaluated in comparison and without any information about their origin renders such an
effect rather improbable. Finally, the way the participants have been recruited could have led
to a biased sample that contained in particular people who have much experience with the
kind of technology that was being tested, resulting in more favorable results for the higher
functionality prototypes. However, during the experiment it became clear that there were
quite large inter-individual differences regarding people’s ease with the tested technology. It
is hence unlikely that the recruitment process led to an unrepresentative sample.
In sum, it appears that consumers appreciate the possibilities provided by the InterActive
Choice Aid—at least when making choices between products that require many trade-offs
between attributes (e.g., multimedia products). However, it also became clear that a crucial
point for the design of a decision aid is its usability. Frequently, systems that offer a high
degree of functionality are also more difficult to understand, which, in turn, may discourage
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potential users. I hence believe that consumers can and will benefit from highly functional
decision aids like IACA only when these systems are easy to understand and to use.
Further studies should pay attention to these factors and take into account the improve-
ment suggestions given in the following. If this is done carefully, subsequent evaluations of
IACA are likely to result in more significant and also more favorable data.
6.4.1 Suggested improvements of IACA
Leading on from the assumption that the tools featured in IACA are, in principle, desirable,
now some suggestions are given here of how both phases of IACA could be improved to
enhance the usability of the system.
Improvements of the pre-selection phase
Albeit intuitively appealing, the sliders turned out to be the major usability problem of the
pre-selection phase. Even though they are implemented in a very similar form on some real-
world consumer websites, they were not appreciated much by the participants. As suggested
by some participants, a better solution might be to replace the sliders with pull-down menus
where the user can choose one of several intervals (e.g., a price between 100 SFR and 150 SFR).
Acceptance intervals could equally be determined in the way they have been implemented in
the LowF prototype for the price attribute, where the users wrote their lower and upper limits
in separate boxes (see Figure 6.1, p. 92). Moreover, the number of sliders and check boxes
had the tendency to confuse the users because they felt that there was too much information
on the screen. Therefore, it could be beneficial to display elimination options only for some
attributes, similar to how this was done in the MedF prototype. Users who want to base their
elimination on more or other attributes can access these via a “more” button or something
similar. A more advanced system could even use machine learning algorithms to establish
which attributes are shown initially, either generally or individually for each user, depending
on his or her past behavior.
A related problem was that many participants had the tendency to set too severe thresh-
olds, which often resulted in an elimination of all alternatives. This could be avoided in part by
interpreting the thresholds in a less strict way, in the sense of the Just-Noticeable-Differences
mentioned in Part I (see p. 34). In other words, alternatives with an attribute value very close
to the threshold set by the user (e.g., within 10%) would be saved from elimination. To visu-
alize these alternatives, they could be highlighted with a color (e.g., red). These JNDs should
be adaptable by the user. However, to avoid making the system even more complicated, this
adaptation should not be mandatory but only be made upon request from the users. In addi-
tion, the possibility to exclude certain alternatives from further elimination should be given
to the users. In this way, consumers could retain alternatives they find appealing and they
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could also compare very dissimilar alternatives, for example, some “should” options with a
more fancy “want” option (see Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998).
Visually indicating how well each alternative corresponds to the consumer’s preferences
is another possible improvement. For example, the color of the attribute value could change
according to how far away (and in which direction) it is from the threshold set by the user.
A different but probably worthwhile method for threshold setting is to use relative in
addition to absolute values (be it with sliders or with other methods). Here, the users would
not indicate a maximum or minimum acceptable value but rather the desired relative position
of the product, for example, to eliminate all products that are not within the top 25% on the
respective attribute.
Further possible improvements are the following:
• Some additional information about the alternatives could be displayed together with
product name and picture, similar to how this was done in the LowF prototype. This
could be information about attributes that are often requested but also on the attributes
that are currently being used for elimination.
• Add boxes next to each product that can be checked to select the respective product for
comparison (cf. MedF). This would probably increase understandability because this is
a standard component of many current websites.
• Add a reset button to set all thresholds back to their original position.
• Add the possibility of sorting the displayed alternatives by one of several criteria (e.g.,
price).
• Add links to external review sites.
• To prevent dominated alternatives from being chosen, they could be highlighted (cf.
Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). However, for several attributes such as design, there is no
general agreement as to what attribute values are desirable because their evaluation
is highly subjective. Therefore, dominance in the strict sense cannot be determined.
Moreover, the vendors would probably very quickly remove such dominated alternatives.
Although it is very likely that the above suggestions would improve the current system,
given the observed problems, it is probably worthwhile to more drastically re-conceptualize
the pre-selection phase. One possible approach is the Teaching Salesman technique (Stolze &
Stro¨bel, 2004) where consumers are asked about the tasks or purposes they need the product
for (e.g., a manager who needs smart phone functions such as mobile internet and push e-
mail). The system then proposes products that correspond to the described needs. Thereafter,
users can communicate their preferred values on certain attributes and are then provided
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with three recommendations, a top-score option, an “upgrade” option (more expensive but
more features) and an “alternative” option (different features). A similar idea is to first ask
the users to assign themselves to one of several categories, such as businessman, mother,
or adolescent. Depending on the chosen category, the system could then propose products
that are typically used by the people pertaining to the respective category. Given that these
systems translate the consumers’ needs to attribute specifications, they are particularly useful
for users who have a low lever of expertise in the respective product category. Stolze and Nart
(2004) show that the combination of such a need-based system with the possibility to specify
desirable attribute levels (i.e., feature-based) is preferred over an exclusively feature-based
system. Finally, a more applied idea for the further development of IACA is to adapt any
advertisements that are displayed on the same page to the thresholds set by the users (e.g.,
expensive cameras when the maximum acceptable price is high etc.).
Improvements of the comparison phase
A general problem with two-stage strategies where alternatives are eliminated in the first stage
is that the eliminated alternatives could have come out as the best alternative if they had not
been rejected earlier in the process (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). A possibility to overcome this
problem would be to propose additional alternatives in the comparison phase that are similar
to the ones currently being compared but that were eliminated in the first phase.
As already briefly mentioned in Section 5.2.4 (p. 83), another area of improvement con-
cerns the calculation of the overall value. In the present prototype, the normalization of
the attribute values is relatively simple (i.e., z -scores). A more sophisticated method that
could be used in this context is the vector normalization employed in many MADM methods
(e.g., TOPSIS; Hwang & Yoon, 1981), with different normalization procedures for benefit at-
tributes (e.g., megapixels of a digital camera) and cost attributes (e.g., price). Moreover, the
system could elicit which attributes are nonmonotonic attributes, that is, attributes where
the optimal value does not lie at one of the extremes but somewhere in the middle of the
attribute range. For example, for some people the optimal mobile phone may be of “average
size.” In other words, their utility curve resembles an inverse u-shaped function. On these
attributes, still another normalization technique would need to be employed (for details, see
Yoon & Hwang, 1995). In addition, the attribute weights could be obtained directly from
the ranks (e.g., reciprocal weights or rank sum weights, Edwards & Fasolo, 2001; Yoon &
Hwang, 1995). Although with this procedure some information might be lost, in the experi-
ment many participants expressed their attribute weights only on an ordinal scale (i.e., rank
order) and therefore did not make use of the possibility to indicate how much more or less
important an attribute was in comparison to another attribute by placing it closer or further
away from it (i.e., interval scale). It cannot be known based on the present results, however,
whether this finding echoes the participants’ preference or whether it is simply due to a lack
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of understanding. Before making such a change to the system, this question should thus be
answered empirically.
Further improvements could be:
• Instead of having an empty ICM at the outset, the attributes that have been used for
elimination could already be included in the matrix, in the order that the thresholds
were set in Phase 1.
• The ability to sort the alternatives in the ICM by attribute values and the overall value
could be added.
• The system could highlight differences between the alternatives with colors, for example,
green for small differences and red for large differences.
• The absolute attribute values could be highlighted in various colors, which correspond
to the relative position of the alternative (e.g., green if the alternative is among the top
25% and red if it is among the bottom 25%).
• The relative attribute values could be represented as a bar underneath the absolute
values, as suggested in Section 6.3.4 (p. 104).
Chapter 7
General conclusions
In this dissertation, two new approaches for studying and aiding decision strategies have been
proposed and evaluated. The first approach is the method of InterActive Process Tracing,
which is described in Part I. This method focuses on the description of consumers’ choice
strategies and is a novel form of combining and thereby complementing several established
process tracing techniques. In two experiments it has been shown that the new interactive
process tracing method is a valid technique for identifying human decision processes. Various
findings in the related literature were replicated and a detailed description of the strategies
people used when making a purchase decision was achieved. Similar to Bettman (1970),
Larcker and Lessig (1983), Einhorn et al. (1979), and Li et al. (2000), it was shown that
models constructed based on verbal reports described the participants’ behavior quite well.
This also demonstrates that retrospective verbal protocols are a valid measure for the detection
of cognitive processes, at least in the context of consumer choices.
A more critical finding that was observed in both experiments is that people’s search for
information often deviated from what would be expected given the described strategy. More-
over, it appears that the data obtained with Mouselab and eye tracking are on a rather general
level and, consequently, are not specific enough to allow for discrimination among candidate
decision strategies. This casts some doubt on the general usefulness of information search
techniques, at least in this context. It may even be that the link between information search
and cognitive processes is less pronounced than is commonly assumed. A possible reason for
this is that Mouselab alters the way that information is searched and processed. For instance,
Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008) found that under time pressure participants switched from com-
pensatory to noncompensatory processing only when Mouselab was used. In contrast, when
an “open” matrix was used (i.e., no covered information), participants used an (automatic)
WADD strategy and they did this extremely fast (i.e., 1.5 sec on average). The authors
suspect that the well-documented switch from compensatory to noncompensatory processing
when under time pressure might be partially induced by the method rather than being some-
thing typical for human decision making. However, the fact that the search patterns did not
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differ much between Mouselab and eye tracking makes this explanation a bit less likely, at
least for the present experiments. Moreover, in these experiments, the choice problems were
much more complex than those used by Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008) (i.e., more attributes
and alternatives, many continuous attributes instead of dichotomous attributes) and no time
pressure was imposed. Thus, I believe that it is sensible to use verbal protocols in addition
to the search measures to obtain data from two different sources that, it seems, highlight
two qualitatively different aspects of the decision making process. For IAPT this means that
Phases 1 and 3 are particularly crucial for the detection of cognitive decision processes. How-
ever, I nevertheless think that the use of information search techniques is still worthwhile
when integrated into a multimethod approach such as IAPT, where the data of one method
can be validated with the data of the other.
Moreover, an attempt was made to improve IAPT by using eye tracking instead of Mouse-
lab. The rationale for this was that eye tracking is expected to result in more valid data due
to the fact that it is less prone to reactivity than Mouselab. However, a direct comparison of
these two information search measures showed that the former method did not provide more
informative data than the latter, and the use of eye tracking did also not result in a higher
validity of the described strategies. In general, the data obtained with both methods was very
similar, but the use of eye tracking was more cumbersome and resulted in more noisy data
that was more difficult to interpret. I therefore conclude that for the kind of task studied
here, Mouselab is a valid and convenient method and the use of eye tracking does not result
in any improvements to the method of InterActive Process Tracing.
Despite the fact that so far it has been tested only in one domain (i.e., consumer choice)
and with only one product (i.e., mobile phones), I am confident that IAPT is a valuable
research tool that is not limited to consumer choice situations and that can be used to answer
many different research questions. The attempt to improve the method by integrating eye
tracking technology was not successful, but more ways how IAPT could be developed further
can be conceived, for instance, by using other process tracing tools such as Flashlight (Schulte-
Mecklenbeck et al., 2008) (see p. 63).
In conclusion, these findings demonstrate that IAPT is a useful tool for the description
of decision processes. In the future, this method could be used in other domains and with
different participant populations to learn more about domain specificity and inter-individual
differences in this context. Moreover, in addition to the purely descriptive use of IAPT that
has been described in Part I, the proposed method can also be used for applied purposes. For
instance, the findings obtained with IAPT could prove beneficial for the creation of purchase
environments, especially regarding the presentation of product information (e.g., selection
and positioning of attributes presented to the consumer). Moreover, IAPT can be used
for the development of decision aids, such as interactive choice aids that are implemented in
consumer websites (e.g., Edwards & Fasolo, 2001; Ha¨ubl & Trifts, 2000). Choice aids facilitate
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the process of choosing by directly assisting the consumers in the execution of typical decision
strategies (e.g., by providing tools for quickly eliminating alternatives or calculating overall
values), and thereby significantly reduce the amount of information that has to be processed.
Given the often very large number of products offered by today’s online shops, the need of
such choice aids is constantly growing, and, not surprisingly, many shopping sites have already
implemented a decision aid.
In Part II, such a decision aid was developed, driven by the results found in the two
experiments described in Part I and based on already existing real-world decision aids. This
decision aid, the InterActive Choice Aid, aims to assist the natural process of choosing by
providing tools that facilitate the execution of resource-intensive tasks. In particular its
comparison feature is a novel and promising development, with which I tried to integrate both
considerations from prescriptive decision theory (i.e., how a rational decision maker should
choose) as well as insights from descriptive decision research and practical considerations.
The experiment conducted to evaluate a first prototype of IACA showed that these tools,
for example for eliminating undesirable products and making in-depth comparisons of al-
ternatives, served their ends, that is, they aided the decision maker during the process of
choosing. However, the encountered usability problems make clear that attention has to be
devoted not only to the tools and their theoretical basis but also to more practical aspects
such as their implementation and the overall usability of the system. Overall, the first test
of the new choice aid gave us some promising results and many ideas of how to continue this
line of research. Given that many of today’s purchases are made on the internet, further
developments of IACA are not only of interest to researchers but also to retailers and, in
particular, to customers who have to find their way through a plethora of similar products
and without the help of a sales assistant. The InterActive Choice Aid might be implemented
on shopping websites or on websites that provide guidance to the customer, for instance by
featuring reviews and buying guides (e.g., www.consumerreports.org).
However, so far I have never asked the question of whether using a choice aid is actually in
the interest or to the benefit of the consumer. The following caveats show that this is actually
not a trivial question.
First, there is evidence that although a rational and thorough approach may be deemed
desirable by decision makers, people are in fact less satisfied after using a decision aid. That
is, although the decision aid enhances objective decision quality, it reduces the confidence in
the decision (Abualsamh, Carlin, & McDaniel, 1990; Cats-Baril & Huber, 1987). A potential
explanation for this is the fact that the decision aid increases the awareness of decisional con-
flict by making the trade-offs between attributes more explicit. Thereby, the downsides of the
chosen alternative become more salient (cf. Wilson et al., 1993). Moreover, in Ariely’s (2000)
study a higher control over the displayed information had detrimental effects on the partic-
ipants’ ability to use the information because the demands on the cognitive resources were
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higher. However, although IACA is not immune to such effects, the calculation feature was
introduced to provide (computational) support for resolving such trade-offs. I am therefore
confident that this feature attenuates potential negative effects. In fact, in the experiment
described here (Experiment 3), nearly half of the participants indicated that they had the
highest confidence in their choice when they made their choice with the HighF prototype.
Moreover, there is also evidence that decision aids increase the users’ satisfaction with their
choices (Kmett, Arkes, & Jones, 1999).
A second caveat is the finding that decision makers seem to dislike using models that
are based on complex procedures (Zachary, 1988) and often prefer relatively unsophisticated
methods (Kottemann & Davis, 1991). This finding should be taken seriously for the design of
decision aids, especially when these are targeted at non-professionals. As mentioned above,
in the present case the benefits of simplicity may outweigh the costs of a less valid preference
elicitation. Moreover, to avoid the possibility that consumers mistrust the decision aid, care
should be taken to ensure a high degree of transparency (cf. Section 5.1.3, p. 75).
Third, there is evidence that managers exhibit a certain reluctance to use decision support
systems (Finlay, 1994). It is therefore reasonable to ask whether consumers would use similar
systems, especially given that in consumer choice the stakes are much lower. However, one
reason for the managers’ behavior is that they are very often under severe time constraints,
which is usually not the case for the consumer who makes only a small number of non-routine
purchase decisions per year.
Finally, users might often not have well-defined preferences when they search for a product
but rather construct them on the spot as they search for information about the products (cf.
Payne et al., 1993). This is particularly likely to happen when consumers are not familiar
with the product category in question or when the product category has changed much since
their last purchase (e.g., due to technological advances). Similarly, Pu and Chen (2008) argue
that people often become aware of their preferences only when they come across unacceptable
attribute values. For instance, a certain customer may decide to restrict the consideration
set to mobile phones that have a bluetooth connection only when he or she sees an otherwise
acceptable mobile phone that does not have this feature. This circumstance could cause
problems for both phases of IACA in that consumers are not certain which attributes to
use for the elimination and the comparison of alternatives. However, the fact that in the
first experiment of this dissertation it was found that consumers were well able to select the
attributes they wanted to base their choice on—no matter whether they were given a list
containing all available attributes or not—provides some evidence that at least in the domain
of mobile phones people are well aware of the attributes they find important. Moreover, the
rationale for providing sliders to set the cut-offs was to allow the users to experience attribute
ranges in a playful way. By setting and re-setting cut-offs, users can build up a representation
of the environment, which ultimately leads to a construction of their preferences. Likewise,
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Kramer (2007) found that people are more likely to accept top-ranked recommendations when
they were based on an explicit and transparent method of preference elicitation as opposed
to an implicit preference elicitation method.
Thus, to be accepted and used by a multitude of consumers, a decision aid needs to have
benefits that outweigh the perceived costs (cf. Peintner et al., 2008), and it needs to be simple,
transparent, and easy to use. In particular, care should be taken to assist the consumers in
their natural way of choosing instead of forcing them to follow a supposedly rational or ideal
procedure. If these points are respected, I agree with Ha¨ubl and Murray (2006) who conclude
that “[w]ell-designed electronic product recommendation agents can and should play a more
prominent role in improving the overall value of online shopping.”
To conclude, both approaches proposed in this dissertation are promising novel devel-
opments, one that has a more descriptive purpose and the other that has a more applied
purpose. Both make contributions to the existing literature by building on it, extending it,
and by pointing to interesting new avenues for research on the topic of decision making.

References
Abelson, R., & Levi, A. (1985). Decision making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology. 1. Theory and method. New York: Random House.
Abualsamh, R. A., Carlin, B., & McDaniel, R. R. J. (1990). Problem structuring heuristics in
strategic decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 45, 159–
174.
Adomavicius, G., & Tuzhilin, A. (2005). Toward the next generation of recommender systems: A
survey of the state-of-the-art and possible extensions. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and
Data Engineering, 17, 734–749.
Aksoy, L., & Bloom, P. N. (2001). Impact of ordered alternative lists on decision quality: The role of
perceived similarity. Paper presented at th Society for Consumer Research Winter Conference,
Scottsdale, AZ, February 15–17, 2001.
Alba, J., Lynch, J., Weitz, B., Janiszewski, R. L., Sawyer, A., & Wood, S. (1997). Interactive
home shopping: consumer, retailer, and manufacturer incentives to participate in electronic
marketplaces. Journal of Marketing, 61, 38–53.
Allais, P. M. (1953). The behavior of rational man in risk situations—A critique of the axioms and
postulates of the American School. Econometrica, 21, 503-546.
Al-Natour, S., Benbasat, I., & Cenfetelli, R. T. (2008). The effect of process and outcome similarity
on user’s evaluations of decision aids. Decision Sciences, 39, 175–211.
Arch, D. C., Bettman, J. R., & Pakkar, P. (1978). Subjects’ information processing in information
display board studies. Advances in Consumer Research, 5, 555–560.
Ariely, D. (2000). Controlling the information flow: Effects on consumers’ decision making and
preferences. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 233–248.
Ball, C. (1997). A comparison of single-step and multiple-step transition analyses of multiattribute
decision strategies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69, 195–204.
Baron, J. (2000). Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bazerman, M. H., Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Wade-Benzoni, K. (1998). Negotiating with yourself and
losing: Understanding and managing competing internal preferences. Academy of Management
Review, 23, 225–241.
Bettman, J. R. (1970). Information processing models of consumer behavior. Journal of Marketing
Research, 7, 370–376.
Bettman, J. R. (1979). An information processing theory of consumer choice. Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley.
117
118 References
Biggs, S. F., Bedard, J. C., Gaber, B. G., & Linsmeier, T. J. (1985). The effects of task size and
similarity on the decision behavior of bank loan officers. Management Science, 31, 970–987.
Billings, R. S., & Marcus, S. A. (1983). Measures of compensatory and noncompensatory models
of decision behavior: Process tracing versus policy capturing. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 31, 331–352.
Bo¨ckenholt, U., & Hynan, L. S. (1994). Caveats on a process-tracing measure and a remedy. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making, 7, 103–117.
Borcherding, K., Eppel, T., & von Winterfeldt, D. (1991). Comparison of weighting judgments in
multiattribute utility measurement. Management Science, 37, 1603–1619.
Borcherding, K., Schmeer, S., & Weber, M. (1995). Biases in multiattribute weight elicitation.
In J.-P. Caverni, M. Bar-Hillel, F. H. Barron, & H. Jungermann (Eds.), Contributions to
decision-making I (pp. 1–28). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bro¨der, A. (2000). A methodological comment on behavioral decision research. Psychologische
Beitra¨ge, 42, 645–662.
Brucks, M. (1988). Search Monitor: An approach for computer-controlled experiments involving
consumer information search. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 117–121.
Cats-Baril, W. L., & Huber, G. P. (1987). Decision support systems for ill-structured problems: An
empirical study. Decision Sciences, 18, 350–372.
Chu, P. C., & Spires, E. S. (2000). The joint effects of effort and quality on decision strategy choice
with computerized decision aids. Decision Sciences, 31, 259–284.
Cook, G. J., & Swain, M. R. (1993). A computerized approach to decision process tracing for
decision support system design. Decision Sciences, 24, 931–952.
Darwin, C. R. (1958). The autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882. With the original omissions
restored. Edited and with appendix and notes by his grand-daughter Nora Barlow (N. Barlow,
Ed.). London: Collins.
Dawes, R. M. (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making. American
Psychologist, 34, 571–582.
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989). Clinical versus actuarial judgment. Science, 243,
1668–1674.
Dhar, R. (1997). Consumer preference for a no-choice option. Journal of Consumer Research, 24,
215–231.
Duchowski, A. T. (2002). A breadth-first survey of eye tracking applications. Behavior Research
Methods, Instruments, and Computers, 1, 1–16.
Edwards, W., & Fasolo, B. (2001). Decision technology. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 581-606.
Einhorn, H. J., Kleinmuntz, D. N., & Kleinmuntz, B. (1979). Linear regression and process-tracing
models of judgment. Psychological Review, 86, 465–485.
Eisenfu¨hr, F., & Weber, M. (1994). Rationales Entscheiden (2nd ed.). Berlin: Springer.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75,
643-669.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1984). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
References 119
Fasolo, B., & McClelland, G. H. (1999). Tracing decision processes on the web. Poster presented at
the annual meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making in Los Angeles, U.S.A.
Favier, J., & Bouquet, M. (2006). Europe’s eCommerce Forecast: 2006 to 2011. Technographics
Research. Retrieved May 26th, 2009, from:
http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,38297,00.html.
Finlay, P. (1994). Introducing decision support systems. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Ford, J. K., Schmitt, N., Schlechtman, S. L., Hults, B. M., & Doherty, M. L. (1989). Process tracing
methods: Contributions, problems, and neglected research questions. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 43, 75–117.
Garcia-Retamero, R., Hoffrage, U., & Dieckmann, A. (2007). When one cue is not enough: Com-
bining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing. Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 60, 1197-1215.
Gensch, D. H. (1987). A two-stage disaggregate attribute choice model. Marketing Science, 6,
223-231.
Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Why heuristics work. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 20–29.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded
rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650–669.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999). Betting on one good reason: The Take The Best heuristic.
In G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us smart (p. 75-95). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Goldstein, D. G. (2008). Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible
models of cognition: Reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008). Psychological
Review, 115, 230–239.
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbo¨lting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: A brunswikian
theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98, 506–528.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us
smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Glo¨ckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008). Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 1055-1075.
Grady, H. M. (2000). Web site design: A case study in usability testing using paper prototypes. In
Proceedings of 2000 Joint IEEE International and 18th Annual Conference on Computer Doc-
umentation (IPCC/SIGDOC 2000) (pp. 39–45). Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Educational Activities
Department.
Harte, J. M., & Koele, P. (1995). A comparison of different methods for the elicitation of attribute
weights: structural modeling, process tracing, and self-reports. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 64, 49–64.
Harte, J. M., & Koele, P. (2001). Modelling and describing human judgement processes: The
multiattribute evaluation case. Thinking and Reasoning, 7, 29–49.
Ha¨ubl, G., & Murray, K. B. (2006). Double agents: Assessing the role of electronic product-
recommendation systems. MIT Sloan Management Review, 47, 8-12.
Ha¨ubl, G., & Trifts, V. (2000). Consumer decision making in online shopping environments: The
120 References
effects of interactive decision aids. Marketing Science, 19, 4-21.
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A methodological
challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 383–403.
Hill, D. J., & King, M. F. (1989). Preserving consumer autonomy in an interactive informational
environment: Toward developmentof a consumer decision aid model. Advances in Consumer
Research, 16, 144–151.
Hogarth, R. M., & Karelaia, N. (2007). Heuristic and linear models of judgment: Matching rules
and environments. Psychological Review, 114, 733–758.
Holsapple, C. W. (2008). DSS architecture and types. In F. Burstein & C. W. Holsapple (Eds.),
Handbook on decision support systems 1 (p. 163-189). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Hostler, R. E., Yoon, V. Y., & Guimaraes, T. (2005). Assessing the impact of internet agent on end
users’ performance. Decision Support Systems, 41, 313–325.
Huber, O. (1982). Entscheiden als Problemlo¨sen. Bern: Huber.
Huber, O., & Huber, O. W. (2003). What makes gambles special? - Active search for probability and
risk defusing information in gambles and quasi realistic risky tasks. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
Huber, O., Wider, R., & Huber, O. W. (1997). Active information search and complete information
presentation in naturalistic risky decision tasks. Acta Psychologica, 95, 15–29.
Hwang, C. L., & Yoon, K. P. (1981). Multiple attribute decision making: Methods and applications.
Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer Verlag.
Is¸ıklar, G., & Bu¨yu¨ko¨zkan, G. (2007). Using a multi-criteria decision maing approach to evaluate
moblie phone alternatives. Computer Standards and Interfaces, 29, 265–274.
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much of
a good thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 995–1006.
Jacoby, J., Szybillo, G. J., & Busato-Schach, J. (1977). Information acquisistion behavior in brand
choice situations. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 708–718.
Janis, I., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and
commitment. New York: Free Press.
Jedetski, J., Adelman, L., & Yeo, C. (2002). How web site decision technology affects consumers.
IEEE Internet Computing, 6, 72–79.
Johnson, R. M. (1985). Adaptive conjoint analysis. In Proceedings of the Sawtooth Software Con-
ference on Perceptual Mapping, Conjoint Analysis and Computer Interviewing (pp. 253–265).
Ketchum, ID: Sawtooth Software Inc.
Johnson, R. M. (1991). Adaptive conjoint analsysis: Some caveats and suggestions. Journal of
Marketing Research, 28, 223–225.
Jungermann, H., Pfister, H., & Fischer, K. (1998). Die Psychologie der Entscheidung. Berlin:
Spektrum.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econo-
metrica, 47, 263-291.
References 121
Karelaia, N. (2006). Thirst for confirmation in multi-attribute choice: Does search for consistency
impair decision performance? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100,
128–143.
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1976). Decisions with multiple objectives: Preference and value tradeoffs.
New York: Wiley.
Kmett, C. M., Arkes, H. R., & Jones, S. K. (1999). The influence of decision aids on high school
students’ satisfaction with their college choice decision. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 1293–1301.
Kottemann, J. E., & Davis, F. D. (1991). Decisional conflict and user acceptance of multicriteria
decision-making aids. Decision Sciences, 22, 918–926.
Kramer, T. (2007). The effect of measurement task transparency on preference construction and
evaluations of personalized recommendations. Journal of Marketing Research, 44, 224–233.
Ku¨hberger, A. (1994). Risiko und Unsicherheit: Zum Nutzen des Subjective Expected Utility-
Modells. Psychologische Rundschau, 45, 3-23.
Larcker, D. F., & Lessig, V. P. (1983). An examination of the linear and retrospective process
tracing approaches to judgment and modeling. Accounting Review, 85, 58–77.
Lewis, J. R. (1995). IBM computer satisfaction usability questionnaires: Psychometric evaluation
and instructions for use. International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction, 7, 57–78.
Li, S., Shue, L., & Shiue, W. (2000). The development of a decision model for liquidity analysis.
Expert Systems with Applications, 19, 271–278.
Linden, G., Smith, B., & York, J. (2003). Amazon.com recommendations: Item-to-item collaborative
filtering. IEEE Internet Computing, 7, 76–80.
Lohse, G. L., & Johnson, E. J. (1996). A comparison of two process tracing methods for choice
tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68, 28–43.
Lopes, L. L. (1990). Discussion on a chapter by Mano and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson. In
R. M. Hogarth (Ed.), Insights in decision-making: A tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Martin, J. M., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Shaping product attribute valuation and consumer choice by
partitioning the web (Tech. Rep.). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
McNee, S., Lam, S. K., Konstan, J. A., & Riedl, J. (2003). Interfaces for eliciting new user preferences
in recommender systems. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on User Modeling
(pp. 178–187). Johnston, PA, USA.
Miles, G. E., Howes, A., & Davies, A. (2000). A framework for understanding human factors
in web-based electronic commerce. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 52,
131–163.
Montgomery, A. L., Hosanagar, K., Krishnan, R., & Clay, K. B. (2004). Designing a better shopbot.
Management Science, 50, 189–206.
Montgomery, H., & Svenson, O. (1976). On decision rules and information processing strategies in
multiattribute decision making. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 17, 283-291.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Nielsen, J. (1990). Paper versus computer implementations as mockup scenarios for heuristic evalu-
122 References
ation. In Proceedings of the IFIP TC13 Third International Conference on Human-Computer
Interaction, August 27-31, 1990, Cambridge, UK (pp. 315–320). Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands: North-Holland.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than you can know: Verbal reports on mental
processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259.
Nixon, H. K. (1924). Attnetion and interest in advertising. Archives of Psychology, 72, 5–67.
O’Keefe, R. M., & McEachern, T. (1998). Web-based customer decision support systems. Commu-
nications of the ACM, 41, 71–78.
Olshavsky, R. W. (1979). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: A repli-
cation and extension. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 24, 300–316.
Olson, D. L. (2008). Multi-criteria decision support. In F. Burstein & C. W. Holsapple (Eds.),
Handbook on decision support systems 1 (pp. 299–313). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Olson, E. L., & Widing, R. E. (2002). Are interactive decision aids better than passive decision
aids? A comparison with implications for information providers on the internet. Journal of
Interactive Marketing, 16, 22–33.
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: an information
search and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 366–387.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Payne, J. W., Braunstein, M. L., & Carroll, J. S. (1978). Exploring predecisional behavior: An
alternative approach to decision research. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
22, 17–44.
Pedersen, P. (2000). Behavioral effects of using software agents for product and merchant brokering:
An experimental study of consumer desicion making. International Journal of Electronic
Commerce, 5, 125–141.
Peintner, B., Viappiani, P., & Yorke-Smith, N. (2008). Preferences in interactive systems: Technical
challenges and case studies. AI Magazine, 29, 13–24.
Pereira, R. E. (2000). Optimizing human-computer interaction for the electronic commerce envi-
ronment. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 1, 23–44.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton.
Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making. New York: Mc-Graw Hill.
Pu, P., & Chen, L. (2008). User-involved preference elicitation for product search and recommender
systems. AI Magazine, 29, 93–103.
Ramaprasad, A. (1987). Cognitive process as a basis for MIS and DSS design. Management Science,
33, 139–148.
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research.
Psychological Bulletin, 124, 372–422.
Reisen, N., Hoffrage, U., & Mast, F. W. (2008). Identifying decision strategies in a consumer choice
situation. Judgment and Decision Making, 3 (8), 641–658.
Riedl, R., Brandsta¨tter, E., & Roithmayr, F. (2008). Identifying decision strategies: A process- and
outcome-based classification method. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 795–807.
References 123
Rieskamp, J., & Hoffrage, U. (1999). When do people use simple heuristics, and how can we tell. In
G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make
us smart (pp. 141–167). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rieskamp, J., & Hoffrage, U. (2008). Inferences under time pressure: How opportunity costs affect
strategy selection. Acta Psychologica, 127, 258–276.
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1992). Pygmalion in the classroom (expanded edition). New York:
Irvington.
Rubin, J. (1994). The handbook of usability testing. New York: Wiley.
Rudd, J., Stern, K., & Isensee, S. (1996). Low vs. high-fidelity prototyping debate. Interactions, 3,
76–85.
Russo, J. E. (1978). Eye fixations can save the world: A critical evaluation and a comparison between
eye fixations and other information processing methodologies. In H. K. Hunt (Ed.), Advances
in consumer research (pp. 561–570). Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Consumer Research.
Russo, J. E., & Dosher, B. A. (1983). Strategies for multiattribute binary choice. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 676–696.
Russo, J. E., Johnson, E. J., & Stephens, D. L. (1989). The validity of verbal protocols. Memory
and Cognition, 17, 759–769.
Russo, J. E., & Leclerc, F. (1994). An eye-fixation analysis of choice processes for consumer
nondurables. Journal of Consumer Research, 21, 274–290.
Russo, J. E., & Rosen, L. D. (1975). An eye fixation analysis of multialternative choice. Memory
and Cognition, 3, 267–276.
Saaty, T. L. (1980). The analytical hierarchial process. New York: Wiley.
Sauer, J., & Sonderegger, A. (in press). The influence of prototype fidelity and aesthetics of design
in usability tests: Effects on user behaviour, subjective evaluation and emotion. Applied
Ergonomics.
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Murphy, R. O., & Hutzler, F. (2008). Flashlight. Annual conference of
the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, November 14–17, Chicago, IL, 14.
Seidl, C. (2002). Preference reversal. Journal of Economic Surveys, 16 (5), 621–655.
Senecal, S., & Nantel, J. (2004). The influence of online product recommendations on consumers’
online choices. Journal of Retailing, 80, 159–169.
Seref, M. M. H., & Ahuja, R. K. (2008). Spreadsheet-based decision support systems. In
F. Burstein & C. W. Holsapple (Eds.), Handbook on decision support systems 1 (pp. 277–
298). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Shah, K. S., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). Heuristics made easy: An effort-reduction framework.
Psychological Bulletin, 134, 207–222.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69,
99–118.
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review,
63, 129–138.
Simon, H. A. (1987). Rational decision making in business organizations. In L. Green & J. H. Kagel
(Eds.), Advances in behavioral economics (Vol. 1, pp. 18–47). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
124 References
Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1–19.
Sismeiro, C., & Bucklin, R. E. (2004). Modeling purchase behavior at an e-commerce web site: A
task-completion approach. Journal of Marketing Research, 41, 306–323.
Stokmans, M. (1992). Analyzing information search patterns to test the use of a two-phased decision
strategy. Acta Psychologica, 80, 213–227.
Stolze, M., & Nart, F. (2004). Well-integrated needs-oriented recommender components regarded as
helpful. In CHI 2004 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (p. 1571).
Vienna, Austria, April 24–29.
Stolze, M., & Stro¨bel, M. (2004). Recommending as personalized teaching. In Designing personalized
user experiences in eCommerce (pp. 293–313). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Svenson, O. (1979). Process descriptions of decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 23, 86–112.
Todd, P. M., & Benbasat, I. (1991). An experimental investigation of the impact of computer based
decision aids on decision making strategies. Information Systems Research, 2, 87–115.
Todd, P. M., & Benbasat, I. (1992). The use of information in decision making: An experimental
investigation of the impact of computer-based decision aids. MIS Quarterly, 16, 373–393.
Todd, P. M., & Benbasat, I. (1994a). The influence of decision aids on choice strategies: An
experimental analysis of the role of cognitive effort. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 60, 36–74.
Todd, P. M., & Benbasat, I. (1994b). The influence of decision aids on choice strategies under
conditions of high cognitive load. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 24,
537–547.
Todd, P. M., & Benbasat, I. (2000). Inducing compensatory information processing through deci-
sion aids that facilitate effort reduction: An experimental assessment. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 13, 91–106.
Tversky, A. (1972). Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Psychological Review, 79, 281–299.
Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment und uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
Science, 211, 453-458.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 57, 297-323.
van Gog, T., Paas, F., van Merrie¨nboer, J. J. G., & Witte, P. (2005). Uncovering the problem-solving
process: Cued retrospective reporting versus concurrent and retrospective reporting. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 11, 237–244.
van Raaij, F. W. (1977). Consumer information processing for different information structures and
formats. Advances in Consumer Research, 4, 176–184.
Vijayasarathy, L. R., & Jones, J. M. (2001). Do internet shopping aids make a difference? An
empirical investigation. Electronic Markets, 11, 75–83.
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wang, W. (2005). Design of trustworthy online recommendation agents: Explanation facilities and
References 125
decision strategy support. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of British Columia,
Vancouver, Canada.
Weber, E. U., Baron, J., & Loomes, G. (2001). Conflict and tradeoffs in decision making. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wedel, M., & Pieters, R. (2007). A review of eye-tracking research in marketing. In N. Malhotra
(Ed.), Review of marketing research, Volume 4 (pp. 123–146). New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc.
Westenberg, M. R. M., & Koele, P. (1994). Multi-attribute evaluation processes: Methodological
and conceptual issues. Acta Psychologica, 87, 65–84.
White, C. M., & Hoffrage, U. (2009). Testing the tyranny of too much choice against the allure of
more choice. Psychology and Marketing, 26, 280–298.
White, C. M., Reisen, N., & Hoffrage, U. (2009). Choice deferral arising from absolute evaluation
or relative comparison. Submitted for publication.
Willemsen, M. C., & Johnson, E. J. (2006). Mouselabweb: Monitoring information acquisition
processes on the web. Retrieved October 14, 2008, from http://www.mouselabweg.org.
Williamson, J., Ranyard, R., & Cuthbert, L. (2000). A conversation-based process tracing method
foruse with naturalistic decisions: An evaluation study. British Journal of Psychology, 91,
203–221.
Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D. J., Schooler, J., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Intro-
specting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 60, 181–192.
Wright, P., & Barbour, F. (1977). Phased decision strategies: Sequels to an initial screening.
(Research Paper No. 353). Stanford, CA: Standford University, Graduate School of Business.
Xiao, B., & Benbasat, I. (2007). E-commerce product recommendation agents: Use, characteristics,
and impact. MIS Quarterly, 31, 137–209.
Yoon, K. P., & Hwang, C. L. (1995). Multiple attribute decision making: An introduction. Sage
University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-104. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Zachary, W. W. (1988). Decision support systems: Designing to extend the cognitive limits. In
M. Helander (Ed.), Handbook of human-computer interaction. Amsterdam, The Netherlands:
Elsevier.
Zack, M. H. (1993). Interactivity and communication mode choice in ongoing management groups.
Information Systems Research, 4, 207–239.
126 References
Appendix A
Questionnaire items
A.1 Usability questionnaire
The questionnaire’s instructions and items are as follows:
This questionnaire gives you an opportunity to tell us our reactions to the system you used.
Your responses will help us understand what aspects of the system you are particularly con-
cerned about and the aspects that satisfy you. To as great degree as possible, think about all the
tasks that you have done with the system while you answer these questions. Please read each
statement and indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement by circling a
number on the scale. If a statement does not apply to you, circle N/A. Please write comments
to elaborate on your answers. Thank you!
The items were presented in the following format:
1. Overall, I am satisfied with how easy it is to use this system.
strongly strongly
disagree agree
← −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− →
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A
Comments:
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Items:
1. Overall, I am satisfied with how easy it is to use this system.
2. The system was too simple (i.e., too rigid) vs. the system was too complex (i.e., too
many functions/steps).∗‡
3. I was able to make my choice quickly using this system.
4. I was able to efficiently choose a phone/camera using this system.
5. I felt comfortable using this system.
6. It was easy to learn to use this system.
7. I would have appreciated getting more error messages when I ran into problems.∗
8. Whenever I made a mistake using the system, I could recover easily and quickly.
9. The information (such as on-line help, on-screen messages, and other documentation)
provided with this system was enough.
10. It was easy to find the information about the phones/cameras that I needed.
11. The organization of information on the system screens was clear.∗
12. The interface of this system was pleasant.
Note. The interface includes those items that you use to interact with the system. For example,
some components of the interface are the keyboard, the mouse, and the screens (including their
use of graphics and their language).
13. I liked using the interface of this system.
14. This system has all the functions and capabilities I expect to have.
15. Overall, I am satisfied with the system.
16. I am confident that I made a good choice, that is, I chose a phone/camera that will
satisfy me.†
17. It was easy to find the product I want.†
∗Item adapted to the task
† Additional item
‡ Scale from –3 (“too simple) to +3 (“too complex)
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A.2 Comparison questionnaire
The questionnaire’s instructions and items are as follows:
This questionnaire gives you an opportunity to tell us how you rate the three prototypes you
just used in comparison to each other. For each of the five dimensions, locate each prototpye
(with the corresponding number) on the line between “low” and “high.” You can also add
comments, if you wish.
The items were presented in the following format:
1. Understandability (i.e., it was easy to understand how the system works)
low ← −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− → high
Comments:
Items:
1. Understandability (i.e., it was easy to understand how the system works)
2. Ease of use (the system was easy to use)
3. Ease of reducing the full set of products to a subset of particularly interesting products
(i.e., I could quickly exclude unattractive phones/cameras from my choice set)
4. Ease of comparison of products (i.e., it was easy to compare the different phones/cameras
to each other)
5. Confidence that I have made a good choice (i.e., that I chose a phone/camera that will
satisfy me).
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A.3 Semi-structured interview
Some or all of the following questions were asked, the order was not determined. The items
were the following.
General questions:
1. Would you use Prototype X (say number) if it existed? (yes/no)
(a) How frequently?
(b) For which products?
(c) Would you pay to use this service? (yes/no)
2. Would you make use of the possibility to create own attributes? (yes/no)
3. Would you like to have an attribute, which represents the rating by a known review
site/journal? (yes/no)
4. Did the interface help you to choose the way you like to choose? (yes/no)
5. Did the way you normally choose change due to the architecture of the system? (yes/no)
6. Do you think you detected and explored all possibilites of the system, or would you
benefit from the instruction of an expert? (On a scale from 1 – 7, where 1 is much profit
from an instruction and 7 is few profit from an instruction)
7. How complex do you find the system on a scale from 1 – 7, where 1 is not complex at
all and 7 is very complex?
8. Would you recommend Prototype X (say number) it to others? If yes, to whom?
(yes/no)
9. Do you think that most people would learn to use this system very quickly? (yes/no)
10. What problems do you see with this system?
11. Based on what you have seen, how should a fourth prototype look like? In particular,
if you were to construct a new prototype, would you use one of the three prototypes as
a starting point or would you rather start from scratch?
Specific questions:
1. Did you understand the meaning of the rulers/buttons? (yes/no)
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2. Did you detect the pictures of the products in the comments? (yes/no)
3. Did you detect the links to the complete descriptions of the products? (yes/no)
4. Did you understand the meaning of the importance factor? (yes/no)
5. Did you understand the meaning of the “negative attributes”? (yes/no)
6. Did you understand the meaning of the overall values/ranks? (yes/no)
7. Did you (1) use the relative information and did you (2) find it helpful? (yes/no)
8. Did you (1) see the buttons labeled all / clear / typical? Did you (2) use them?(yes/no)
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Appendix B
Stimuli
B.1 Experiments 1 & 2
Table B.1: Stimuli used in Experiments 1 & 2
Mobile Phones
Attribute 1 2 3 4
1a Image∗ see Figure B.3
1b Phone Name† Samsung SGH-D357 Samsung SGH-Z500 Samsung SPH-A940 Samsung SGH-T309
2 Band Support tri-band tri-band dual-band tri-band
3 Bluetooth YES YES YES NO
4 Color White Black or silver Silver Black
5 Connectivity (USB) NO YES NO NO
6 Email Support (POP3+IMAP4) YES YES YES YES
7 External LCD Display 96x64, 4 colors 80x64, 65k colors 96x96, 65k colors 96x96, 4 colors
8 External Memory NO up to 256 MB up to 256 MB NO
9 GPRS YES YES YES YES
10 Infrared NO YES NO NO
11 Integrated Digital Camera NO 1 Mpixel 1.3 Mpixel 0.3 Mpixel
12 Integrated Speakerphone YES YES YES YES
13 Internal Display 128x160, 65k colors 176x220, 262k colors 176x220, 262k colors 128x160, 65k colors
14 Internal Memory NO 50 MB 60 MB NO
15 Java Games YES YES YES YES
16 MMS (Photos+Text+Sound) YES YES YES YES
17 MP3 player NO YES YES YES
18 Office© NO NO NO NO
19 Price 165 € 300 € 330 € 150 €
20 Size 86x45x25 mm 89x44.5x24.5 mm 93x46x26 mm 94x48x25 mm
21 SMS YES YES YES YES
22 Speech Recording NO YES NO NO
23 Stand-by Time 200h 260h 293h 216h
24 Stereo FM NO NO NO NO
25 Talk Time 5h 3.4h 4h 4.5h
26 UMTS(3G) Compatibility NO YES NO NO
27 VibraCall Alert YES YES YES YES
28 Video Playback with Sound NO YES YES YES
29 Video Streaming NO NO NO NO
30 Voice Command NO NO YES YES
31 WAP YES YES YES YES
32 Weight 100g 95g 139g 85g
33 Windows© Mobile NO NO NO NO
∗ used only in Experiment 1 table continued on next page
† used only in Experiment 2
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Figure B.1: Images of the mobile phones used in Experiment 1 (in alphabetical order)
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B.2 Experiment 3
Table B.2: Stimuli used in Experiment 3: a) Mobile phones
Mobile Phones
Attribute Samsung SGH-G600 Samsung SGH-M110 Samsung SGH-F700 Samsung SGH-G800 Samsung SGH-U700
1 Price 249 CHF 1 CHF 359 CHF 359 CHF 149 CHF
2 Size 101 x 47.8 x 14.9 mm 109 x 48 x 17.9 mm 112 x 56 x 15.9 mm 103 x 51 x 17 mm 103 x 50 x 12.1 mm
3 Weight 104 g 95 g 139 g 139 g 86 g
4 Standby 300 h 400 h 300 h 370 h 270 h
5 Talk time 3.5 h 8 h 4.5 h 8.7 h 5 h
6 Camera 5 Mpixel 0.3 Mpixel 3.15 Mpixel 5 Mpixel 3.2 Mpixel
7 Music Player Yes No Yes Yes Yes
8 Internal Memory 55 MB 2 MB 100 MB 160 MB 42 MB
9 Display 240 x 320 Pixel 128 x 128 Pixel 240 x 440 Pixel 240 x 320 Pixel 240 x 320 Pixel
10 Band Support Quad-band Dual-band Tri-band Tri-band Quad-band
11 Email Yes No Yes Yes No
12 Active Sync No No No No No
13 LiveTV Yes No No Yes No
14 WLAN No No No No No
15 Infrared No No No No No
16 Bluetooth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
17 USB Yes No Yes Yes Yes
18 UMTS No No No Yes Yes
19 GPRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
20 EDGE Yes No Yes No Yes
21 HSDPA No No Yes No Yes
22 SAR 0.56 W/kg 0.29 W/kg 0.07 W/kg 0.221 W/kg 0.82 W/kg
23 Customer Rating∗ 4.5 (10) 2.5 (2) 5 (1) 3.5 (15) 3 (51)
∗available only in the LowF prototype; the scale ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high); table continued on next page
the numbers in brackets indicate the number of customers who rated this product
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158 APPENDIX B. STIMULI
HTC S730 Sony Ericsson W960i HTC Touch Dual HTC TouchCruise HTC TyTN II LG KF 600
LG KU990 Viewty Motorola KRZR K1 Motorola MOTO Q9h Motorola RAZR V8 Motorola RAZR2 V8 Nokia 3110
Nokia 5310 Xpress Nokia 5610 Xpress M Nokia 5700 Xpress Nokia 6110 Nokia 6120 Classic Nokia 6267
Nokia 6300 Nokia 6500 Classic Nokia 6500 Slide Nokia 8600 Luna Nokia 8800 Arte Nokia E90 Comm
Nokia N73 Nokia N81 SD 2GB Nokia N82 2GB Nokia N95 Nokia N95 8GB Sagem my850C
Samsung SGH-F700 Samsung SGH-G600 Samsung SGH-G800 Samsung SGH-M110 Samsung SGH-U700 Sonim XP1
Sony Ericsson K770i Sony Ericsson K810i Sony Ericsson K850i Sony Ericsson P1i Sony Ericsson T650i Sony Ericsson W580i
Sony Ericsson W880i Sony Ericsson W890i Sony Ericsson W910i
Figure B.2: Images of the mobile phones used in Experiment 3 (in alphabetical order)
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Canon Canon Canon Canon Canon Canon
A 720 IS Ixus 70 IXUS 75 IXUS 860 IS PowerShot A560 PowerShot S5 IS
Canon Casio Casio Casio Casio Casio
PowerShot SX100 IS Exilim EX-S880 EXILIM EX-V7 Exilim EX-Z75 Exilim EX-Z80 Exilim EX-Z1080
Fujifilm Fujifilm Fujifilm Fujifilm Kodak Kodak
FinePix F50fd FinePix F480 Zoom FinePix S5700 FinePix S8000fd C613 V1273
Kodak Kodak Nikon Nikon Nikon Nikon
Z710 Z712 Coolpix L16 Coolpix P50 Coolpix S51 Coolpix S200
Nikon Olympus Olympus Olympus Olympus Panasonic
Coolpix S550 SP-510 UZ SP-560 UZ µ 770 SW µ 1030 SW Lumix DMC-FX55
Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic Samsung
Lumix DMC-FZ18 Lumix DMC-FZ50 Lumix DMC-TZ2 Lumix DMC-TZ3 Lumix DMC-TZ5 L730
Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Sony Sony
L830 NV15 S85 S860 DSC-H3 DSC-H9
Sony Sony Sony
DSC-T2 DSC-T50 DSC-W55
Figure B.3: Images of the digital cameras used in Experiment 3 (in alphabetical order)
